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POLITICAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE
WORLD COURT, WITH REFERENCE TO
UNITED STATES COURTS
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER*
Nobody seems to argue that the political branches of the United
States government should refrain from taking any action that might
embarrass the courts in their administration of justice. Yet the political
question doctrine that counsels judicial abstention in international
cases routinely embarrasses our constitutional system in the quixotic
interest of keeping its powers meticulously separated.' Perhaps we
should take a cue from the Dalai Lama: "Always keep in mind," he pronounced on arriving in Taiwan recently, "that any activities of mine
should not bring any embarrassment to anybody." 2 If only a simple disclaimer of this sort would relieve the courts of their fear of doing something embarrassing to the political branches of the government! After
all, how is it possible to embarrass the very branches of government
3
that produced the Helms-Burton legislation?
The political question doctrine ultimately relies on principles of
democracy. Those principles provide a justification, though a deceptively simple one, for courts to shun rulings on international issues that
might complicate the essentially political conduct of foreign relations.
That is the theory. In reality, however, the doctrine may be understood
to be a technique of judicial management; a means of weeding out controversial cases. The courts understandably seek refuge in the separation of powers as they face more complicated disputes with fewer resources. Better yet, why not a divorce of powers rather than a mere

* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. This
article is based on the author's remarks at a conference on 'The Celebration of 50 Years of
the International Court of Justice" held at the University of Denver College of Law, April
18, 1997.
1. The classic statement of this doctrine, rooted in the separation of constitutional
powers, is found in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Seth Faison, Dalai Lama in Taiwan to China's Dismay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1997, at 4.
3. The controversial Helms-Burton legislation signed into law by President Clinton
extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply sanctions against "traffickers" in property of
United States nationals that was confiscated by the Cuban government of Fidel Castro
and excludes such "traffickers" from admission into U.S. territory. Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.S. § 6021 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997).
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separation? The problem, of course, is that the political branches are
uncertain whether they want to gain full custody over transnational
dispute resolution, leaving the courts with only occasional visiting
rights.
A related issue involves the choice of international law as a rule of
decision. Although the Supreme Court has confirmed that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law,"4 debate continues on the meaning of that statement. For example, one recent "argument for what its
authors candidly call "political branch hegemony" 5 would require specific Congressional authorization for the courts to apply customary international law as federal law. The philosophical premise for such a
surprising interpretation of the Constitution seems to be that legislative intervention generally enhances democratic values. Let the people
speak! Public choice theory has, however, challenged pat assumptions
about a close identification between the legislative process and the fulfillment of democratic values. 6 Technically, the political hegemony argument is based on an expansive reading of the Erie doctrine 7 and a
narrow reading of other Supreme Court law, rather than on separationof-powers doctrine. Its correlation with political question etiquette is
nevertheless evident.
I.

A.

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF "LEGAL DISPUTES" BEFORE THE
WORLD COURT

A FunctionalApproach

The World Court's8 sharply contrasting model of adjudication recognizes that virtually every claim before it is bound to have political

4. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
See generally Jordan Paust,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 6-8 (1996).
5. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 861, 871
(1997).
6. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987); Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1996); Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 490 (1996).
7. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (interpreting the Federal Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652 (1994), requiring a federal court hearing a case on the basis of
diversity of citizenship to apply the substantive law of the state in which the court is sitting). On Erie and the relationship between state courts and international law, see James
A.R. Nafziger, State Law in InternationalCases, 84 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 333 (1990);
James A.R. Nafziger, Resolving InternationalConflict of Laws by Federal and State Law,
2 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 67 (1990).
8. The generic term "World Court" is used to refer to the current International Court
of Justice and its predecessor tribunal during the League of Nations period, the Permanent Court of International Justice.
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implications. 9 Indeed, the Court is at its best when it is resolving political disputes. For example, the first phase of the Lockerbie'° case confirmed the Court's customary presumption of justiciability despite the
highly charged political context in which the case arose. A legal dispute,
as that term appears in Article 36(3) of the United Nations Charter," is
therefore defined not by the nature of the dispute, but by the process for
best resolving particular issues. The political-legal distinction, to the
extent it exists at all, is therefore functional, not philosophical or hierarchical. 12 The Court has therefore refrained from characterizing a particular dispute as essentially "political" or "legal." It acknowledges that
to do so might be a preface to inaction.
The United Nations Charter itself contemplates a concurrent jurisdiction between an active Court and the so-called political organs. 13 The
Charter thereby reinforces a functional distinction between the respective roles of the Court and the political organs in pursuing a common
purpose of peacefully settling disputes. 14 The Security Council serves as
a source of decisions and norms, as well as the chosen instrument for
enforcement of the Court's decisions.' 5 The question is really how best

9. Edward Gordon, Discretion to Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction,81 AM. J. INT'L. L.
129, 133 (1987).
10. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K; Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 3
(Provisional Measures Orders of Apr. 14) [hereinafter Lockerbie]. For an excellent discussion of these points, see Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM.

J. INT'L L. 643 (1994).
11. In demarcating the Security Council's powers, Article 36 para. 3 states that 'legal
disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of
Justice." U.N. CHARTER art. 36(3). On the non-technical, generic character of references
to the term "disputes" in the Charter and Statute of the Court, see Edward Gordon, "Legal Disputes" Under Article 36(2) of the Statute, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT A CROSSROADS 183 (L.F. Damrosch ed. 1987).
12. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerationsand the InternationalJudicial
Process, 17 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 58, 61, 74 (1968) ("A dispute is a legal dispute if it is to be
settled by the application of legal norms, that is to say, by the application of existing
law.') (quoting HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 526 (R.W. Tucker, 2d.
rev. ed. 1966).
13. Art. 35(1) enables any member to bring to the attention of the Security Council or
General Assembly any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or
give rise to a dispute. U.N. CHARTER art. 35 para. 1. Article 96 enables United Nations
organs and specialized agencies to request advisory opinions from the World Court on any
legal question. Id. at art. 96. Concurrently, the Statute of the Court establishes the jurisdiction of the Court over all cases that parties refer to it, and to all matters that the
Charter and international agreements specially provide. I.C.J. Statute, art. 36(1).
14. It is therefore "impossible to say that the World Court should not hear cases
merely because the Council is involved." Jos6 Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1996).
15. U.N. Charter art. 94 para. 2 provides that,
[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:5

to allocate the powers of coordinate organs to avoid further tensions resulting from a dispute. As Wilfred Jenks observed in the very year of
the Sabbatino16 decision:
[T]here will now be a wide measure of agreement (1)
that there are no technical limitations to the possibility
of determining judicially every international controversy
but (2) that this is not the heart of the matter, the essence of the problem being that a judicial determination
on the basis of the existing law may aggravate rather
17
than eliminate the difficulty.
Despite this risk, the Court's review of political action by the Security Council is likely to enlarge as the Council produces more legal
norms for the Court to interpret and apply.
The Court's expanded docket since the end of the Cold War may or
may not reflect a durable trend in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Similar surges in the Court's agenda immediately following the two
World Wars should make us cautious about reading too much into the
trend. Of particular significance is the greater use of the Court to resolve or help resolve serious political disputes. Although it is difficult to
be optimistic about the Court's centrality in international dispute resolution, it does seem that states are more inclined today to view adjudication as a worthwhile step in the political process and to conceptualize
18
important issues in legal terms.
The end of the Cold War eliminated a powerful incentive for states
to pursue adjudication cynically as a tool to shame each other. Today
their motivation is more likely to be either an honest commitment to
the judicial settlement of a dispute or a use of adjudication to leverage a
settlement by alternative dispute resolution. The Great Belt,19 Nauru20
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide measures to be taken to give effect
to the judgment.
U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para.2.
16. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Supreme Court
stated that the act of state doctrine is a rule of federal common law that operates "[i]n ordering our relationships with other members of the international community." Id. at 425.
Therefore, the court held that the Judicial Branch would not examine the validity of a
Cuban act expropriating property "[iun the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law." Id. at 428. The exact meaning of the
phrase "other unambiguous agreement" is unclear, but may be reasonably interpreted to
refer to international custom and general principles of international law.
17. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 16 (1964).

18. These points are convincingly developed in Gary L. Scott, et al., Recent Activity
Before the InternationalCourt of Justice,3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1996).
19. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
20. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (Preliminary Objections Order of June 26) [hereinafter Nauru]. The terms of settlement of the
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and Persian Gulf Aerial Incident2 l cases illustrate the leveraging strategy.
B.

The Nuclear Weapons Case

Nuclear Weapons 22 fits the paradigm of political dispute resolution
by the Court. The Court confirmed that "[t]he fact that this question
also has political aspects, as, in the nature of things, is the case with so
many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a 'legal question'. ... "23 Several states, arguing against the Court's competence to hear the dispute, had claimed
that neither the World Health Organization ("WHO") nor the General
Assembly were authorized to request an advisory opinion because neither was itself competent to address the legality of nuclear weapons in
the first instance and both institutions had been politically motivated in
making their requests. Although the Court denied the WHO request, it
observed in both cases that "[t]he political nature of the motives which
may be said to have inspired the request and the political implications
that the opinion given might have are of no relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion."24 Other recent decisions to the same effect include Aegean Sea Continental Shelf,25 Hos27
and Lockerbie.28
tages,26 Nicaragua,
The Court's advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons is a mixture of
judicial activism and restraint. 29 On one hand, the Court agreed to re-

dispute are summarized at 32 I.L.M. 1471 (1993).
21. Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 9 (Feb.
22).
22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. The Court agreed to issue an advisory opinion to the
General Assembly; however, on the same day, the Court denied a request by the World
Health Organization (WHO) for a similar advisory opinion. Legality of the Use by a State
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. (July 8) [hereinafter WHO Request].
23. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 22, para. 13; WHO Request, supra note 22, para.
16.
24. Id.
25. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Interim Protection
Order of Sept. 11) [hereinafter Aegean Sea Continental Shell].
26. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
3 (May 24) [hereinafter Hostages].
27. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Order of Nov. 26) [herein-

after Nicaragua].
28. Gordon, supra note 9.
29. See THOMAS J. BODIE, POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN ACTIVIsT
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1995) (analyzes justiciability in international litigation, concluding that after 1966 the World Court became more activist). This article
draws upon the author's review of the book. James A.R. Nafziger, Book Review, 21 LEGAL
STUD. F. 129 (1997).
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view the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion on
whether international law permits the threat or use of nuclear weapons.3 0 On the other hand, the Court refused to review the similar request by the WHO that emphasized the detrimental health and envi3
ronmental effects of a nuclear explosion. 1
The Court's dispositif in Nuclear Weapons reflects the same mixture of activism and restraint. The Court first decided that international law neither authorizes nor prohibits the use or threat of nuclear
weapons, although such activity would at least have to conform to the
requirements of the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law. 32 By a 7-7 vote, however, the Court found itself unable to
"[c]onclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake."33 The Court thereby left
unresolved the issue of whether self-defense, in extreme circumstances,
could ever be permitted to trump the prohibitions, under international
humanitarian law, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
The Court unanimously concluded that an effective international
solution to the problem of nuclear weapons should be left to the political
process of nuclear disarmament. 34 This should not be interpreted as an
international version of the political question doctrine. Instead, the
Court's encouragement of disarmament negotiations represented its
customary deference to the political process for implementation of its
decisions, doubtlessly strengthened by the political stakes involved in
the Nuclear Weapons case.
More importantly, this kind of a diplomatic denouement reflects
and yet transcends the simple wisdom first articulated in Haya de la
Torre35; that the details for carrying out the Court's judgments are to be
entrusted to politics and political institutions. 36 The political-legal distinction is clearly functional.
As Judge Schwebel so boldly began his dissenting opinion with an

30. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 22, at para. 105.
31. WHO Request, supra note 22, at para. 22.
32. Id. at paras. 63, 65-67, 86, 89.
33. Id. at para. 105(2)E.
34. Id. at paras. 99-100. The political exit on the issue of disarmament is reasonable,
for "[ilt [would be] unrealistic to expect the International Court of Justice to solve this
immense problem by means of an advisory opinion in reply to a vigorously contested request that consisted of a mere fifteen words. Its final resolution will more likely be
brought about by political compromise." Peter H. Bekker, InternationalDecision: Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 132-33
(1997).
35. Haya de la Torre (Colom.v. Peru) 1951 I.C.J. 71 (June 13) [hereinafter Haya de la
Torre].
36. See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 151 (2d ed. 1991).
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emphasis3 7 a half century of reliance by the global community on nuclear deterrence, "[miore than any case in the history of this Court, this
proceeding presents a titanic tension between State practice and legal
principle." 38 A definition of state practice and hence international custom is, however, complicated. The expectations of the nuclear powers
must be viewed in the light of the growing antinuclear consensus of the
global community in recent years. 39 In any event, the interests of both
nuclear and non-nuclear states will have to be expressed fully in the
political give-and-take of disarmament. An ongoing political tradeoff between nuclear and non-nuclear states is, after all, the premise 40 of the
entire non-proliferation regime.
C. A Balance Between JudicialActivism and Restraint

The Nuclear Weapons decision was not so much a product of judicial activism, as it was an example of the Court's characteristic respect
for its special role in the United Nations regime of conflict management.
The Court's recent record reflects a mixture of activism and restraint.
The Court has broadly construed its jurisdiction in Nauru4 1 and QatarBahrain;42 however, in East Timor,43 the Court refused to allow what it
found to be the erga omnes character of a right to self-determination to
overcome a narrow reading of its jurisdiction. Thus, the Court refused
to hear Portugal's claim protesting an agreement between Australia
and Indonesia on delimitation of waters around East Timor. Also, East
Timor's narrow construction of the necessary party rule in Monetary
Gold 44 further challenges any assumption that the Court is bent on progressive change. To the contrary, the Court's timorous decision recalls
all too ironically the very name of the disputed territory. Similarly, the
Court's refusal, however reasonable or appropriate, to explore the environmental implications of underground nuclear testing in Nuclear Tests

37. Haya de la Torre, supra note 35 (Schwebel, dissenting).
38. Id. at 836.
39. See Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, InternationalLaw and the World Court: A
Historic Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1997) (noting an antinuclear consensus among
United Nations members).
40. Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, art. 6, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
41. See Nauru, supra note 20.
42. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 15) [hereinafter Qatar-Bahrain].
43. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30) [hereinafter East Timor].
44. Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15)
[hereinafter Monetary Gold].
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I145 cannot be counted as a blow for activism. In that respect, the Nuclear Weapons opinion adopts a more progressive approach by addressing the role of environmental considerations in the law governing military action. Both Nuclear Tests H and Nuclear Weapons reflect the
Court's inability to draw precise conclusions from the law that the
opinions establish.
In Nuclear Weapons, the Court's restraint produced a non liquet,
but that is not the same as an abdication of judicial responsibility. Legal indeterminacy does not in itself require judicial abstention. For example, the numerous maritime boundary disputes attest to the Court's
willingness to adjudicate in the face of indeterminacy, 46 even in contentious proceedings. This seems even more appropriate in advisory cases.
As Judge Vereschchetin noted, procedures in advisory proceedings, unlike contentious proceedings, do not presuppose a seamless web of legal
authority. In his words:
Even had the Court been asked to fill the gaps, it would
have had to refuse to assume the burden of lawcreation, which in general should not be the function of
the Court. In advisory procedure, where the Court finds
a lacuna in the law or finds the law to be imperfect, it
ought merely to state this without trying to fill the lacuna or improve the law by way of judicial legislation....
In my view, the case in hand presents a good example of an instance where the absolute clarity of the Opinion would be "deceptive"
and where on the other hand, its partial "apparent indecision" may
47
prove useful "as a guide to action".
The non-liquet issue highlights the foundations of a political-legal
distinction that the Court has consistently rejected. A venerable academic doctrine derived from the writings of Vattel and eventually
couched in terms of justiciability would have confined the definition of
international legal disputes to those that are capable of resolution by
applying international law and those that do not affect the vital inter45. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J.
288 (Sept. 22) [hereinafter Nuclear Tests II].
46. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 17.
47. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 22, at 833 (separate opinion of Judge
Vereschchetin). In Judge Vereschchetin's words,
The Court cannot be blamed for indecisiveness or evasiveness where
the law, upon which it is called to pronounce, is itself inconclusive.
Even less warranted would be any allegation of the Court's indecisiveness or evasiveness in this particular Opinion, which gives an unequivocal, albeit non-exhaustive, answer to the question put to the
Court.
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ests of states. 48 By contrast, other disputes are "political."
The Court's denial of standing to Ethiopia and Liberia in its infamous South West Africa Phase Two 49 decision was said to be a case in
point. Generally, the World Court has rejected the venerable doctrine to
determine its competence.50 "[T]he distinction between legal and political disputes.., has no validity as an abstract proposition of law, despite its real importance as a matter of practical politics."51 Nonjusticiability has generally been a matter of propriety rather than an
acknowledgment that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a particular
dispute.5 2 A salient exception from the Court's first decade was the Free
Zones case, 53 in which the Court refused to address economic issues left
unresolved by agreement between France and Switzerland.
In Hostages,5 4 the Court clearly emphasized its paramount role in
the peaceful resolution of international disputes, even though the legal
dispute over Iran's continued detention of American diplomatic staff
members was only one aspect of a larger, essentially political dispute
between the two countries.5 5 In Nicaragua,56 the concurrent Contadora
process for restoring peace to Central America provided no basis for
suspending or discontinuing the Court's examination of some of the
same issues. The choice of one method of dispute resolution does not
exclude all others. 57 Although to some extent international Arbitral
bodies have followed the same rule, as in the Air Services Award5 8 case
between the United States and France, their competence ordinarily has
been more strictly confined to technical, so-called "justiciable" or "legal"

48. BODIE, supra note 29, at 7.
49. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Mr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Second Phase,
Judgment of July 18) [hereinafter South West Africa Phase Two].
50. I.C.J. Statute, art. 36.
51. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 94
(1965).
52. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 10, at 652.
53. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22
[hereinafter Free Zones].
54. See Hostages, supranote 26.
55.[Llegal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are
likely to occur in political contexts and often form only one element in
a wider and long-standing political dispute between the States concerned. Yet never [before] has the view been put forward 0 that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a
political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the
legal questions at issue between them.
Id. at 20.
56. See Nicaragua,supra note 27.
57. The Charter does not adopt this principle (una via selecta, non datur recursus ad
alteram). SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 238
(4th rev. ed. 1989).
58. Air Services Arbitral Award (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (1978) [hereinafter Air
Services Award].
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issues. 59
It is tempting to link the political-legal distinction, to the extent it
is influential, with principles of domestic jurisdiction, in other words,
the reserved domain of states. Accordingly, characterization of an issue
as "political" would be tantamount to recognizing a state claim of exclusive "domestic jurisdiction" over it. The World Court has generally ignored this invitation to sloth. Instead, its famous dictum in TunisMorocco Nationality Decrees became the benchmark of a more dynamic
survey of the reserved domain: "Whether a certain matter is or is not
solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative ques60
tion; it depends on the development of international relations."
II.

COOPERATIVE ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE COURT AND

THE POLITICAL ORGANS

Despite the Court's record of political dispute resolution, its competence is limited to "legal disputes" 6 1 (italics added). Its rejection of an
all-or-nothing doctrine of abstention from political issues does not imply
unlimited powers of judicial review. An appropriate formula for allocating functions between the Court and the political organs remains
elusive. During the Cold War, the Court and the Security Council overcame the latent constitutional and jurisdictional conflicts between them
62
by practicing cooperation out of necessity.
The end of the Cold War and the expansion of the Court's docket
has exacerbated the latent conflicts between the Court and the Security
Council. Although one organ is labeled "political," and the other "judicial," both organs must concurrently act to protect international peace
and security. Lockerbie confirmed that "[b]oth organs can ... perform
their separate but complementary functions with respect to the same
effects," 63 but the boundaries are uncertain in a political-legal dispute
where the Court is called upon to evaluate the merits of Security Council action. Judge Shahabudeen's exasperation rings in our ears:
Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the
equilibrium of forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations
within the evolving international order, is there any conceivable point
beyond which a legal issue may properly arise as to the competence of
the Security Council to produce such overriding results? If there are

59. See BODIE, supra note 29, at 21; MANLEY
PAST AND FUTURE 241 (1944).

0.

HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

60. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at
24.

61. See supra note 10.
62. See W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis in the United Nations, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 83, 84 (1993).
63. Lockerbie, supra note 10, at 22, 141.
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any limits, what are those limits and what body, if other than the Secu64
rity Council, is competent to say what those limits are?
Because the United Nations is not a system of checks and balances,
its organs have the capacity to coordinate a mutually satisfactory allocation of powers. The Court and the political organs should therefore
seek to coordinate their spheres of authority. Instead of awaiting a judicial formula to allocate powers, the World Court and the political organs
of the United Nations should work together to develop different standards of review depending on the posture and type of issue presented to
the Court.
65
Levels of scrutiny applied by domestic courts might be instructive.
For example, an abuse-of-discretion standard might be more appropriate to the highly sensitive issues in contentious cases involving Security
Council actions under Chapter VII. On the other hand, advisory opinions on General Assembly resolutions might warrant a less deferential
standard of review.
Questions occasionally arise about the proper exercise of executive
or administrative discretion. Domestic practice might be helpful in defining standards for reviewing the Secretary General's discretionary
powers, as well as the U.N. family's administrative decisions. For example, the Chevron standard 66 requires United States courts to accept
an agency's reasonable interpretation of the law if the agency is the
chosen instrument of implementation. To avoid indeterminacy in the
law, a court must ascertain whether there has been a clear legislative
pronouncement on the precise question at issue. If so, it is binding and
the agency's views are irrelevant. If, however, the legislative intent
cannot be easily discerned, Chevron counsels a judicial deference to a
reasonable or permissible resolution by the agency of legislative uncertainty or ambiguity. 67 Such an approach to judicial review would emphasize a functional rather than purely formal allocation of powers
within the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
III. CONCLUSION
The image of the International Court of Justice as a sort of lemonade stand dispensing occasional decisions to sovereign passersby is no
longer apt. Of course, the Court's docket of a dozen or so cases would
certainly be the envy of a county court. Nevertheless, even having more
than one or two cases before it indicates the Court's expanded role
64. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Shahabudeen).
65. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 26.
66. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
67. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Judicial Review of Agency Legal Determinations
in Asylum Cases, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 773, 781 (1992).
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during the past decade in resolving significant disputes. To be sure,
several of the cases have covered the same waterfront of maritime delimitation. A more ambitious agenda is apparent, however. The Nuclear
Weapons, Bosnia and Lockerbie cases, in particular, have touched the
sensitive nerves of legal indeterminacy, powers of judicial review and
functional parallelism among United Nations organs.
The political question etiquette that has handicapped judicial decision-making in the United States has no place in the global system. It
operates, and poorly at that, only in a system of checks and balances,
similar to that of Marbury v. Madison.68 Even then, bully legislation
such as the Helms-Burton Act directed against Cuba strains the separation-of-powers rationale of the doctrine in transnational dispute
resolution.
Though the World Court is free of both Vattel and Fidel, it needs to
clarify an appropriate allocation of powers between organs with concurrent jurisdiction. It can do so without sacrificing its judicial independence by working with the Security Council and perhaps the General Assembly to define appropriate standards of review. The experience of
national courts, including those of the United States, will be instructive.
We have much to learn from each other in the global family of institutions, and it is in everyone's interest to avoid a troubled marriage between the principal partners within the United Nations family.

68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). But see Michael J. Glennon, Protectingthe Court's Institutional Interests: Why Not the Marbury Approach?, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1987) (suggesting that the Court in the Nicaraguacase should have considered Marbury as a model for
confirming its powers of review while refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the sensitive
issues in the case).

DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
JORDAN J. PAUST*
Over fifty years ago, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) was
created to provide advisory opinions for various U.N. entities and to
decide certain state-to-state disputes.' Advisory opinions, as the phrase
suggests, were to be merely advisory; 2 and under Article 59 of the
Statute of the I.C.J., even a decision of the Court concerning state-tostate complaints was to have "no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case." 3 As text-writers affirm,
the formal preclusion of stare decisis with respect to decisions of the
Court "and the relegation of judicial decisions generally to a 'subsidiary
status' [concerning the sources and evidences of international law4]
5
reflect the reluctance of states to accord courts.. .a law-making role."
Nonetheless, decisions and advisory opinions of the International
Court of Justice have generally been widely received as authoritative
explications of international law. 6 Buttressed by cautious attention to
*Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston; Edward Ball Eminent Scholar
Chair in International Law, Florida State University.
1. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. arts. 34, 36, 59-60, 65; U.N. CHARTER art. 96;
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903.1 & 903.2
cmts. a & h, reporters' notes 10 & 12 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 65; U.N. CHARTER art. 96; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 903.2 cmt. h, reporters' note 12; MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE-THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 128 (1981) (quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. 150); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 721
(1990); COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 70 (4th ed. 1995);
DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCESS 247-48 (1992).
3. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 59; see also McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 2,
at 1536-38 (indicating that some national courts do not automatically enforce I.C.J.
judgments, but treat them like foreign judgments); U.N. CHARTER art. 94 (noting that
there is a duty "to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party'); President of the I.C.J. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by
National Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 21, 25-26 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds.,
1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS].
4. See STATUTE OF THE 1.C.J. art. 38.1(d).
5. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (1993); NEWMAN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 722.
6. See, e.g., HENKIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 120-21; NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at
722; PARTAN, supra note 2, at 3; Bedjaoui, supra note 3, at 26-35 (regarding effects and
"reception" of I.C.J. decisions and opinions); Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox,
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the Court's authority and patterns of opinio juris they help to shape,
decisions and advisory opinions have acquired a functional significance
far beyond what printed constitutive articles might have allowed.
Indeed, despite formal abhorrence of stare decisis, the Court, as nearly
any other, has dared to cite itself and has often incorporated the
7
reasoning from other cases by reference.
This growth in authority and influence is generally recognized, 8 but
the decision of the United States in 1985 to withdraw from the general
jurisdictional competence of the Court 9 must partly hamper such
developments. Also inhibiting the development are a series of U.S.
reservations to human rights treaties. With respect to I.C.J.
adjudication of issues arising out of such a treaty, a typical U.S.
reservation declares that the U.S. will agree to I.C.J. jurisdiction if, at
some future time, the U.S. actually does agree.10 Such a reservation
relegates the role of the Court to an ad hoc adjudicatory process
whenever the United States is involved, and it is partly self-defeating
for the United States. Given the decision of the Court in the Case of
Certain Norwegian Loans," the U.S. reservations may preclude use of
Introduction: Transnational Judicial Synergy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 3, at 6-7; Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, Effect of the
Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt of Justiceon National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 3, at 338, 343, 345-69; Christoph
Schreuer, The Authority of InternationalJudicialPractice in Domestic Courts, 23 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 681 (1974); Egon Schwelb, The InternationalCourt of Justice and the Human
Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 350-51 (1972). For use of I.C.J.
decisions in other countries, see, e.g., Bedjaoui, supra note 3, at 30-35; Jochen Frowein,
remarks, panel on International Law in Domestic Legal Orders: A Comparative
Perspective, 91 AM. SOC. INT'L L., 56 (1997); Yuji Iwasawa, remarks, id. Cf. McDOUGAL &
REISMAN, supra note 2, at 78 & n.* (stating that Article 38 of the STATUTE OF THE I.C.J.
does not fully portray realistic roles), 103 (identifying the actual authority of U.N.
entities), 142-44 (indicating the growth of the expansive authority of I. C.J.).
7. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903, reporters' note 8; BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1995); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 5,
at 121; NEWMAN ET AL.., supra note 6, at 722; Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 338, 343.
8. See supra note 6; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903, reporters' note 11
('The judgments of the Court have been generally complied with .. ");
cf. OLIVER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 78-79 (indicating noncompliance by some states); HENRY J. STEINER ET
AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 182-86 (4th ed. 1994) (same).
9. See 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903 cmt. c, reporters' note
3.
10. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 268-69 (3d ed. 1995) (indicating reservations to
Genocide Convention and International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Race Discrimination); NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 404; PARTAN, supra note 2, at 52829. This sort of reservation has been objected to by other states. See, e.g., LILLICH &
HANNUM, supra at 269; Bedjaoui, supra note 6, at 27 (stating the consequences of the
Vandenberg Reservation).
11. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6). Therein, the
general principle recognized was that reciprocal use of limitations of acceptance of the
jurisdictional competence of the Court should pertain by analogy to limitations placed in a

1998

DOMESTIC INFLUENCE

the I.C.J. by the United States to redress human rights claims of U.S.
nationals against foreign governments.
Nevertheless, the United
States is also a signatory to over seventy multilateral treaties and
thirty bilateral treaties that contain special declarations of acceptance
of I.C.J. jurisdiction that do not require additional consent to
competence. 12 Thus, the prospect of increased U.S. participation in
litigation before the Court remains, even if such participation is likely
to be treaty or subject-specific.
Has the general growth of authority and influence of the
International Court, despite certain inhibiting practices of the U.S.
political branches, had any impact domestically within U.S. judicial
processes? Despite the lack of any direct relevance domestically of
I.C.J. opinions advising U.N. entities, the rarity of state-to-state
disputes appearing directly or obliquely in U.S. courts, a formally
proclaimed lack of "binding force" of I.C.J. decisions outside the parties
to a dispute, and the embarrassing fact that most U.S. lawyers and
judges have never taken a course in international law, have I.C.J.
decisions and opinions had any influence within our domestic legal
processes? Perhaps surprisingly, ineluctably, they have.
In sharp contrast to the general influence of I.C.J. decisions and
advisory opinions within the United States, however, is the severely
limited role for I.C.J. judgments recognized by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Committee of United
States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan.13 In its 1988 opinion,
the D.C. Circuit nearly slammed the door on any direct enforcement of
I.C.J. judgments in U.S. courts. Still, general use of I.C.J. decisions and
opinions as authoritative indicia of identifiable international law
remains strong.
Plaintiffs had been various private parties seeking, however
indirectly, the enforcement of the 1986 decision of the I.C.J. against the
United States with respect to U.S. activities in Nicaragua and support
of the Contras. Such plaintiffs, the Circuit Court declared, lacked
standing concerning the claims alleged and Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter, which allows a party to a case "recourse to the Security
Council" for enforcement of a judgment, 14 "simply does not confer rights

reservation to an I.C.J. clause contained within a multilateral or bilateral treaty. Id.
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903 cmt. c; See Louis Henkin ET AL., supra
note 5, at 809-10; Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, supra note 6, at 341 & n.37 (stating
that U.S. is a signatory to approximately 60% of more than 260 such treaties); see also
OLIVER ET AL.., supra note 2, at 46 (over 250 treaties provide special acceptance); PARTAN,
supra note 2, at 10.
13. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
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on private individuals."15 "Because only nations can be parties before
the ICJ," the court added, the plaintiff-appellants "are not 'parties'
within the meaning" of paragraph 2 of Article 94, since it clearly "does
not contemplate that individuals having no relationship to the ICJ case
should enjoy a private right to enforce the ICJ's decision."'16 The court
continued:
Our interpretation of Article 94 is buttressed by a related provision in
the Statute of the ICJ, which... provides that "[t]he decision of the
Court has no binding fore except between the parties and in respect of
th[e] particular case."... Taken together, these Charter clauses make
clear that the purpose of establishing the ICJ was to resolve disputes
between national governments. We find in these clauses no intent to

vest citizens who reside in a U.N. member nation with authority to
17
enforce an ICJ decision against their own government.
Its conclusion was that "[n]either individuals nor organizations
have a cause of action in an American court to enforce ICJ
8
judgments."
Thus, direct enforcement of a state-to-state judgment by private
individuals might seemingly be precluded. 19 Yet, the court did not
address the possibility of a suit brought by a foreign state to enforce an
I.C.J. judgment, which would present different issues concerning
21
immunity 20 and the enforcement of non-U.S. judgments in U.S. courts.
15. Comm. of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 937.
16. Id. at 938.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 934 ('The ICJ is a creation of national governments, working through the
U.N.; its decisions operate between and among such governments and are not enforceable
by individuals having no relation to the claim that the ICJ has adjudicated-in this case,
a claim brought by the government of Nicaragua.'). The Circuit Court also found that,
under the last-in-time rule, subsequent congressional legislation could override U.N.
Charter obligations domestically. Id. at 936-37. It stated that federal statutes could also
override customary norms. Id. at 938-39. There is a split in authority over this
controversial point, with the preference for the primacy of custom having the edge. See,
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 89-95 passim

(1996). It also decided that a U.S. obligation to comply with an I.C.J. judgment is not jus
cogens. Comm. of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 939-41.
19. Although the Court stressed that it was dealing with plaintiffs "having no
relation to the claim" before the ICJ, supra note 18, at 934, "no relationship to the ICJ
case," see supra text accompanying note 16, and with plaintiffs having merely some
related claims "against their own government," see supra text accompanying note 17, the
primary focus of the rationale was on a distinction between state claimants before the ICJ
and private individuals or groups. Comm. of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d. at 938-941.
20. These could include issues with respect to immunity of the United States, the
President of the United States, other federal officials, or a foreign government or entity.
Concerning the latter, see the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-1611 (1998). With respect to a sitting President, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982). With respect to nonimmunity for violations of international law, see, e.g.,
PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 105, 205, 208, 210-11, 215, 232, 276-79, 283-84, 291-92, 348,
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The Court, although stressing that the private plaintiffs before it had
"no relationship to the ICJ case," seemed unaware of the fact that in
some instances the underlying claims before an international tribunal
are ultimately those of private parties who are being represented at the
international level by their government.
In the latter case, the
Supreme Court has already recognized that, even though claims before
an international tribunal are technically those of governments, private
litigants can have a claim of right under relevant international law and
the "award" of the tribunal, and such a right is undoubtedly
"susceptible of judicial determination." 22 It seems logical, then, that if
an I.C.J. decision is favorable with respect to underlying claims of
private parties, the private parties should have an opportunity to utilize
the judgment in domestic legal processes.
Far more significant have been the many indirect U.S. judicial uses
of I.C.J. decisions and advisory opinions in order to identify and clarify
relevant international law. Since the creation of the International
Court, forty-two cases in federal courts 23 have applied fifteen I.C.J.
405-09, 413, 416-18, 471-72; Jordan J. Paust, It's No Defense: Nullum Crimen,
International Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657, 658-62 (1997).
Concerning suits against the United States, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a) & (b), 1491,
2671-2680 (1998). Concerning suits in U.S. courts brought by foreign states, see, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1 (arising under), cl. 2 (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332 (a)(4) (1998) (diversity), 1607 (1998) (counterclaims against a foreign state
plaintiff).
21. Concerning enforcement of foreign judgments, see, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895); Ramirez v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 467(1996) (28 U.S.C. § 1491 does not
provide Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over claim seeking recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment against the U.S.); 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (assistance to foreign
and international tribunals, which does not include enforcement of judgments). See, e.g.,
Tacul, S.A. v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 693 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Conn. 1988); In
re Civil Rogatory Letters Filed by Consulate, 640 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex. 1986); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2414 (enforcement of judgments against the U.S. and discretion of the U.S. Attorney
General); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(e) (pleading of foreign judgment); RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, §§ 481-482 & chpt. 8, introductory n. at 591-93; STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 713-15,
740-41; Uniform Foreign Money - Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L. ANN. 263 (Master
ed. 1986), reprinted in STEINER ET AL., supra note 8,at 727-28. Alien plaintiffs may have
a claim utilizing an I.C.J. judgment as evidence of international law and its breach under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
22. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 457-58 (1899). See also
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907) (indicating that the International Boundary
Commission decision applies directly to disputes between governments but can be utilized
in domestic litigation involving private parties); PAUST, supra note 18, at 274-75 n.541
(describing that claims before the I.C.J. can ultimately be those of individuals), 290-91
n.604 (showing that the same general points evidenced even in P.C.I.J. decisions);
THORPE, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 58-60 (1924); see supra notes 31, 41 and accompanying
text.
23. The cases are cited infra notes 27-28, 31-34, 36-45, 47-48. Not listed among the
forty-two is a Court of Claims decision addressing the need to interpret a treaty by using
the ordinary meaning of terms used in the text of a treaty. See Coplin v. United States, 6
Cl. Ct. 115, 126 n.12 (1984), citing 1950 Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the
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decisions or advisory opinions as evidence of international normative
content. 24 Within the federal judiciary, such uses have appeared
somewhat more frequently in U.S. circuit courts. There have in fact
been six relevant uses in the Supreme Court, 25 nineteen uses in the
circuit courts, 26 sixteen uses in the district courts, and one citation in
the Court of Trade. Utilization of I.C.J. decisions or opinions appears
most often in the text of a judicial opinion, and they appear far less
frequently merely in a footnote. Further, utilization has most often
27
appeared in main opinions, with use in only four dissenting opinions
(or in some ten per cent of the cases). Citations to two I.C.J. decisions
or opinions appear in only two federal cases, 28 the rest of the federal
cases contain just one citation. With respect to frequencies of use in
given decades, most significant uses appear during the 1980's. There
were five cases in the 1990's, twenty-four in the 1980's, four in the
1970's, seven in the 1960's, and only two in the 1950's. Thus, trends in
frequency of use demonstrate a greater use of I.C.J. decisions and
opinions for normative guidance in the last two decades.
The types of I.C.J. decisions and opinions utilized include ten stateto-state cases and five advisory opinions ranging in dates from 1949 to
1988.29 Most of these did not directly involve actions or responsibilities
of the United States, although nearly half did. This is not surprising
given the general use of I.C.J. decisions and opinions to identify and
clarify international law, especially customary international law, that is
relevant to a case or controversy brought before a U.S. court. 30 The
types of international
norms addressed have been varied,
demonstrating a general relevance of I.C.J. decisions and opinions and
a lack of special or peculiar patterns of use with respect to subject
matter.

General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8
(Mar. 3).
24. The fifteen I.C.J. decisions or advisory opinions are listed in Appendix I.
25. See notes 31, 33, 45, 48 infra. The Justices were: Black, Blackmun, Harlan,
O'Connor, Stevens, and Stewart.
26. More frequent use appears in the D.C. Circuit (8 cases), followed by the Ninth (5
cases), Fifth (2 cases), Seventh (2 cases), First (1 case), and Eighth (1 case) Circuits.
27. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1180, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley, J.,
dissenting); Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting);
Rogers v. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.,
278 F.2d 268 (1960) (Fahy, J., dissenting). All of the dissents are in circuit court cases.
28. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d at 1180, 1184 (Wald, J., dissenting) (Advisory
Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention and Barcelona Traction); Trelles
Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, 695 F.2d 428, 433 & ns. 8-9 (9th Cir. 1982) (Nottebohm
and U.N. Reparations).
29. See Appendix I.
30. See PAUST, supra note 18, at 1-50 (showing the nature, proof, and utilization of
customary international law as law of the United States).
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A favorite cite in the federal courts is the 1970 Barcelona Traction
Light & Power Company case, cited in seven federal cases. Next in
apparent attraction is the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, with
citations in six cases, and the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, with four citations to the
decision on the merits and two cites to the Order for Provisional
Measures. Two advisory opinions, the Advisory Opinion on Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations and the
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia, are tied for fourth with four
citations each. The Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States) has
citations in three federal cases, and the rest of the I.C.J. decisions or
opinions have either two or merely one citation.
Barcelona Traction is actually cited with respect to two general
clusters of international prescription: (1) international rules concerning
corporations (e.g., that the nationality of a corporation is the state
where incorporation takes place, that only the state of nationality can
represent the corporation at the international level, and that corporate
form can be disregarded in some cases or does not obviate relevant
liability of a state), 31 and (2) obligatio erga omnes (especially with
respect to basic human rights and the prohibition of genocide) and the
fact that they are the concern of all states and can sometimes be related
to peremptory norms jus cogens. 32 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries,the next
most frequently cited case, is cited with respect to the nature and
delimitations of the territorial sea and other sea areas. 33 The Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran is
cited in recognition of the fact that Iran's actions in connection with the
continued occupation of the U.S. embassy and hostage-taking violated
international law and that treaties between the two countries
31. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 628 n.20 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) ("separate status of an incorporated entity may be
disregarded in certain exceptional circumstances'); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("separate corporate existence does not shield the
state from liability"); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 365 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (international law uses place of incorporation for the nationality
of a corporation); Looper v. Morgan, 1995 WL 499816, at 50-51 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (only the
state of nationality of a corporation can represent it at the international level).
32. Two cases: Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d at 1180, 1184 (Wald, J., dissenting);
Siderman De Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992). Also see
generally Ordonez & Reilly, supranote 6, at 367.
33. See United States v. Maine, et al., 475 U.S. 89, 98 (1986) (Stevens, J.) (use of
strait baselines upheld in part because of historic claim and occupation); United States v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 107 n.10 (1985) (Blackmun, J.) (delimitation of baselines,
especially with reference to island fringes); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 43
n.55, 69-70 (1969) (Stewart, J.) (same); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 869 (5th
Cir. 1979) (limits of extension of the territorial sea); Island Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 352 F.2d
735, 741 (9th Cir. 1965) (historic waters acquired partly by control); CAB v. Island
Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990, 1003-04 & ns.23-24, 1005 & n.27 (D. Hawaii 1964) (same).
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nevertheless remained in force. 34 The Namibia Advisory Opinion is
cited in U.S. courts either concerning the consequences of the opinion in
southern Africa or to demonstrate that human rights are of
international concern and that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 35 is an authoritative aid for the identification and clarification of
basic human rights. 36 The U.N. Reparations Advisory Opinion, tied for
fourth place in frequency of citations, is cited concerning the legal
personality of the United Nations as well as for the proposition that,
although a general norm proclaims that a state may not present a claim
on behalf of another state, there are exceptions to the rule. 37 The
Interhandel Case, weighing in with three citations, is cited concerning
the need to exhaust local remedies and exceptions to such a rule where
38
local remedies would be unfair or futile.
The 1986 I.C.J.. decision in Nicaragua v. United States is cited
concerning the decision of the Court and the attempt by private groups
to assure enforcement, and for the general point that widely accepted
treaties often reflect customary international law. 39 The 1984 Gulf of
34. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(violation and crimes); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir.
1983) (violation); United States v. Central Corp., 1987 WL 20129, at 8 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
("treaty remained in effect during the 1979-80 Iran-United States 'hostage crisis");
National Airmotive v. Government and State of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 555, 556 (D. D.C. 1980)
(violation). Arising from the same controversy between the United States and Iran, the
1979 Order of the I.C.J. granting Provisional Measures was cited in Agee v. Muskie, 629
F.2d 80, 90, 116 n.79 (appendix) (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) and Narenji
v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("lawlessness of this conduct of the Iranian
government was recognized by the decision of the World Court"). See generally Ordonez &
Reilly, supra note 6, at 353-55.
35. G.A. Res. 217A III, 3 U.N. GAOR, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
36. See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (consequences);
United States-South West Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States
Dept. of State, 90 F.R.D. 695, 696 n.2 (D. D.C. 1981) (consequences); Rodriguez Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980) ("Declaration has evolved into an
important source of international human rights law"); In re Alien, MDL No. 398, 501 F.
Supp. 544, 591 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (human rights are of international concern).
37. See Trelles Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, 695 F.2d 428, 433 & n.9 (9th Cir.
1982) (exceptions to the rule of nonrepresentation); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (re: U.N. legal personality);
United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 81, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (same); Balfour, Guthrie
& Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 834 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (U.N. is separate legal
entity). See generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 364 & n.164.
38. See Rogers v. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A., 278 F.2d 268, 273 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (merely
cited as part of the history of the case); Greenpeace, Inc. v. France, 946 F. Supp. 773, 783
(C.D. Cal. 1996); American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525
(D. D.C. 1980).
39. See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 932, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Arcoren v. Peters, 811 F.2d 392, 397 n.11 (8th Cir. 1987)
("widely accepted treaty obligations often reflect the requirements of customary
international law").
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Maine decision is cited in recognition of the decision of the International
Court concerning allocation of sea areas and various points in pleadings
before the Court. 40 The Nottebohm Case is cited concerning appropriate
tests of nationality under international law and the general rule that a
state cannot rightly present a claim at the international level on behalf
of non-nationals. 41 The 1959 Advisory Opinion on South West Africa is
cited concerning limitations extant with respect to state sovereignty in
connection with a League of Nations mandate or U.N. trusteeship
42
system, especially regarding human rights of the inhabitants.
The remaining five I.C.J. decisions or opinions, with only one
citation each, address an array of legal precepts. The 1988 Advisory
Opinion on Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate is cited in order
to distinguish a case addressed by the federal judiciary from those
disputes that must proceed to arbitration under the U.N. Headquarters
Agreement. 43 The French Nuclear Test Cases are cited concerning the
nature of the Exclusive Economic Zone and coastal state competence
therein merely to exercise limited control for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources. 44 The
1952 decision in France v. United States is cited for the proposition that
"[t]he word 'disputes' has been interpreted by the International Court of
Justice to comprehend criminal as well as civil disputes." 45
The
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention was cited
as evidence of the fact that the principles underlying the Genocide
Convention 46 are customary international law. 47 Finally, the 1949
Corfu Channel Case is cited for the rule that a coastal state cannot

40. See Conservation Law Found. of New Eng. v. Secretary of the Interior, 790 F.2d
965, 967 (1st Cir. 1986) (decision); Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373, 1387-88 n.8
(D. Mass. 1984) (points in pleadings).
41. See Trelles Cruz, 695 F.2d at 433 & n.8 (general rule concerning representation at
international levels); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 n.14 (7th Cir. 1980) (residence
is not controlling re: nationality-in fact, one needs a stronger nexus with the state).
42. See McComish v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 580 F.2d 1323, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1978); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
43. See United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1461-62, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See
generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 357-58.
44. See Koru North America v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 229, 232 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988). The Court of International Trade was in error, however, when it considered that
the EEZ involves "nothing more than a preferential fishing zone." Id.
45. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 61 (1957) (Black, J.).
46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; G.A. Res. 2670, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)). On the reach of the
Genocide Convention and customary aspects, see, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET. AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1081-1112 (1996).
47. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
Actually, the entire proscription of genocide is customary international law, as well as a
prohibition jus cogens, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 293, 300-05; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 702 cmt. n, reporters' note 3.
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"claim a strait as inland water if, in its natural state, it served as a
48
useful" international highway.
Also of interest is the fact that the precursor to the I.C.J., the
Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) under the League of
Nations, has been cited in eighteen federal cases from the 1930s to the
1990s. Like references to the I.C.J., most utilization of the P.C.I.J.
decisions involves the identification and clarification of customary
international law. During this period, there have been citations to eight
P.C.I.J. decisions. 49 Not unlike the general pattern of use of I.C.J.
decisions and opinions, most of the federal cases citing the P.C.I.J.
appear in the 1980s (nine cases) 5° and only one cite appears in the
1990s. P.C.I.J. citations occur in two Supreme Court cases, twelve
circuit court cases, 5 1 and four district court cases. Like I.C.J. citations,
most P.C.I.J. cites are in opinions of the court-with only one in a
dissenting opinion, and that in a federal case citing the same P.C.I.J.
decision in the opinion of the federal court. 52 Two cases involved
53
citations in argument by counsel.
The P.C.I.J. case most frequently cited is the S.S. Lotus. It is cited
in eleven cases with respect to customary international legal principles
concerning jurisdiction. 54 The S.S. Wimbleton is cited in one case
48. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 172 (1965) (Harlan, J.).
49. See Appendix II.
50. Use in various time periods are: 1990's (one case), 1980's (nine cases), 1970's (one
case), 1960's (four cases), 1950's (one case), 1940's (no cases), 1930's (two cases, arguments
of counsel-see infra note 50).
51. These appear in fairly equal numbers in the Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits (in 4, 3, 2, and 3 cases respectively).
52. See First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189, 192
(2d Cir. 1989); id. at 198 n.1 (Newman, J., dissenting). Both opinions cited Legal Status
of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, for the
proposition that, in certain circumstances, a state can be bound by its officials'
unauthorized actions.
53. See Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 343 (1937) (citing Serbian Loans);
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 249, 277 (1935) (citing The Serbian
Loans and The BrazilianLoans).
54. See Kreimerman v. Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 639 nn.17-18 (5th Cir. 1994)
(jurisdiction and international restrictions on states); Laker Airways Lyd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); In re Marc Rich &
Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. MarinoGarcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction and law of the sea); United
States v. Riker, 670 F.2d 987, 988 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); FTC v. Compagnie de SaintGobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1314 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction); United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979) (jurisdiction and law of the sea); Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(jurisdiction), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882,
885 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that no jurisdiction to enforce exists unless there is
jurisdiction to prescribe under international law; on this point, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 431); In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(extraterritorial jurisdiction); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489 (S.D. Cal.
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concerning the same principles.5 5 The Factory at Chorzow is cited in
three cases with respect to the valuation of and remedies for
expropriated property of aliens, 56 as is the Polish Upper Silesia case,
cited in one federal opinion.57 Both the Serbian Loans and Brazilian
Loans cases were cited concerning "gold value" clauses or obligations;58
and The Oscar Chinn Case was cited in two federal cases for two points:
(1) that there should be no national origin discrimination or
discrimination against aliens with respect to expropriation of property,
and (2) that the valuation of and payment concerning expropriated
property should involve fair, prompt, and adequate compensation. 59
Finally, use of the Eastern Greenland case involved recognition that in
certain circumstances a state can be bound by representations of its
60
officials where their lack of authority is not obvious.
A few state court opinions have also used I.C.J. decisions or
opinions on points of international law. 6 1 In one case, the Supreme
Court of New York of New York County noted that in 1980 the I.C.J.
62
had confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of Amity with Iran.
The same court noted earlier that the I.C.J. had decided that an oil
company's contract with Saudi Arabia "cannot be given the status of a
treaty."63 Additionally, an advisory opinion of the Court was cited by a
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in recognition

1960) (same). Also see generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 366. On international
law concerning jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at
387-412.
55. See Kreimerman v. Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 639 nn.17-18 (5th Cir. 1994).
56. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888 (2d
Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 863 n.11 (2d Cir. 1962);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 431, 446 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
57. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d at 863 n.11.
58. See Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 343 (1937) (argument of U.S. Solicitor
General); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 249, 277 (1935) (arguments
of counsel); Lemaire v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R.R. Co., 140 F. Supp. 82, 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
59. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d at 867 (holding that international law does
not permit national origin or alienage discrimination); Banco Nacional de Cuba, 505 F.
Supp. at 431 (discussing the value of expropriated property).
60. See First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Gov't of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir.
1989); id. at 198 n.1 (Newman, J., dissenting).
61. See Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 139 Misc. 2d 1026, 1028, 529 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 451; 190
N.Y.S.2d 218, 223-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Navios Corp. v. Nat'l Maritime Union, 402 Pa.
325, 347-48, 350; 166 A.2d 625, 636 (1960) (Bell, J., dissenting). For two other cases
merely mentioning that the United Nations has an I.C.J, see People v. Wright, 12 Misc. 2d
961, 964, 173 N.Y.S.2d 160, 164 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958); Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 251, 95 A.2d 202, 218 (1953) (Musmanno,J., concurring).
62. See Bank Sepah-Iran, 139 Misc. 2d at 1028.
63. See American Jewish Congress, 23 Misc. 2d at 451 (citing Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
(U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22)).
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that "the registry and flag of Liberia are entitled to the same national
status accorded the registry and flag of any other nation" concerning
the registry of vessels. 64 One state court, the Third District Court of
Appeal of Florida, cited the P.C.I.J. while quoting the so-called Tate
Letter of an Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State. The
P.C.I.J. case cited was the S.S. Lotus. It was cited for the proposition
that customary international law does not recognize "immunity when
the foreign government engages in commerce.... ,,65
The general patterns of use of I.C.J. and P.C.I.J. decisions are
informing. Despite a supposed lack of stare decisis and the U.S.
withdrawal from a general jurisdictional competence of the
International Court, international judicial decisions play a significant
role in United States courts. They are often used as authoritative
evidence of the content of customary international law and, at times,
are used as authoritative interpretation of international agreements.
In both instances, there has been attention to international decisions
addressing a wide array of normative subjects; and in no federal case
has there been any questioning of such an authority.
For a few people, these patterns must be fairly disturbing. If one is
an enemy of customary international law (a choice that, in my view, will
not inure to one's benefit in the history of humanity), this growing
influence of the International Court must be frightening.
Such
influence occurs without complete control by the Executive and, like the
influence of much of international law for more than 200 years, with
seeming indifference to the House of Representatives. More generally,
some complain that customary international law, highly valued by our
Founders 66 and the most democratic form of international law, is
somehow antidemocratic. 67
Exactly which customary laws are

64. See Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 402 Pa. at 347-48, 350 (citing
Advisory Opinion on Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8)).
65. See Harris & Co. Advertising v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687, 690-91 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961), quoting The Tate Letter, May 19, 1952, 26 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL.
984 (1952), citing S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 29.
66. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at vii, 1, 5-6, 8, 10 n.1, 15-17, 34-37, 47-50, 120-23
n.55, 139 n.96, 144-45, 154-55 nn.1-13, 170-76, 182-83, 214-24 passim. Cf. id. at 132-33
n.81.
67. Compare PAUST, supra note 18, at 2-3, 11 n.4, 13-14 nn.1O-13, with Curtis A.
Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 821, 857-59, 868, 871 (1997), and
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 665, 707-09, 713-16, 721-23, 731 (1986). Despite the title, Professor Trimble's
"revisionist" view would actually involve a radical departure from historic use of
customary international law, views of the Founders, and predominant expectations since
the formation of the United States. It also seeks acceptance of illegality, apparently any
illegality, under a euphemistic phrase "accommodating change" and a compliant judiciary
abdicating its constitutional role under Articles III and VI of the U.S. Constitution.
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supposedly threatening to our democracy, however, have not been
identified 6 8-- certainly none of those utilized by our courts for more than
200 years. Such laws have been many and have addressed numerous
subjects, involving rights, competencies and duties, and both private
and public actors here and abroad. 69 Given the primary constitutional
bases for incorporation of customary international law in the phrase
"laws of the United States" found in Articles III and VI of the U.S.
Constitution 70 and prevailing expectations since the Founders that
customary international law is both directly and indirectly
incorporable, 71 such patterns and trends in use of international law are
Compare Trimble, supra at 707-11, 713-16, 721-23 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 6-8, 1819, 46-48, 143-46, 154-60.
See also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 7, at 82-83
(demonstrating that Professor Trimble prefers overturning the preferences of the
Founders, as well as changing the traditional methods of incorporation of customary
international law, and substituting what appears to have been a British system or direct
incorporation only through legislation. Even the British have abandoned transformation
(which, contrary even to Professor Trimble's preference, had allowed adoption by judicial
decision). See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 1 Q.B. 529,
553-54 (1978)). Such a revisionist denial of the judicial role in our domestic legal process
is antithetical to a balance and separation of powers conceived by the Founders and
involving the law of nations, see PAUST, supra note 66; PAUST, supra note 18, at 7-8, 3448, 201-02, 264-70 passim. This denial is sought by some as an ideologic weapon against
the efficacy of human rights and, thus inevitably, the preferred consequences of
democracy. Judicial power is an integral part of the constitutional design for the
separation of powers and reflects, in part, "the profound conviction of the Framers that
the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed," see
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947, 951 (1983). With respect to democratic values, it is
worth emphasizing that no single institutional arrangement necessarily represents
authority of guarantees a democratic functioning or outcome, see PAUST, supra at 462-63;
see also James A.R. Nafziger, Political Dispute Resolution by the World Court, With
Reference to United States Courts, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL.'Y 775 (1998). At any given
time, legislative bodies may merely represent special interests.
68. The closest to a claim concerning specific customary norms is implicit in the
proclaimed worry of Professors Bradley and Goldsmith over, of all things, "a large body of
... human rights" and related prohibitions of genocide and slavery, see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 832, 841. Despite their concerns (and their use of a number
of historical inaccuracies and fallacies, see infra note 71), there has been significant
attention to a rich and wide array of human rights ever since the formation of the United
States, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 169-203, 214-72, 323-25, passim. Importantly,
Chief Justice Marshall had recognized in 1810 that our judicial tribunals "are established
•. . to decide on human rights .... Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
Federal courts had been using human right precepts prior to his affirmation of judicial
authority and responsibility, and have done so ever since.
69. For merely a partial listing of earliest subjects, including human rights, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 48-50 nn.60-88.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; PAUST, supra note 18,
at 6-8, 34-48.
71. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-50 passim; see also Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL
COURTS, supra note 3, at 16 ("[t]he law of nations is an integral part of... .our']
jurisprudence.'). Given my disagreement with much of the recent work by Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith, and Professor Bradley's participation in this symposium, it is
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worth highlighting some nineteen points of disagreement and concern. Much of their
reasoning rests on an erroneous premise that customary international law was and is
merely "general common law." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 820, 823-24,
827, 844, 849. But see PAUST, supra note 18, at 5, 30-33, 176 passim. Because customary
international law is not mere "common law," but part of the "law of the land" and "laws of
the United States" within constitutionally-based judicial authority and responsibility, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-8, 30-50, 176, their nearly obsessive focus on Erie R.R..Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (14 Pet.) 1 (1842), neither of
which addresses international law or has had any demonstrated impact on actual
patterns of federal court use of customary international law, is significantly flawed and
misleading. Additionally, use of what are merely "common law," 'law merchant," or
"maritime" and "admiralty" cases and arguments of others who rely on such cases is
seriously misplaced. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 822, 824, 850
n.222, 851 & nn.230-231, 852-56, 859 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 30-33. The reference
to United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812), a case
addressing mere "common law" and making no mention of the law of nations or
international law, is but one example. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at
851 & n.231 (and other cases cited therein) with PAUST, supra note 18, at 32-33, 44-45; Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its history this Court
has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as
well as of enemy individuals."). Indeed, actual patterns of use of customary international
law throughout our history demonstrate that what they term the "modern position," see
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 816-17, 834, 837, 868, was generally endorsed
long ago and has been evidenced fairly consistently in the continuous use of customary
international law by federal courts for more than 200 years. See PAUST, supra note 18, at
1, 5-50, 201-02, 264-70; supra note 68; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at
822-23, 834 n.125, 850-51 & nn.223 & 229-230. Further, what Professor Bradley
considers "new" law regulating "a state's treatment of its own citizens," see Curtis A.
Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts-Before and After
Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL.Y 807 (1998), is not new and is partly what our nation,
and much of the Bill of Rights, was founded upon. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 5, 8,
34, 95, 142, 169-75, 192-94, 216-23, 248, 324-25, 330-32 passim.
Their disfavored theory requires that "all law applied by federal courts...be
either federal law or state law," Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 852, and
recognition that "if CIL [customary international law] is not federal law, then there is no
basis for the federal judiciary to enforce CIL..." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at
846. This is their real preference. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 817. If so,
the inescapable fact of continued use of customary international law in the federal courts
and overwhelming patterns of supportive expectation, regardless of CIL's domesticated
name or classification (which clearly has not been merely state law), speak loudly with
respect to the general validity of their theory. Moreover, this use continued after Erie and
its supposedly relevant reasoning. Additionally, if Erie, which is not on point, requires
that mere "common law" have some sort of authorization, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 67, at 852 & n.243 (or, if "governed by the Federal Constitution"), 855-56 & n.263,
that need is met with respect to customary international law and its constitutional bases
in Articles III and VI of the U.S. Constitution, as well as in other constitutional provisions
and various federal statutes (also providing subject matter jurisdiction). See PAUST,
supra note 18, at 5-8, 30-50, 174-75, 186, 192-94, 222, 246-48. An early case had also
expressly related to the duty to incorporate CIL to the Constitution: "courts ....[i]n
this
country .... are bound, by the Constitution of the United States, to determine according to
treaties and the law of nations, wherever they apply." Waite v. The Antelope, 28 F. Cas.
1341, 1341 (D.C.D. S. Car. 1807) (No. 17,045).
Other fallacies or errors include statements that customary international law
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lacks supremacy consequences, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 821, 82425, 851 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 6-7, 15-16, 36, 42-43, 44 (stating that in all
tribunals CIL is universally binding), 92, 97, 121-22 (indicating that the view of the
Continental Congress noted therein had been similar to Jessup's policy argument,
mentioned in Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 859), 131, 134, 139-40, 179, 182-83,
187, 229, 248 n.391, 333-34, 352, lacked jurisdictional consequences. Compare Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 821 with PAUST, supra note 18 at 8, 34, 42, 45-46, 201-02,
264-70; supra note 68; Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294 (1808); Church v.
Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804); United States v. Peters, District Judge, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 121, 129-32 (1795), and lacked "other consequences of federal law," compare
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 821 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-8, 29-50, 14346, 154-60, 201-02, 264-70; supra notes 66 (describing views of Founders), 68. A more
informative quotation from THE FEDERALIST No. 3 than that contained in PAUST, supra
note 18, at 34 n.38, is: "Under the national government... the laws of nations, will always
be expounded in one sense. . .[and there is] wisdom... in committing such questions to the
jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government." THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 62 (J. Jay) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1868). If general
common law lacked such consequences and did not bind the states, uses of the law of
nations mentioned in material cited above also stand in opposition to claims that
customary international law was mere common law. Similarly, if "general common law"
"was not considered part of the 'Laws of the United States,'" it is telling that customary
international law certainly was. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at -n.32]
with PAUST, supra note 18, at 6, 40. One case that they cite, actually declares that a
state court "is bound to take notice" of the law of nations, "as...is...the courts of the
United States." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 824 n.53, Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
Another case cited, actually recognizes that questions of
international law involve concurrent duties since they "must be determined in the first
instance by the court, state or nation, in which the suit is brought," adding that such
questions can be brought in federal courts and the federal court "must decide for itself,
uncontrolled by local decisions." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 824 n.48,
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892). Concerning New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875), see PAUST, supra note 18, at 33, 40. In my opinion, Justice
Bradley's dissent was correct that CIL is 'law of the United States" for purposes of
review, see 92 U.S. at 287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 111, reporters' notes 2-3 &
115, cmt. e. In Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440 (1924), the Court
actually ruled that the question was one of "general law applicable alike" and "as fully" to
"suits in state courts as to those prosecuted in the courts of the United States" and should
be "transferred to the [federal] Circuit Court of Appeals." Id. at 442-43. Ker, Huntington,
and Oliver American Trading actually reaffirm that state courts are "bound to take
notice" of and "as fully" to apply CIL. Not one of the cases declares that CIL is not part of
the law to be applied in lower federal courts. Indeed, each recognizes that federal courts
have the same duties as states with respect to cases that originate in federal courts. For
additional recognition that states were bound by the law of nations, see, e.g., Manchester
v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264 (1891) (ruling that states are bound by law of nations
in defining their boundaries); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 560 (1856)
(McLean, J., dissenting) ("Our States... are independent ... subject only to international
laws."); United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686, 692 (D.C.E.D. Pa.
1855) (No. 16, 726) (each state "is bound by... the 'law of nations.' What it could not do if
freed from federative restrictions, it cannot do now; every restraint upon its
policy.. .binds it still .... ); Thompson v. Doaksum, 68 Cal. 593, 596, 10 P. 199, 201 (1886)
(noting that the obligation to protect private rights under the law of nations "passed to
the new government"); Territory ex rel. Wade v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. 93, 148, 12 P. 879
(1887) (holding that New Mexico had a judicial duty "to maintain only those principles of
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law.. .proper for the protection of human rights. ... '); Republic of Arg. v. New York, 25
N.Y.2d 252, 259, 250 N.E.2d 698, 701, 303 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (1969) (stating that action
"in this case is mandated by the rules of international law. It is settled that... all
domestic courts must give effect to customary international law."); De Simone v.
Transportes Maritimos do Estado, 200 A.D. 82, 89, 192 N.Y.S. 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922)
("...the court has no jurisdiction and could not disregard the protest and overrule the
objection by a claim... [under] the municipal law of this State ... for by the law of nations
an adjudication.. .could not be made. . . .'); Stanley v. Ohio, 24 Ohio St. 166, 174 (1873)
(noting that the state has concern "to discharge such duties as are imposed upon it by the
law of nations"); Peters v. McKay, 195 Ore. 412, 424, 426, 238 P.2d 225, 230-31 (Ore.
1951) (".... he rule is firmly established and uniformly recognized that "International law
is part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the Union .... The rule has been
briefly stated as follows:.. .the law of nations is to be treated as part of the law of the
land. The courts of all nations judicially notice this law, and it must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination....' 30 AM. JUR.,
InternationalLaw, p. 178, at 7 .... In essence, the rule appears to be that international
law is part of the law of every state which is enforced by its courts without any
constitutional or statutory act of incorporation by reference, and. . .relevant provisions of
the law of nations are legally paramount whenever international rights and duties are
involved before a court having jurisdiction to enforce them."); see also Ex parte Bushnell, 9
OHIO ST. 77, 189 (1859) ('The constitution of the United States was framed.. .subordinate
to, and without violating the fundamental law of nations.... .'); Siplyak v. Davis, 276 Pa.
49, 52, 119 A. 745, 746 (1923) (".. .where the general law of nations and those of foreign
commerce say the contrary.. .I very much question the power or authority of any state or
nation... to pass such a law...," quoting Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 536
(1867)). Further, their references to cases and opinions using phrases "laws of the United
States," "law of the land," and "our law" are incomplete and potentially misleading.
Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 823, 834 n.125, 850-51 with PAUST,
supra note,18, at 6, 34-36, 40-43, 47; United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 299
n.*, 27 F. Cas. 713 (No. 16,122) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) ("law of nations is part of the law of the
United States'); id. at 298 (Wilson, J., declaring that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction "in cases like the present" and Congress can nevertheless provide a
concurrent jurisdiction in lower federal courts). Concerning the language "in Pursuance
thereof' in Article VI of the Constitution, compare Bradley, supra note 18, at 43.
With respect to the nature of customary international law, they state incorrectly
that the dissenter view is the "prevailing view," compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
67, at 857 n.275 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 14-18, that the only participants
concerning its formation and meaning are states, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 67, at 838 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 1-3, 10-14, that state "consent" is the basis
of customary law, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 838 with PAUST, supra
note 18, at 10-17, 28; J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51-52 (6th ed. 1963), that it does
not specify how obligations must be treated within domestic legal processes, compare
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 819 n.19 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 198-203,
212, 256, 259-64 passim, and that it was antithetical for customary legal rights of
individuals, especially human rights, to obtain against states, especially against one's own
state, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 822 (quoting incorrect and
incomplete list of alleged categories of customary international laws), 831 & n.106, 828,
839-42 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 44, 198-203, 209-10, 256-70, 288-91, 323-25, 329
passim; see also supra note 22. Others have also recently confused the supposed lack of
direct remedies of individuals at the international level prior to World War II (they
existed, but were rare-see PAUST, supra note 18, at 290-91; see also PAUST, supra note
18, at 274-75; supra note 22), with a lack of individual rights under international law.
See, e.g., David P. Kunstle, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable
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not surprising.
With increasing interdependence currently thrust upon us and a
predictable growth in international adjudication of disputes, domestic
Rights and Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
319, 321-23, 337 (1995); cf id. at 339-41.

Concerning several of the points made in this

paragraph, see also Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of
Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.147 (1995/96).
Additional errors include their statement that the only appropriate "sovereigns"
are either the federal government or the states, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
67, at 852 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 171-72, 194, 328-31, 347-49, 353, 469-70, that
only one court of appeal ever addressed whether the President is bound, compare Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 845 & n.199 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 155 nn.8-9 &
13-14, 158-59 nn.28 & 31 & 36-37, 161 n.61, 164 n.68, and that Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) "actually denied that all of CIL was enforceable federal
law" and "did not consider international law to be part of the law of the United States"
compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 860 with 376 U.S. at 425, 428, 430 n.34;
Jordan J. Paust, letter, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 601 (1978). Finally, The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900), was interpreted improperly (especially with respect to the actual
position of the United States before the Court and the ruling that the Executive actions
were in violation of the law of nations, invalidated, and redressable in our courts, compare
Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 67, at 842-43 & n.177, 845 n.199, 849 with PAUsr, supra
note 18, at 92-95, 146, 148-50, 161-64, and the split in authorities concerning the primacy
of custom over a federal statue was not adequately addressed. Concerning the split and
authorities, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 843 with PAUST, supra note
18, at 38-39, 88-95, 120-23, 138-41. Concerning The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388
(1815), addressed in Bradley, supra, see PAUST, supra note 18, at 128-29. Concerning
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), addressed in Bradley, supra, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 123-24, 144-45, 156. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 691, 692 (1802) addressed
only the issue whether CIL should be directly incorporable for criminal sanctions ("doubt
the competence. . ., there being no statute recognizing the offence .. "). On this issue, see
PAUST, supranote 18, at 7, 44-45.

Professor Bradley states that there are no 19th Century cases actually
invalidating a presidential or congressional act. Bradley, supra -his text near n.56-.
But see PAUST, supranote 18, at 138 n.96 (1892 case). This would not be surprising, since
it seems that well into the 20th Century, no one expected that the President or Congress

could even authorize a violation of CIL and nothing in the text or structure of the
Constitution would permit such a result. Actually, it is more telling that there were no
cases holding that presidential or congressional acts prevail until the mid-1980s when a
complete and unprofessional misreading of Paquete Habana occurred-all in cases
concerning the mistreatment of aliens. There are no known federal cases ruling that
states can violate CIL, but there are rare cases denying merely Supreme Court
jurisdiction to review state rulings, a denial that is no longer authoritative. Further, in
the 20th Century, there are cases allowing CIL to prevail against Executive acts, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 146, 149, 163-64, and congressional legislation, see PAUST, supra
note 18, at 138-39, 141. As my treatise documents, with respect to presidential powers,
rulings concerning similar claims (e.g., concerning acts of lower officials and alleged
orders or approval of the President) are near rulings, and overwhelming patterns of
expectation have long supported these results, see Paust, supra note 18, at 88, 124-25,
143-46, 154-60. During discussions at the law school colloquium, Professor Bradley

assured that he is no enemy of customary international law and indicated that he was not
opposed to its use indirectly as an aid to interpret other laws, which happens to be the
most common use of customary international law. See PAUST, supra note 18, at 62, 94,
193, 212-13 passim.
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utilization of the decisions and advisory opinions of the International
Court is likely to increase. 72 Not to be cute, but to provide appropriate
recognition, law school curricula should reflect an increasing global
interdependence in all sectors of public life, both civil and criminal. 73 In
that regard, the University of Denver, with the guiding and always kind
and enthusiastic participation of Professor Ved Nanda, is surely within
the forefront.
Appendix I
I.C.J. Decisions and Advisory Opinions Cited in Federal Courts
1949 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J.
4 (Apr. 9).
1949 Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79, 181 (Apr. 11).
1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West
Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Jul. 11).
1951 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23
(May 28).
1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United
Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 132, 138-39 (Dec. 18).

Kingdom

v.

1952 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (France v. United States), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 188-89 (Aug. 27).
1955 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4,
13, 22, 23-24, 26 (Apr. 6).
1959 Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), 1959 I.C.J.
6, 26-27 (Mar. 21).

72. See also Justice O'Connor, supra note 71, at 18 ("there is great potential for our
Court to learn from the experience and logic of foreign courts and international
tribunals.... ."). I am surprised that there is apparently only one direct reference to the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT). See United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d
431, 440 (3d Cir. 1995) (referencing denaturalization); see also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338
U.S. 197, 212 n.12 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring in 1949) (quoting "the Nuremberg
Tribunal" with respect to the principle nullum crimen sine lege, and the fact that it does
not obviate jurisdiction over, or prosecution of, crimes that were crimes under
international law at the time of commission, as well as the fact that the principle was
used similarly in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East); for references to
the IMT for the Far East ....,see also id. at 199, 209, 211-15; Jordan J. Paust, Nullum
Crimen and Related Crimes, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321 (1997).
I expect that with increasing use of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the long awaited creation of a permanent
International Criminal Court, as well as several regional international criminal courts,
citations to decisions of international criminal tribunals in U.S. cases will also increase.
73. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL
COURTS, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 395-96 (1997) (book review).
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1970 Barcelona Traction Light & Power Company, Limited
(Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 4, 32, 33, 38-39, 42 (Feb. 5).
1971 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 118-19,
124, 131 (June 21).; id. Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, at 76
1974 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec.
20); (New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
1980 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 28, 44, 200 (May 24);
and id.1979 Provisional Measures Order (15 Dec. 1979), 1979 I.C.J. 7,
19
1984 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Canada v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
1986 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 14, 146,
149, 183 (June 27).
1988 Advisory Opinion on Applicability of the Obligation to
Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United
Nations
Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 3 (Mar. 9).
Appendix II
P.C.I.J. Decisions Cited in Federal Courts
S.S. Wimbleton, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1, at 25.
German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.
7.
S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 1819, 23, 25.
The Factory at Chorzow (Indemnity), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 17,
at 46- 48.
Serbian Loans, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 14 and Nos. 20-21, at 32-41.
Brazilian Loans, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) Nos. 15 and 20.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, at 71-73.
Oscar Chinn, 1934 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 63, at 87.

THE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTSBEFORE AND AFTER ERIE
CURTIS A. BRADLEY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The greatest weakness of international human rights law may be
the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism. There is, to date, no
general international criminal court. The jurisdiction of existing international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, often requires state consent, and the formal sanctions for noncompliance with
the tribunals' decisions are often weak or nonexistent. Needless to say,
the domestic courts of the alleged violator of human rights cannot always be counted on to provide an effective forum for enforcement. Although there are less formal methods of enforcement, such as monitoring by international organizations and self-reporting, these methods are
not generally regarded as sufficient to deter widespread human rights
abuses. As Professor Mark Janis has observed, "The central problem
has become not so much finding a universal law of human rights (most
agree that one now exists), but enforcing that law."'
This enforcement problem may explain why human rights advocates have been so intent on having U.S. courts pass judgment on alleged human rights abuses occurring in other countries. Given encouragement by the seminal Filartigadecision,2 there have been numerous
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like to thank
Kathryn Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Hiroshi Motomura, Alisa Schreibman, and Steve
Smith for helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Christine Trend
for excellent research assistance.
1. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (2d ed. 1993); see
also, e.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 233 (1996) (noting the "fundamental weakness of international law enforcement mechanisms'); Daniel Bodansky, Human Rights and Universal
Jurisdiction,in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1
(Mark Gibney ed., 1991) (noting that "implementation and enforcement of these [human
rights] standards have been woefully inadequate"); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and
State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 41 (1995/96) ("Enforcement has always
been seen as the weak link in the international legal system, and it is surely the weak
link of international human rights law.").
2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga,the court allowed two Paraguayans to sue a former Paraguayan military official for allegedly violat-
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cases brought in recent years concerning alleged human rights abuses
committed in places such as Bosnia, 3 Ethiopia, 4 Guatemala, 5 and the
Philippines. 6 These cases typically involve torture, summary execution,
war crimes, or other egregious conduct by foreign government or quasigovernment actors. Although it may be difficult for the plaintiffs in
these cases to collect damage awards, many of them find value in sim7
ply obtaining a formal condemnation of the conduct in question.
Lawyers and commentators are now turning their attention inward
to some extent, seeking to apply the international human rights standards to U.S. government actors.8 Again, they are looking to U.S.
courts. And, for a variety of reasons, the international law they seek to
have the courts apply is customary rather than codified. 9 This customary law, they argue, has the status in this country of federal common
law.
In a recent article, Professor Jack Goldsmith and I provided a criing customary international law by engaging in torture and other acts in Paraguay. In
doing so, the court held that customary international law has the status in this country of
federal common law. Id. at 885. As Professor Bederman has observed, "[i]n a sense, all
current human rights litigation owes its fortune to Filartiga."David J. Bederman, Dead
Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation,
25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255, 256 (1995/96); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991) ("In Filartiga,transnational public law litigants finally found their Brown v. Board of Education.").
3. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
4. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
5. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
6. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. See Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191, 203 (1995/96).
8. See articles cited infra notes 14-17; see also Paul L. Hoffman, The "Blank Stare
Phenomenon" Proving Customary InternationalLaw in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 181, 189 (1995/96) (noting that "the critical crossroads for the [Filartiga]precedents will come when we try to rely upon them to sue U.S. government defendants");
Jules Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1073-74 (1985) ("Subjecting violations of international law by foreign governments to federal court review makes it difficult to justify
shielding similar violations by our own government from judicial scrutiny.").
9. There are two principal types of international law-treaties and customary international law. A treaty is a "purposeful agreement among states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note at

18 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Customary international law is the law of
the international community that "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Id. § 102(2); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 STAT. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (sources of international law include "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law"). Although much of international human rights law is reflected in treaties as well as
in customary international law, the treaties generally cannot be invoked as a source of
law in U.S. courts, either because the United States has declined to ratify the treaties or
because it has declared them to be "non-self-executing." See text accompanying notes 100110.
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tique of the proposition that customary international law has the status
of federal common law, a proposition that we called the "modern position." 10 The modern position has become widely accepted only in the
last twenty years, and to date it has been invoked primarily in international human rights litigation. Among other things, it has been invoked
to support the constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, which purports to give the federal district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."" Many suits brought under the Alien
Tort Statute are between aliens and concern alleged violations of customary international law. Because Article III diversity jurisdiction does
not extend to suits between aliens, 12 it may be that federal courts can
constitutionally hear such cases only if customary international law has
3
the status of federal law.'
The potential consequences of the modern position, however, are
far greater than merely opening the doors of the federal courts to alienalien suits under the Alien Tort Statute. If customary international law
has the status of federal common law, it presumably preempts inconsistent state law in this country. 14 Thus, to recite a few examples, it might
be used to invalidate state laws ranging from death penalty provisions,
to state immigration measures like California's Proposition 187, to limitations on the rights of homosexuals.' 5 Perhaps even more dramatically, some proponents of the modern position argue that, because customary international law is federal law, the President may be compelled

10. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
12. See 15 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 102.77, 102.78 (3d ed.
1997);

13B CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT ET.

AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE,

JURISDICTION 2D § 3604 (1984 & 1997 Supp.); see also, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800); Saadeh v.
Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
13. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 847-48; see also Anne-Marie Burley,
The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
461, 468 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
InternationalLaw, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295.
15. For commentary suggesting that these state laws are inconsistent with customary
international law, see, for example, Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of InternationalNorms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983) (death penalty provisions); Stephen Knight, Note, Proposition
187 and InternationalHuman Rights Law: Illegal Discriminationin the Right to Education, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183 (1995) (Proposition 187); Brenda SueThornton, The New InternationalJurisprudenceand the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725 (1995) (limitations on rights of homosexuals); see also Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against Federal and
State Governments, 104 HARM. L. REV. 1269 (1991) (arguing that courts should enforce
international law against the federal and state governments).
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by the courts to follow it.16 Some proponents even argue that customary
international law supersedes inconsistent federal legislation, at least if
the customary international law is formed after the enactment of the
legislation.17 Professor Jordan Paust, a fellow panelist at this Colloquium, goes so far as to argue that some customary international law
norms have the status of U.S. constitutional law and therefore super18
sede even later-in-time federal legislation.
For purposes of this panel discussion on the impact of international
law in the domestic arena, I will elaborate on two points made by Professor Goldsmith and myself in our recent article: first, that customary
international law did not have the status of federal law in the nineteenth century; and, second, that customary international law's purported status today as federal common law is at least in tension with
the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 19 In doing
so, I will discuss several examples that tend to clarify and confirm these
claims. In addition, because Professor Paust is a participant on this
panel, I will highlight some areas of disagreement between Professor
Paust and myself. I will not attempt here, however, a point-by-point
rebuttal of Professor Paust's "some nineteen points of disagreement and
concern" with Professor Goldsmith's and my views (recited by Professor
Paust without much explanation in a long footnote), 20 although much of
21
what I say here will be relevant to those points.
16. For debate over this issue, see Essays, Agora: May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986); Essays, Agora: May the President
Violate Customary InternationalLaw? (Cont'd), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987); The Authority of the United States Executive to Interpret, Articulate or Violate the Norms of International Law, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297 (1986); see also Michael J. Glennon, Raising
The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary InternationalLaw by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321 (1985); Lobel, supra note 8, at 1071; Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 872 (1987).
18. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6,
95, 174-75, 186, 193-95, 324-25, 338-45, 371 (1996). Notwithstanding Professor Paust's
arguments, the lower courts uniformly have rejected the proposition that customary international law supersedes federal legislation. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d
916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986).
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. See Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the International Court of Justice, 26
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787, 799 n.71 (1998).
21. Nor do I discuss here the use of international law by courts in interpretingfederal
enactments. This interpretative use of international law is reflected, for example, in the
"CharmingBetsy canon," pursuant to which courts will, "[wihere fairly possible," construe
federal statutes "so as not to conflict with international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 114; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) ("[Ain act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains. .. .'). For discussion of the history and proper
role of the Charming Betsy canon, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
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STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY

A number of courts and commentators have relied on history to
support their claim that customary international law today has the
status of federal common law. The court in Filartiga,for example,
claimed that customary international law "has always been part of the
federal common law." 22 Other courts have invoked history in claiming
that it is "well settled" that customary international law has the status
of federal common law. 23 Several commentators similarly have claimed
that customary international law had the status in the nineteenth century of federal law. 2 4 In making these claims, courts and commentators
typically cite to statements in early Supreme Court decisions referring
to the law of nations as, for example, "part of the law of the land" 25 or
26
"part of our law."
These courts and commentators are impliedly arguing that, because customary international law had a certain status in the nineteenth century, it should have that status today. The proper weight to
be attributed to history in legal analysis is, of course, a matter of substantial controversy. 27 Moreover, "[h]istory itself cannot justify guid28
ance by history"; rather, the justification "must... come from theory."
My focus here is not on that theoretical question, however, but rather
on the premise that customary international law had the status in the

Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J.
479 (1998). It is also reflected to some extent in the "presumption against extraterritoriality," pursuant to which courts are to presume '"that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the
United States.'" EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). For discussion of this presumption, and
its relationship to international law, see Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 510-19, 545-61 (1997).
22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th
Cir. 1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995).
24. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-8; Glennon, supra note 16, at 345-47; Lobel,
supra note 8, at 1090-95.
25. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
26. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
27. This controversy is reflected, for example, in the debates between "originalist"
and "textualist" theories of constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127-28 (discussing these
debates). In the context of international law, compare PAUST, supra note 18, at 6, 34 (relying on early U.S. history to support claims regarding current domestic legal status of
customary international law), with Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in
Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 849 (1989) (stating that "their contextual differences from world affairs should lead us to view the various statements about the law of
nations from that era as having no bearing on modern controversies').
28. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1745
(1996).
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nineteenth century of federal law. The historical evidence suggests that
courts and commentators have been taking statements by the Supreme
Court out of context and that customary international law was not in
29
fact treated in the nineteenth century as federal law.
In the nineteenth century, federal courts applied a body of law that
30
has come to be referred to as "general law" or "general common law."
General common law was not viewed as emanating from any one sovereign source, but rather from "common practice and consent among a
number of sovereigns." 31 In Justice Holmes' words, general common
law was "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute." 32 Thus,
"American courts resorted to this. . . body of preexisting law... with33
out insisting that the law be attached to any particular sovereign."
The important point for present purposes is that general common
law was not viewed as federal law. In particular, it was not considered
part of the "Laws of the United States" within the meaning of Articles
III and VI of the Constitution. Thus, federal court interpretations of
general common law were not binding on the states, and a case arising
under general common law did not establish federal question jurisdic34
tion.
Prior to Erie, customary international law (referred to in the nineteenth century as part of the "law of nations") 35 had the status of general common law. 36 Indeed, the Supreme Court's most famous applica-

29. The following discussion elaborates on Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at
822-26.
30. See generally William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513
(1984).
31. Id. at 1517.
32. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1517.
34. See id. at 1521-27; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1274-75 (1985).
35. "In its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised the law merchant, maritime
law, and the law of conflicts of laws, as well as the law governing the relations between
states." Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 819, 821-22 (1989); see also Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952). But see PAUST, supra
note 18, at 33 (distinguishing law of nations from maritime law).
36. My claim is not that the law of nations was always labeled as general common
law, just that it was treated like other bodies of law that have come to be referred to as
general common law-in particular, that it was treated as non-federallaw. Consequently,
my claim is not undermined by the existence of decisions, such as those cited by Professor
Paust, in which courts referred separately to the "common law" and the 'law of nations."
See PAUST, supra note 18, at 30-32. It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court
on several occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did refer to the law
of nations as part of the "general law," which was the phrase the Court used for general
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tion of general common law, Swift v. Tyson, 37 involved the law merchant, which was then a component of the law of nations. 38 Customary
international law, like other general common law, was viewed as emanating not from a particular sovereign source, but rather from principles of natural law and from international custom. 39 When courts applied this law, they were not Seen as "legislating," because, among other
40
things, the law was believed to be objective and discoverable.
Importantly, customary international law, like other general common law, was not considered part of the "supreme Law of the Land" in
Article VI. 41 Nor was it considered part of the "Laws of the United
States" for purposes of constitutional or statutory federal question jurisdiction. 42 These historical conclusions, although resisted by some
commentators, 43 are supported by several examples.
First, the Supreme Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries consistently refused to review lower court rulings concerning
customary international law, on the ground that the cases did not arise
common law. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47. Moreover, as Professor Louis
Henkin has noted, there are "[niumerous statements" from the Supreme Court in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries referring to the law of nations as part of the
"common law." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
509 n.17 (2d ed. 1996); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 161 (1820)
(referring to "the law of nations, (which is part of the common law)"); United States v.
Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 392 (1798) (referring to "the law of nations, which is a part
of the common law of the United States'); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161
(1795) (referring to "the common law, of which the law of nations is a part") (Iredell, J.,
concurring). This is also how the law of nations was characterized in England. See 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 67 (1769) (noting that
the law of nations is "adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the common law, and is held to be
a part of the law of the land."); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 51 (K.B. 1767)
(same).
37. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
38. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1540-54; Jay, supra note 35, at 821-22.
39. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 18151835 676-78 (1988); Jay, supra note 35, at 822-23.
40. See Jay, supra note 35, at 824, 833; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1056-57 (1985); cf. RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH
U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 32 (1977) (describing this view with respect
to all of general common law); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1365, 1405-07 (1997) (same).
41. See, e.g., CHARLES PERGLER, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1928) (if state statute "violates an established principle of international law ...clearly there would be only one course open to the courts, viz., to enforce the state statute, always assuming its constitutionality and that it does not contravene any valid federal enactment, or any treaty); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 161 (1922) ("state constitution or legislative provision in
violation of customary international law [wa]s valid unless in conflict with a Federal constitutional provision or an act of Congress").
42. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 824.
43. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 18, at n.71.
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under federal law. In an 1875 decision, for example, the Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review issues concerning "the general laws
of war, as recognized by the law of nations" because such issues did not
involve "the constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of
the United States" but rather concerned only "principles of general law
alone."4 4 The Court reached this conclusion over Justice Bradley's lone
dissent, in which he specifically argued that a claim under "unwritten
45
international law" is made under the "laws of the United States."
Similarly, in an 1886 decision, the Court held that the question whether
forcible seizure of a criminal defendant in a foreign country is grounds
to resist trial in state court is "a question of common law, or of the law
of nations" that the Court has "no right to review." 46 And, in a 1924 decision, the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review an issue
concerning foreign sovereign immunity-an issue governed by customary
international law-because that issue was one of "general law" over
47
which the Court had no jurisdiction.
Second, in several decisions in the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court indicated (admittedly in dicta) that customary international law
is not to be applied if it is inconsistent with federal legislation or a controlling executive act. In the famous Paquete Habana decision in 1900,
for example, the Court stated that U.S. courts are to apply customary
international law "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision." 4 In an earlier decision, the Court
said that it was bound by the law of nations "[t]ill ... an act [of Congress] be passed." 49 In still another decision, 50 the Court emphasized
that the international law it was applying did not conflict with Presidential action 5' and described the law of nations as "a guide which the
sovereign follows or abandons at his will." 52 The lower courts have in44. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 286, 286-87 (1875).
45. Id. at 288 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
46. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
47. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); see also
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580 (1924) (dismissing
appeal raising issue of foreign sovereign immunity "for the want of jurisdiction'), per curiam dismissing a writ of errorfor want of jurisdiction,234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
For additional cases, see Weisburd, supranote 16, at 1218-19.
48. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also id. at 708 (courts must
"give effect to" customary international law "in the absence of any treaty or other public
act of the government in relation to the matter').
49. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
50. See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
51. Id. at 121-23.
52. Id. at 128. For differing views regarding the significance of this decision, compare
Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government
to Violate Customary InternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 922 n.27 (1986) (describing Brown as "the clearest case in which the President's wide discretion in this area is
acknowledged'), with Jordan J. Paust, The President is Bound by InternationalLaw, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 380 (1987) (stating that "the various opinions of the Justices in Brown
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terpreted these decisions to stand for the proposition that Congress and
53
the President have the power to violate customary international law.
Finally, in a number of instances in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal government made statements to foreign governments that the violation of customary international law by a state
did not by itself create an issue of federal law. In the early nineteenth
century, there were instances of state prosecution of foreign citizens in
alleged violation of immunities under the law of nations. In these instances, the federal government disclaimed the power to interfere with
or review the state court proceedings absent federal legislation on the
subject. 54 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there
were instances in which the states failed to prosecute perpetrators of
mob violence against aliens, in alleged violation of obligations under
customary international law. Again, the federal government maintained that it lacked the authority to compel state compliance with customary international law in the absence of a treaty or federal statute on
55
the subject.
Because of these and other examples, a number of commentators
have concluded, like Professor Goldsmith and myself, that customary
international law had the status in the nineteenth century of general
common law, not federal law. Thus, for example, Professor Stewart Jay
has stated that "[tlhe law of nations was classified as 'general law' in
the sense that Swift t. Tyson later employed the term."5 6 Similarly, the

and the holding actually affirm that the President is bound by international law"); see
also PAUST, supra note 18, at 144-45 (discussing Brown).
53. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1447-48 (5th Cir. 1993); Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See
also the cases cited supra note 17.
54. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 825; see also WRIGHT, supra note 41,
at 20-24 (1922) (discussing examples); David J. Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of Alexander McLeod: Superior Orders and the American Writ of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L. J.
515 (1992) (same). An early example of this view is an opinion by Attorney General Levi
Lincoln, in which he stated that no federal law was violated by an assault on a Spanish
ambassador in violation of the law of nations because the law of nations is "part of the
municipal law of each state." Insult to the Spanish Minister, 5 Op. Att'y. Gen. 691, 692
(1802).
55. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 825; see also CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES §
290, at 518 (1922) (noting that the federal government was "obliged to content itself with
requesting the Governor of such State to set in motion the local machinery of justice");
Charles H. Watson, Need of Federal Legislation in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of
Lynching of Aliens, Lecture Delivered at the School of Civics and Philanthropy, Chicago,
Ill. (Mar. 13, 1916), in 25 YALE L.J. 561, 570 (1916) ('"[Ihe federal officers and courts
have no power in such cases to intervene for either the protection of a foreign citizen or for
the punishment of his slayers."') (quoting PRESIDENT HARRISON, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES 686 (1891)).
56. Jay, supra note 27, at 832.
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Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
which is otherwise supportive of broad claims regarding the status of
customary international law, observes that, "[diuring the reign of Swift
v. Tyson... State and federal courts respectively determined international law for themselves as they did common law, and questions of international law could be determined differently by the courts of various
States and by the federal courts." 57 Even Professor Louis Henkin, perhaps the leading proponent of the modern position, appears to have
conceded, at least in some writings, that customary international law
was not treated as federal law in the nineteenth century. 58 It is telling
that the commentators who disagree with this conclusion are unable to
cite a single decision from the nineteenth century in which a court invalidated a presidential, congressional, or state enactment on the basis
of a conflict with customary international law.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ERIE FOR THE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

That customary international law did not have the status of federal
common law in the nineteenth century does not mean, of course, that it
should not have this status today. It is possible that other, nonhistorical arguments might support the treatment of customary international law today as federal common law. This is not the place for a
comprehensive response to such arguments, some of which are addressed in the article by Professor Goldsmith and myself. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that, to be successful, such arguments
must overcome a number of constitutional concerns, including the countermajoritarian concern of unelected judges applying law derived from
sources largely external to the domestic political process, the separation-of-powers concern associated with judges interpreting and enforcing such law without authorization to do so from the political branches,
and the federalism concern of federal judges making supreme federal
59
law in this area binding on the states.
My focus here is not on these constitutional issues per se, but
rather on a single event that, by itself, substantially undermines the
modern position claim that customary international law has the status

57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 9, ch. 2, introductory note, at 41.
58. See Henkin, supra note 17, at 886 n.69; Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law
in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (1984); but see Louis HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 69 (1995) (asserting, without citational support, that customary international law has historically been supreme federal law).
59. For discussion of these concerns, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 85759, 861-70; John M. Rogers, InternationalHuman Rights Law and U.S. Law, in WORLD
JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 107, 116-18 (Mark Gibney ed.,

1991); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 665, 707-31 (1986).
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of federal common law. That event is the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.60 The Erie decision, while long the subject
of substantial attention by federal courts and civil procedure scholars,
has generally been ignored by proponents of the view that customary
international law has the status of federal common law. This is surprising, given that Erie appears to have direct relevance to that view on
61
a number of levels.
As discussed above, the federal courts in the nineteenth century
felt free to develop their own general common law, independent of the
common law developed by state courts. In overruling the nearly century old Swift v. Tyson decision that had approved this practice, the
Court declared that "[t]here is no federal general common law." 62 As a
result, the Court held, consistent with its reading of the Rules of Decision Act, 63 that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
64
of the State."
As we have seen, customary international law had the status in the
nineteenth century of general common law. 65 Erie's holding therefore
could be read as directly precluding independent application of customary international law by the federal courts. Indeed, no less a judge than
66
Learned Hand reached this very conclusion.
One obvious response to this argument, made by Professor Philip
Jessup shortly after Erie was decided, is that, notwithstanding its broad
language, the Court in Erie was "surely was not thinking of international law."67 While this is probably true, it is not by itself a particularly persuasive response. The Court in Erie was not thinking specifically about many areas of law that are presumably subject to its
holding. More fundamentally, the Court was thinking about-and
speaking to-the proper role of the federal courts in making law. That
60. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61. The following discussion elaborates on Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at
852-55.
62. 304 U.S. at 78.
63. The Rules of Decision Act was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789 and today appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1652. The Act provides: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
64. 304 U.S. at 78. The Court forgot about treaties, which are also mentioned in the
Rules of Decision Act (as well as in the Supremacy Clause).
65. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
66. See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948). Judge Hand did add
the following caveat: "Whether an avowed refusal [by a state] to accept a well-established
doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would present a federal
question we need not consider, for neither is present here." Id.
67. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. IN'L L. 740, 743 (1939).
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aspect of its analysis does not seem to depend on the particular law in
question.
In any event, even if the actual holding of Erie does not speak to
the issue, the reasoning of Erie provides additional grounds for questioning the claim that federal courts today have the independent power
to apply customary international law. As Justice Frankfurter later explained, Erie "did not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a
particular way of looking at law." 68 Specifically, the Court in Erie rejected two theoretical underpinnings of nineteenth-century jurisprudence: the idea that federal courts can apply law not derived from a
sovereign source, and the idea that courts merely discover the common
law rather than make it.
In rejecting the first idea, the Court explained that the practice of
the federal courts in developing their own general common law had
rested on a "fallacy."69 This fallacy involved the assumption, in the
words of Justice Holmes, that "there is 'a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute."' 70 In fact, said the Court (again quoting Holmes),
'law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist with-

out some definite authority behind

it."'71

In rejecting the second idea, the Court expressed the view that
courts do not discover common law, they make it. The Court quoted
Justice Field's observation, for example, that federal general common
law 'is often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine
72
thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular subject."'
The Court therefore emphasized the need to identify the source of the
authority being exercised by the federal courts, noting, for example,
that "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer [general common73
lawmaking] power upon the federal courts."
These two ideas rejected in Erie had served to legitimize judicial

68. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945); see also, e.g., BRIDWELL &
WHITTEN, supra note 40, at 130 ("Erie purported to overrule a particular philosophy of, or
manner of looking at, law'); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.5, at 300

(2d ed. 1994) ("the decision reflected a major shift in jurisprudence away from a belief
that courts simply apply preexisting objectively true natural law principles'); Larry
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 283 (1992)
("Erie's real significance is that it represents the Supreme Court's formal declaration that
this [nineteenth-century] view of the common law (with all its implications for our understanding of law in general) is dead....').
69. 304 U.S. at 79.
70. Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518,
533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
71, Id.
72. Id. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)
(Field, J., dissenting)).
73. Id.
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application of customary international law in the nineteenth century. 74
With these ideas repudiated, the claim that federal courts can continue
to apply customary international law independent of incorporation by
the political branches becomes at least questionable. This is especially
so given the fundamental difference between pre-Erie general common
law and post-Erie federal common law-the latter is considered supreme
federal law binding on the states. As Professor Weisburd has explained, "extending federal common law status to customary international law would federalize a subject over which the Supreme Court
75
consistently disclaimed control even pre-Erie."
Of course, notwithstanding Erie, the federal courts have continued
to create some common law. This post-Erie "federal common law," unlike the earlier general common law, is considered part of supreme federal law and thus is binding on the states.7 6 Although scholars differ
significantly regarding the proper scope of federal common law, 77 many
agree that, in light of Erie, there must be some sort of authorization
from the Constitution or federal legislation for the federal courts to en78
gage in this lawmaking.
So, we are left with the following question: Where is the authorization for the federal courts to apply customary international law as federal common law? 79 The authorization cannot easily be found in the
text of the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution declares treaties
to be the supreme law of the land,8 0 and Article III extends the federal

74. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
75. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, FederalCourts, and InternationalCases, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 41 (1995).
76. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-07 (1964). Judge Friendly famously referred to this common
law as the "new federal common law." In fact, the common law before Erie was not, at
least generally, federal. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The confusion arises
because "federal" can refer to the nature of the law (supreme federal law) or the source of
the law (federal courts).
77. For a discussion of various theories regarding federal common law, see George D.
Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem, 12 PACE L. REV. 229 (1992).
78. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 895-96 (1986); Friendly, supra note 75, at 407, 421, 522; Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1985);
see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 876 n.263 (citing additional authority).
79. In a recent article, Professor Lawrence Lessig misstates the authorization requirement proposed by Professor Goldsmith and myself as requiring that, "before international law gets incorporated into a domestic regime, a statute must ratify it." Lawrence
Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1785, 1810 (1997). In fact, all that our thesis requires is "political branch
authorization," something that, as we explained, could take a variety of forms and may
not always be easy to ascertain. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 819-20, 869,
870, 871.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
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judicial power to cases arising under treaties,8 1 but neither article mentions customary international law.8 2 The only reference in the Constitution to customary international law is its delegation of power to Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.8 3 As for
statutory authorization, Congress has not enacted any statute purporting to authorize general incorporation of customary international
law into federal law. It has instead incorporated customary international law into federal law in select instances,8 4 something that would
be largely superfluous if all of customary international law were federal
common law.
Professor Paust maintains that the authorization comes from the
reference in Articles III and VI of the Constitution to the "Laws of the
United States," which he maintains encompasses customary international law.85 There are a number of difficulties with this argument.
First, it does not sit well with the historical evidence, which, as discussed above, suggests that customary international law was treated
like general common law, not federal law.8 6 Indeed, Professor Paust's
argument appears to be the same one made in 1875 by Justice Bradley
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ....').
81. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ('The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; ... .
82. The historical record of the drafting of the Constitution "is at best inconclusive"
regarding the Framers' intent concerning the domestic legal status of customary international law. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 493 n.38 (1989). An early draft of Article III, apparently written by James Wilson, would have extended federal court jurisdiction to cases
arising under the "Law of Nations." See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 157 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). The reference was deleted, however, without explanation. See PAUST, supra note 18, at 30 n. 33; Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the
United States, supra note 58, at 1569 n.22; Jay, supra note 34, at 830.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("he Congress shall have Power... To define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations;"). For a discussion of the history of this clause, see Charles D. Siegal,
Deference and its Dangers: Congress' Power to Define... Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 874-79 (1988).
84. A recent example is the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, in which Congress
created a federal cause of action against any individual, acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation," who subjects another individual to
torture or extrajudicial killing. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 STAT. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350).
85. See Paust, supra note 18 at 6; see also Comment, Federal Common Law and Article III: A JurisdictionalApproach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 328 (1964) (making similar
argument).
86. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text; see also Jay, supra note 34, at 83233 (explaining that the law of nations probably was not mentioned in Articles III and VI
of the Constitution because it was considered general law, not federal law); Weisburd, supra note 16, at 1233 (explaining that, "at least throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, customary international law was not seen as part of the law of the United
States, as that term is used in article III of the Constitution.')
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and rejected by all the other members of the Supreme Court.87 Moreover, the argument ignores other language in the Constitution, such as
the requirement in Article VI that "Laws of the United States" be "made
in pursuance" of the Constitution.88 In light of that requirement, Article VI cannot easily be read to include customary international law,
given that, as Professor Henkin notes, customary international law "is
not made by the United States and through its governmental institutions alone but by them together with many foreign governments in a
process to which the United States contributes only in an uncertain way
and to an indeterminate degree."8 9 In addition, reading it that way
would contradict "the [Framers'] prepositivist understanding that
judges merely discovered law."90 Finally, the argument does not explain why the Framers would mention the law of nations specifically in
Article I but refer to it only by implication in other articles, or why they
would repeatedly mention treaties but not the law of nations. 91
I do not contend that this is the last word on the subject of authorization. Complicated arguments about authorization have been and will
continue to be developed. Professor Goldsmith and I address some of
these arguments in our article, including the argument that the
authorization comes from the structure of the Constitution.92 Significant progress will have been made, in my view, simply if more proponents of the modern position begin to identify and explain the purported
authorization.
The authorization issue is particularly important today, given recent changes in the nature of customary international law. As Profes87. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; .... ")
89. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 508 n.16; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10,
at 850.
90. Jay, supra note 34, at 833.
91. There were statements in connection with neutrality prosecutions in the 1790s
asserting that the law of nations was part of "the laws of the United States." See, e.g.,
Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Grand Jury
charge of Jay, C. J.). The meaning of these statements is unclear at best. There is nothing to suggest that these statements meant that the law of nations was part of the "Laws
of the United States" within the meaning of Articles III and VI of the Constitution. Indeed, the historical evidence suggests that these statements might have meant simply
that the law of nations was general common law, see Jay, supra note 27, at 825-33, or
that it was state law, see Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 L. &
HIST. REv. 267 (1986). In any event, the Supreme Court subsequently resolved the matter against the law of nations having federal-law status. First, the Court repudiated federal court common law prosecutions such as those conducted in the neutrality cases. See
United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Second, as the nineteenth century progressed, the
Court repeatedly referred to and treated the law of nations as general common law.
92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 860-70.
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sor Brilmayer has observed, "notions of what international law is all
about are central to arguments about whether it belongs in American
courts."9 3 In this regard, much of the traditional customary international law of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has either
been codified in this country in the form of statutory or treaty law (as is
the case, for example, with respect to foreign sovereign and diplomatic
immunity) 94 or has become irrelevant (as is the case, for example, with
respect to prize law). 95 Consequently, most of the relevance of the modern position claim that customary international law has the status of
federal common law concerns what Professor Goldsmith and I have
termed the "new customary international law."96 This new customary
international law has evolved largely since World War II, and largely in
the area of human rights.
As Professor Goldsmith and I, as well as others, have explained,
the new customary international law differs from traditional customary
international law in several fundamental ways: it can arise much more
quickly; it is based less on actual state practice and more on international pronouncements, such as UN General Assembly resolutions and
multilateral treaties; and, perhaps most importantly, it purports to
regulate not the relations of states among themselves, but rather a
state's treatment of its own citizens. 97 In sum, the new customary international law is less consensual and less objective than traditional
customary international law, and it is more likely to conflict with domestic law.
Although these changes in the nature of customary international
law certainly could be questioned (both normatively and descriptively), 98 I do not take issue with them for purposes of this paper. My
93. Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L.J. 2277, 2279 (1991).
94. Foreign sovereign immunity is now the subject of a comprehensive federal statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994), and diplomatic immunity is the subject of treaties to which the United States is a party. See, e.g.,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
95. Prize law, an important feature of the Supreme Court's nineteenth-century
docket, has now largely disappeared. See David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of
Prize, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 31, 36-41 (1995) (book review).
96. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 838-42.
97. Id.; see also HENKIN, supra note 58, at 33-39, 173-81 (describing these changes);
Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over InternationalHuman
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartigav. Pena-Irala,22 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 53, 64-74 (1981) (same); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 529, 543-50 (1993) (same).
98. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles,12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992); J.S. Watson,
Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in InternationalLaw, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609 (1979). But see Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature,
Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147
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argument is simply that these developments further compel consideration of the proper domestic institutions for giving effect to this law. In
particular, they arguably increase the need for the law to go through
U.S. democratic processes before having the effect in this country of
federal law. 99
This need is further heightened by actions taken by the political
branches in recent years with respect to international human rights
law. For better or worse, the political branches have gone out of their
way not to convert international human rights law into domestic law.
Much of the customary international law of human rights is reflected in
multilateral treaties. 100 The first thing that is noteworthy about these
treaties is that the United States has so far declined to ratify many of
them. 10 1 In addition, for the treaties that it has ratified, the United
States has consistently attached a series of reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs") that purport to limit the treaties' domestic effect.
As an example, the United States attached to its ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights10 2 "the cornerstone of modern international human rights law" 10 3 five reservations,
five understandings, and four declarations. 104 These provisions include
retention of certain substantive rights that are in conflict with provi(1995/96) (defending modern customary international law as consistent with traditional
principles).
99. As Professor John Rogers has pointed out: "To say that the courts have an additional body of 'higher law' to apply, to be found in the whole amorphous body of customary
international law, is to inject an enormously distorting overdose of additional power into
the judicial branch. This is particularly so in the area of human rights, where practice is
difficult to ascertain, and evidence that nations feel bound by international human rights
norms is difficult to distinguish from hypocrisy." Rogers, supra note 59, at 117.
100. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 832, 839-40; Henkin, supra note 10,
at 36; Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982).
101. The United States has not yet ratified, for example, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(A) (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976); the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 46), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 29, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); and the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force
July 18, 1978).
102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
103. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the InternationalCovenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 277
(1995).
104. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2,
1992).
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sions of the Covenant, such as the right to execute juveniles. They also
include a federalism clause, stating that, in implementing the treaty,
matters within the jurisdiction of the constituent states may be implemented by the states rather than by the federal government. In addition, they include a declaration that the treaty is not self-executing.
Similar provisions appear in connection with the U.S. ratification of
other human rights treaties.10 5
One motivation for these RUDs, which the government included in
the face of substantial domestic and foreign opposition, "was a desire
not to effectuate changes in domestic law." 106 Thus, again taking the
example of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
non-self-executing declaration "clarif[ies] that the Covenant will not
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts"; 10 7 the federalism understanding "serves to emphasize domestically that there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority between State and Federal
governments or to use the provisions of the Covenant to 'federalize'
matters now within the competence of the States";108 and specific reservations that preserve differences between United States law and the
requirements of the Covenant ensure that "changes in U.S. law in these
areas will occur through the normal legislative process."' 09 This position of the political branches of our government further brings into
question the independent incorporation of such norms into domestic law
by the federal judiciary. 11
105. See U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02
(daily ed., June 24, 1994); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings, International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 132 CONG. REC. S1355-01 (daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986).
106. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1206 (1993).
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report, Sen. Rep. 102-23, 102nd Cong. 2d Sess., at 19 (March 24, 1992).
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Some commentators suggest that the exercise of this independent judicial power
should not be a matter of concern because Congress can always overrule the courts if it
disagrees with their decisions in this area. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 58, at 1566.
There are a number of problems with this reasoning. First, not all proponents of the
modern position agree that Congress can in fact overrule customary international law.
See Henkin, supra note 17; Henkin, supra note 58. Second, the argument proves too
much. The argument could be made, for example, regarding all of the Swiftian general
common law, yet Erie declared that the federal courts do not have the power to make such
law. See 304 U.S. at 78. Third, the argument assumes that Congress has the information, time, and political ability to overrule what it would view as judicial mistakes in this
area. In fact, these institutional limitations may mean that "lawmaking by federal courts
would in most cases give the last word to the federal courts rather than to Congress."
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, and for other reasons articulated
in my article with Professor Goldsmith, customary international law
should not have the status today of federal common law. Acceptance of
this conclusion does not mean that customary international law would
necessarily have the status of state law. Absent some sort of legislative
enactment, it may not be law at all for U.S. courts, in either the state or
the federal courts. If states did choose to borrow international law
principles into their law, they presumably could do so, and this borrowed international law would have the same effect as other state law.
At first glance, this conclusion-that states might have a role in interpreting customary international law-may seem surprising. But it
should not be. This was true historically, as discussed above. Moreover, in the area of human rights law, incorporation of international
norms by the states generally would make the states more rightsprotecting than the federal government, a status that is often allowed to
the states in other areas of law.111
Despite my disagreement with the modern position, I want to emphasize that I am not, to use Professor Paust's term, an "enemy of customary international law."1 1 2 My concern here is not with the legitimacy of customary international law but rather with the proper
institutions in our constitutional structure for incorporating such law
into U.S. law.1" 3 As a result, my analysis is not intended as an arguThomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23
(1985). Fourth, the argument begs the question of why the normal constitutional presumption that state law governs in the face of political branch silence should not apply.
Cf. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994)
(rejecting challenge under dormant foreign commerce clause to state taxation rule and
noting that "we leave it to Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's-to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy").
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the exercise of this judicial power is improper,
then it should not be allowed to occur in the first place. See Merrill, supra at 22.
111. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 70 (2d ed. 1992) ("state courts are always free
to grant individuals more rights than those guaranteed in the Constitution, provided it
[sic] does so on the basis of state law"); id. at 71 ("one must always remember that the
state courts may exceed the federal courts in the granting of rights under the state's laws
or constitution as long as they do not violate a restriction of federal law")
112. Paust, supra note 20.
113. For a powerful criticism of the tendency of some courts and commentators to focus on
rights to the exclusion of structural and institutional considerations, see ROBERT F. NAGEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 62-72
(1989). This tendency may explain Professor Lessig's recent suggestion that the decision
whether to require U.S. courts to obtain authorization from the Constitution or the political
branches before applying international law as federal law involves a choice "between a particular philosophy of law and a value of justice." Lessig, supra note 79, at 1810. The sharp
dichotomy drawn by Professor Lessig ignores the possibility that institutional considerations
may themselves have implications for justice. His statement may also reflect an assumption
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ment, for example, against ratification of human rights treaties or the
enactment of expansive human rights legislation. Indeed, it could be
read as inviting exactly such measures. In my view, incorporating international law in this fashion, rather than on an ad hoc and inconsistent basis through the judiciary, will actually be better in the long run
for the domestic enforceability of international norms.

that courts are the principal agents for justice, a proposition that is both uncertain and controversial. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991) (questioning the
ability of courts to bring about social change).

TRAGEDIES IN SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA,
HAITI, RWANDA AND LIBERIA- REVISITING
THE VALIDITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW- PART II
VED P. NANDA,* THOMAS F. MUTHER, JR.** AND AMY E.
ECKERT***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In part I of this article,' Professor Ved Nanda presented a framework for determining the validity of unilateral humanitarian intervention under international law. The framework was based on an analysis
of selected cases of humanitarian intervention that occurred during the
Cold War. To fall within this category, the intervention had to be an
assertion of a state's right to protect its "own nationals or a third state's
nationals in another state, or even the nationals of the state against
which coercive measures were undertaken."2 Although a historical
analysis of this doctrine was undertaken, the selected cases (the United
States' 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1983 intervention
in Grenada, and 1989 intervention in Panama; India's 1972 intervention in East Pakistan; Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda; and
Vietnam's 1978 intervention in Cambodia) all occurred in the postUnited Nations Charter period.
Based on these case studies, five criteria for evaluating humanitarian intervention were enumerated: (1) the necessity criterion,
whether there was genocide or gross, persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights; (2) the proportionality criterion, the duration and propriety of the force applied; (3) the purpose criterion,
whether the intervention was motivated by humanitarian consideration, self-interest, or mixed motivations; (4) whether the action was
collective or unilateral; and (5) whether the intervention maximized the

* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law at the University of Denver, College of Law.
** J.D. graduate of the University of Denver, College of Law, 1996.

J.D. graduate of the University of Denver, College of Law, 1997.

1. Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti- Revisiting
the Validity of HumanitarianIntervention Under InternationalLaw - Part 1, 20 DENy. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 305 (1992).
2. Id. at 309.
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best outcome. 3 These criteria were then applied to determine the validity of United Nations ("U.N.") intervention in Iraq to protect the
Kurds in North Iraq and the Shiites in the South. However, since the
publication of Part I of this article, several additional interventions on
humanitarian grounds have occurred. For the most part, these interventions were undertaken collectively by multinational forces, under
the auspices of the U.N. or other regional arrangements. In the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international security organization, NATO, led
the intervention.
For the current study, we have selected the following five cases:
Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Liberia. Our purpose is to explore
the current trends of humanitarian intervention and to make some tentative observations on its future direction. We will, however, begin with
a few preliminary remarks highlighting the pertinent geopolitical
changes in the recent past which have a significant bearing on how the
doctrine is perceived and shaped.
II.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by hopeful signs that the
dream of collective security for the maintenance of international peace
and security would perhaps become a reality. To repel the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, an effective marshaling of forces drawn from several countries occurred pursuant to the Security Council ("Council")
mandate that Member States "use all necessary means ... to restore
international peace and security in the area."4 This effort reflected the
ability of the Security Council's permanent members to work together
as never before and created widespread hope that the U.N. would, at
5
last, function as the framers intended.
Subsequently, in January 1992, a Council summit took place with a
request to the Secretary-General to submit a report on the U.N.'s
peacekeeping activities. 6 A few months later, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
then Secretary-General, complied with the request and submitted An
Agenda for Peace,7 a blueprint for future U.N. action. An ambitious vision of the U.N.'s role in the maintenance of international peace and security, this vision included four types of activities: preventive diplomacy
before disputes escalate; peacemaking under Chapter VII when hostile
parties have not yet reached an agreement; peace-keeping; and postconflict peace-building.8 The Secretary-General emphasized the pros3. Id. at 330.
4. S.C. Res. 678, April 5, 1991, reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S/678].
5. James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 28 (1991).

6. Statement by the President of the Council in the section entitled "Peacemaking
and peace-keeping," U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992).
7. U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111, June 17, 1992
8. Id. para. 20.
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pects for the U.N.'s ability to maintain peace in the post-Cold War
world and characterized the new spirit of cooperation in the Security
Council as a "second chance to create the world of our Charter." 9 Initially, the permanent members of the Security Council shared this enthusiasm, which they expressed by creating an unprecedented number
of new operations.
To illustrate, while there were just thirteen
peacekeeping operations from the U.N.'s inception to 1985, they jumped
to thirty by the end of 1994.10
The prospects for a more effective U.N. role in the maintenance of
the international order were, however, short-lived. The Gulf War became at best a distant memory after severe setbacks to U.N.
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia;1" a display of sheer helplessness by
U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia; 12 a withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping
force from Rwanda, which led to disastrous results in that country-including genocidal acts, hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties,
and a million refugees and displaced persons; 13 and an ineffective U.N.
partnership with the intervening forces of the Economic Community of
14
Western African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian civil war.
Meanwhile, the United Nations came under heavy attack in the
U.S. Congress on charges that it suffered from cumbersome bureaucratic bungling and wasteful duplications and redundancies. 15 The outcome was that the U.N. had its share of financial woes, causing the organization nearly to go bankrupt. 6 Moreover, there was no enthusiasm
9. Id. para. 75.
10. See VICTORIA K. HOLT, BRIEFING BOOK ON PEACEKEEPING-THE U.S. ROLE IN
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 1-4 (2d ed. 1995).
11. See generally Jarat Chopra, Achilles' Heel in Somalia: Learning from a Conceptual Failure, 31 TEX INT'L L.J. 495 (1996) [hereinafter Chopra].
12. Roger Cohen, U.N. Mission in Bosnia: A Painful Lesson in Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1995, at A10.
13. The United Nations had difficulties establishing a peacekeeping force in the wake
of the Rwandan violence. See Paul Lewis, Boutros-GhaliAngrily Condemns All Sides for
Not Saving Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at Al. Once established, the peacekeeping force failed to provide security against human rights violations. See Donatella Lorch,
U.N.-Rwanda Ties Sour as Mandate Nears End, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A8; Barbara Crossette, Send the Peacekeepers Home, a Ravaged Rwanda Tells U.N., N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1995, at A9.
14. See section III(E) infra and Clement T. Adibe, The Liberian Conflict and the
ECOWAS-U.N. Partnership,18 THIRD WORLD Q. 471 (1997). Adibe alleges that the U.N.'s
effort in Liberia was "indifferent and purposeless" and that many Liberians were not even
aware of the U.N.'s presence there. Id. at 485.
15. Several outspoken members of the U.S. Congress criticized the United Nations as
bloated and ineffective. Such sentiments, coupled with a perception that he opposed reform, motivated the American opposition to Boutros Boutros-Ghali's serving a second
term as Secretary-General. See John M. Goshko, U.S. Sides against Second Term for
U.N. Chief in Informal Vote, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1996, at A13. Dissatisfaction with the
management of the United Nations also underlies Congressional objections to paying the
U.S.' debt to the United Nations. See Plan to Fund U.N. Draws Helms'Fire,WASH. POST,
Jan. 30, 1997, at A6.
16. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Juggles Funds to Stay Afloat, Expert Says, N.Y. TIMES,
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among major players at the United Nations for building the organization's capacity to enable it to effectively discharge its primary function
of maintaining international peace and security.
The SecretaryGeneral's plea for the U.N. to have a rapid deployment force and for
sound financing came to naught.
A major outcome of the end of the Cold War and especially the rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia was the closing of the chapter
on superpower intervention and proxy wars on ideological grounds. The
U.S. would now define its national interest quite narrowly, retreating
from its earlier preference for assertive multilateralism as the focus of
its foreign policy. The change in policy was articulated in May 1994 in
Presidential Decision Directive ("PDD") 2517 enunciating the criteria by
which President Clinton's administration would determine whether or
not to support U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations. Henceforth the
criterion for U.S. action or support would be the extent to which U.S.
interests would be advanced. Among other factors were the severity of
the threat to international peace and security, including the gross violation of human rights, the clarity of objectives, the capacity to accomplish those objectives, the consequence of inaction, and the anticipated
duration of the mission.18
In light of these developments, it remains doubtful whether collective intervention could be realistically expected to occur even in the face
of egregious violations of human rights, if the major powers in the U.N.,
especially those with veto power in the Security Council, did not find it
in their national interest to authorize the use of force for such intervention. Rwanda is a case in point, as are Burundi and Liberia. As a result, in order to prevent and deter further transgressions against humanity, there must be room for unilateral intervention on
humanitarian grounds.

Sept. 13, 1995, at A8.
17. White House Press Release, The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations, undated.
18. For a thoughtful analysis of PDD 25, see generally Glenn T. Ware, The Emerging
Norm of HumanitarianIntervention and PresidentialDecision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L.
REV. 1 (1997).
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III. CASE STUDIES
A.

Somalia' 9
1.

The Conflict

Somalia gained its independence in 1960 from colonial powers Britain and Italy.20 For nine years immediately following independence,
Somalia enjoyed a stable democratic government. 21 However, in 1969,
allegations of fraud by the elected government prompted Major General
Mohamed Siad Barre to seize power through a military coup. 22 By manipulating Somalis' clan loyalties, repressing opposition groups, and
corruption, Barre maintained his grip on Somalia for over two dec23
ades.
Because of Somalia's strategic location near the Gulf of Aden, both
superpowers sought Somalia's allegiance during the Cold War by providing Barre with foreign aid. 24 Playing Somalia's strategic geographical position to his advantage, Barre courted the U.S. and the Soviet
Union alternately. 25 After coming to power in 1969, Barre declared his
government to be Marxist in order to receive foreign aid from the Soviet
Union. 26 In 1977, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Ethiopia, Somalia's historical rival. 27 Consequently, Barre sought and received foreign aid from the U.S..28
By the mid-1980s, the U.S. started decreasing its aid to Somalia,
which fell from $34 million in 1984 to $8.7 million by 1987, a 75 percent

19. See generally JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION
RESTORE HOPE (1995); I.M. LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA: NATION AND STATE
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (1980); D.D. LAITIN & S.S. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: NATION IN SEARCH
OF A STATE (1987); TERRENCE LYONS & AHMED I. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: STATE COLLAPSE,
MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION, AND STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (1995);
M.S. OMAR, THE ROAD TO ZERO: SOMALIA'S SELF-DESTRUCTION (1992); A.I. Samatar, Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention, 30 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 625 (1992).
20. Modern Somalia existed as two separate colonies, Italian Somaliland and British
Somaliland. These two colonies merged into Somalia upon independence in 1960. S.S.
SAMATAR, HISTORICAL SETTING, IN SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 3 (Helen Chapin Metz
ed., 1993)[hereinafter SAMATAR].
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. at 36-37.
23. SAMUEL M. MAKINDA, SEEKING PEACE FROM CHAOS: HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 17 (1993)[hereinafter MAKINDA].
24. Keith B. Richburg, Orphan of the Cold War: Somalia Lost its Key Role, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 1992, at A24 [hereinafter Richburg].
25. Id.
26. SAMATAR, supra note 20, at 42.
27. Richburg, supra note 24.
28. Id.
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decline in just three years. 29 By 1988, the U.S. and the European
Community, except for Italy, had virtually abandoned Somalia. 30 After
the end of the Cold War, Somalia's strategic position ceased to have
value, and the international community's interest in the country diminished still further. 31 This undermined Barre's political position
within his own country. Inter-clan rivalries, corruption within Barre's
government, and weariness of political repression erupted into fullfledged civil war. Even before the final collapse of Barre's government
in January 1991, the Somali state had ceased to fulfill its institutional,
political, and economic functions. 32 After the final defeat of Barre, the
United Somali Congress ("USC") appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed as So33
malia's interim president.
The USC draws its support from Somalia's largest clan, the
Hawiye. However, Mohamed Ali Mahdi faced opposition from General
34
Mohamed Farah Aideed, a member of a different Hawiye sub-clan.
During the course of their struggle for control, the factions supporting
Ali Mahdi and Aideed destroyed most of Mogadishu. 35 The ongoing civil
war between the USC factions, along with the presence of violent armed
gangs in the country, resulted in the collapse of an effective government
in Somalia. The situation was further exacerbated by a severe drought,
which exacted a terrible toll on Somalia-approximately 300,000 persons perished. 36 These conditions captured the world's attention and
prompted a response from the international community.
2.

The Intervention

The United Nations first addressed the situation in Somalia in
January, 1992. Recognizing the gravity of conditions within Somalia
and terming them a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council imposed a complete arms embargo on Somalia and called
for increased humanitarian aid. 37 Beyond this marginal commitment to

ending the military strife and resulting widespread famine, this resolution did little more than espouse commonplace rhetoric with no clear
hopes of bringing about an end to the crisis.
Three months later, after a cease-fire agreement was signed by the
29. SAMATAR, supra note 20, at 46.
30. MAKINDA, supra note 23, at 56.
31. Id. at 89.
32. ROBERT

G.

PATMAN,

THE U.N.

OPERATION

IN

SOMALIA,

IN A

CRISIS

OF

EXPECTATIONS: U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990's 87 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A.
Thayer eds., 1995)[hereinafter PATMAN].
33. MAKINDA, supranote 23, at 31.
34. Id. at 31.
35. Keith B. Richburg, Aideed Warlord in a Famished Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 8
1992, at Al.
36. PATMAN, supra note 32, at 85.
37. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992).
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warring parties in early March 1992, the Security Council acted again
by adopting Resolution 746. 3 8 In addition to calling on the combatants
within Somalia to cease their activities, Resolution 746 accepted the
U.N. Secretary-General's recommendation that a technical team be sent
to Somalia with the goal of observing the administration of humanitarian aid and brokering a peace agreement between the parties. 39 The
team was to report back to the Security Council. However, the inadequacy of these measures soon became apparent, the situation continued
to deteriorate, and the Security Council was forced to take additional
measures. Thus it adopted Resolution 751,40 which foreshadowed the
formation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia ("UNOSOM").
The resolution authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a special
representative for Somalia, deployed fifty troops to monitor the ceasefire, and "in principle" established a security force "to be deployed as
soon as possible."41 In August 1992, the Security Council acted again in
light of further deteriorating conditions in Somalia, authorizing an airlift of humanitarian aid through Resolution 775.42 This resolution
seemed to reflect the Security Council's view that UNOSOM had enjoyed some success and that the deployment of additional U.N. forces
43
would perhaps suffice to bring peace to the region.
Months later, nearly one year after its original recognition of the
human rights abuses in Somalia, the Security Council acknowledged
the ineffectiveness of the embargo and the previous deployment of
forces. In Resolution 794, the Security Council determined that the
conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security,44 and endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General that
action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should
be taken in order to establish a more secure environment for humani-

38. S.C. Res. 746, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES746 (1992).
39. Id. See also Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th
mtg., at 16, U.N. Doec. S/23963 (1992). This approach was tenable, given the U.N.'s success in negotiating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, ending the eight year
war between Iran and Iraq in 1988, and South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia in 1989.
40. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992).
41. On July 27, 1992, Security Council Resolution 767 acknowledged the arrival of
the fifty observers. S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3101st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S1RES/767 (1992). It is also noteworthy that Resolution 751 established a committee to
monitor the arms embargo, a seemingly moot initiative considering the embargo's inconsequential effect on the human rights situation in Somalia to that point. See Rajendra
Ramlogan, Towards a New Vision of World Security: The United Nations Security Council
and Lessons of Somalia, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 213, 235 (1993).
42. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992);
see also Security Council Approves More Troops to Somalia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,

Aug. 29, 1992, Lexis, Nexis Library, AFP File, at 2. This action was taken on the Secretary-General's recommendation. The Situation in Somalia: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/24480 & Add. 1 (1992).
43. See Ramlogan, supra note 41.
44. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doec. S/RES/794
(1992).
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tarian relief operations in Somalia. 45 This resolution could be considered a watershed because it marked the first time that the Security
Council invoked its Chapter VII powers and acted under Article 42 on
46
humanitarian grounds.
To illustrate, Resolution 794 broke new ground in two significant
ways. First, in light of the internal turmoil and the lack of a functioning government, the Council was forced to intervene without the consent of the government. 47 Second, Resolution 794 seemed to extend the
scope of Chapter VII to include human rights abuses, for in invoking its
Chapter VII powers, the Security Council stated that "the magnitude of
human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia... constitutes a
threat to international peace and security."48 This aggregation of gross
violations of human rights within the borders of a country with a threat
to international peace and security expanded the scope of Chapter VII
action considerably.
Just as the decision to use force in Somalia broke new legal ground,
the implementation also featured a new model of collective humanitarian intervention which could become possible only after the end of the
Cold War. While the early stages of U.N.-led intervention were successful in providing food and medical care to those in need, the U.N. lacked
the necessary resources and political will to create another U.N. force.
Thus, Resolution 794 empowered a U.S.-led coalition, the Unified Task
Force ("UNITAF"), to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia."49
Before opting for the U.S.-led coalition, the Council, however, considered five options to address the Somali crisis, as outlined by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his letter to the Council. 50 Two of these options envisioned direct U.N. intervention. 51 But, as noted earlier, the U.N. lacked
the necessary resources, the logistical and contingency planning infrastructure, and the organizational capability to undertake an operation
of this magnitude by itself. Moreover, the U.S. had offered to lead a
45. Letter Dated 29 Nov. 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992) [hereinafter
Secretary-General's Letter].
46. The Security Council adopted Resolution 794 as it was concerned with the starvation of civilians in Somalia, finding that a threat to international peace and security existed because of the "magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia,
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian
assistance." Id.
47. Paul Lewis, Key U.N. Members Agree to U.S. Force in Somalia Mission, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3 1992, at Al.
48. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 44, at 1.
49. Michael Wines, US. Launches SomaliaAid Mission, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 5 1992,
at Al. It seems likely that without the U.S.'s offer, the U.N. may never have committed to
a full peace force in the region. Ramlogan, supra note 41 at 237.
50. Secretary-General's Letter, supra note 45.
51. Id.
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52
military force for delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia.

UNITAF, established to end the humanitarian suffering in Somalia, consisted of 37,000 military personnel, 28,000 of whom came from
the U.S.53 This new operation enjoyed more success than its predecessor, and the parties agreed to a cease-fire on January 8, 1993, which
permitted the full implementation of the U.N.'s 100-Day Action Program.5 4 There was an increased U.N. and non-governmental organization ("NGO") presence in Somalia. The Addis-Ababa agreements of
January 8-15 that year committed Somali clan leaders to cooperate in
the creation of a cease-fire monitoring group and the collection and destruction of weapons.
With its limited resources and personnel, the U.N. would not have
achieved these results without the help of the U.S.. However, the
U.N.'s decision to defer control of UNITAF to the U.S. also entailed
some costs. The U.S., having achieved the immediate goal of restoring
some peace and stability, was unwilling to remain in an increasingly
hostile environment longer than necessary. 55 By contrast, the Secretary-General clearly wished for the U.S.-led UNITAF to remain in place
longer, stating that "[i]t would be a tragedy if the premature departure ...of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into an56
archy and starvation."
On March 26, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
814, which established the United Nations Operation in Somalia
("UNOSOM I") in hopes of promoting a prompt, smooth, and phased
57
transition from the Unified Task Force to a U.N.-led intervention.
52. Id. For a discussion of these options, see Mark R. Hutchinson, Recent Development - Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded
Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 624, 629-32 (1993).
53. By comparison, UNOSOM consisted of only 500 personnel. In his December 8,
1992 address, the Secretary-General stated that Operation Restore Hope's goals were "to
feed the starving, protect the defenseless, and prepare the way for political, economic, and
social reconstruction." Statement of the Secretary-general to the People of Somalia on
United Nations Action on Security, Humanitarian Relief, and Political Reconciliation in
Somalia, U.N. Press Release SG/SM14874, December 8, 1992.
54. See 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, October 6, 1992, which called for, among other things, massive infusion of food aid,
provision of basic health services, urgent provision of clean water, delivery of shelter materials, and prevention of future refugee outflows.
55. Keith Richburg, Top U.N. Officer in Somalia says Tactics were Apt, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23 1993, at A12. In areas controlled by UNITAF, food and medical supplies resumed
movement and agricultural workers once again began production. Robert Oakley, Mission Accomplished in Somalia, WASH. POST, Mar. 21 1993, at C7.
56. Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs
18 and 19 of Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/25354 and add. 1 & 2 (1993) (proposing that UNITAF extend its operations to the whole
of Somalia and disarm the factions before handing over operational responsibility to a
new U.N. peacekeeping operation.). See also U.N. Doc. S/24992, Dec. 19, 1992.
57. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/814
(1993).
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Taking into consideration UNITAF's limited success in creating a stable
peace in Somalia, the Security Council again acted under Chapter VII
and expanded UNOSOM II's size and mission. The Security Council
gave UNOSOM II responsibility for consolidating, expanding, and
maintaining a secure environment throughout all of Somalia, with a
special eye to disarmament and demanding that the Somali parties
abide by the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993.58 This included
such nation-building efforts by the U.N. as the establishment of regional councils and a police force. Given UNOSOM II's mandate, it is
appropriate to conclude that, while it typified a traditional peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM II was conceived as a peace enforcement mis59
sion.
In response to an attack on Pakistani troops serving as part of
UNOSOM II, in which over 20 soldiers were killed and over 50
wounded, the Security Council passed Resolution 837.60 The Resolution
reiterated the Secretary-General's prior authorization under Resolution
814 to take all necessary measures including investigation, arrest, detention, and prosecution of all those responsible. The U.N. action entailed, inter alia, attacks upon Aideed's headquarters. 6 1 Several civilian
casualties occurred and efforts were taken to find and prosecute Aideed.
62
These actions, however, alienated segments of the local population.
Subsequently, the U.S. withdrew its forces, several European countries
followed suit, and eventually in January 1995, UNOSOM II troops, conceding the failure of the mission, began withdrawing. By early March,
63
all UNOSOM II forces had departed from Somalia.

58. Id.
59. See Kenneth Freed, Somali Civil War is Over, Rivals Vow Peace, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1992, at Al; John M. Goshko, U.N. Chief Favors Use of Force in Somalia: Plan Offers
Radical Change from Group's History of Passive Peace Keeping, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1992,
at Al; Robert Greenberger, Troop Strength: Outspoken U.N. Chief Takes Strong Role, Irking Some Nations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at Al.
60. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1-3 , U.N. Doc. S/Res./837
(1993).
61. See Donatella Lorch, U.N. Says Attack Dealt Heavy Blow to Somali Faction, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1993, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Planes Hit Mogadishu Again, WASH.
POST, June 13, 1993, at Al.
62. See Donatella Lorch, Aidid's Forces Still Strong, U.N. Aides in Somalia Say, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1993, at A6; Keith B. Richburg, Somali Mob Kills Three Journals,Melee
Follows Raid on MilitiaForces, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993, at Al.
63. See Donatella Lorch, As U.N. Girds to Leave Somalia, Renewed Fighting, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at A3; Donatella Lorch, Marines Cover U.N.'s Pullout from Somalia,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at Al; Farewell to Africa, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 28, 1995,
at 19. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994), U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/1995/231 (1995); Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1996/42 (1996).
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Appraisal

The United Nations intervention in Somalia extended the scope of
Chapter VII to include violations of human rights. The intervention began with the objective of providing humanitarian assistance. Subsequently, its focus was shifted to follow the traditional role of U.N.
peacekeeping missions of seeking reconciliation among the warring factions, and still later to undertaking enforcement action. The U.N. mission failed in Somalia primarily because it lacked a coherent policy to
identify its objectives and to marshal adequate resources to accomplish
those objectives. To illustrate, the task of building or rebuilding institutions in Somalia with the goal of political reconstruction and nation
building that the U.N. undertook through resolution 794 required the
investment of considerable political capital, resources and know-how,
and skillful operation in the effort to bring about Somalia's political
transformation. Also, the U.N. mandate to disarm the warring factions
and to take enforcement action under Chapter VII resulted in heavy reliance on armed forces and a disproportionate emphasis on a military
approach to address the crisis. The U.N. found itself wanting on both
64
accounts as it sought to meet these goals.
B. Former Yugoslavia
The U.N. intervention in the former Yugoslavia is by far the best
known, and perhaps least understood, of all U.N. actions since the end
of the Cold War. The huge toll in human life and property damage captured the attention of the world. 65 In addition, the U.N. operation that
responded to this crisis was the largest to date. 66 Despite its high visibility, the complexities of the dispute made it difficult to understand,
especially because the conflict involved numerous ethnic, linguistic, and
religious factors, and because the positions of the parties changed from
time to time.
1.

The Conflict

Beginning after World War II and until its eventual collapse, Yugo64. For an incisive analysis of the failure of the U.N. mission, see generally Chopra,

supra note 11.
65. The estimated death toll for 1995 ranges from 167,000 (Bosnian Institute of Public Health) to 250,000 (Country Reports on Human Rights).
66. U.N. involvement in the former Yugoslavia was authorized by several Security
Council resolutions and consisted of 44,000 military and civilian personnel. Nearly $4
billion was assessed to U.N. Member States. Peace Operations- Update on the Situation
in the Former Yugoslavia, GAO Report, May 9, 1995, at 3. For incisive accounts of the
conflict and the intervention, see generally SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS
AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995); SUSAN WOODWARD, IMPLEMENTING
PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A POsT-DAYTON PRIMER AND MEMORANDUM OF
WARNING (1996).
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slavia provided a system of peaceful compromise for the many nationalities within its borders, in spite of the conflicting, multifaceted, and
perennial national questions they posed.6 7 Yugoslavia's creation in
1918 marked the first occasion of Serbs and Croats living together in
the same state, 68 and the interdependence of these two largest ethnic
groups in the country helped to maintain the stability of the Yugoslav
system. 69 Still, Yugoslavia never succeeded in constituting itself as a
political community, and was always forced to compete with its subsidi70
ary national communities and their desires for statehood.
The death of Tito in May 1980, after thirty-seven years of rule,
marked the beginning of the end of the Yugoslav state. With Tito's
death, the political center in Yugoslavia weakened, and new pressures
for change began to surface. 71 Serbian nationalism would come to play
a significant role in Yugoslavia's eventual disintegration and the ensuing war. In 1984, the League of Communists of Serbia introduced the
first comprehensive reform package since Tito's death.7 2 Key among its
provisions was the rolling back of the provinces' autonomy within Ser73
bia.
In 1987, the triumph of conservative factions in the League of
Communists of Serbia and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic bolstered a
nascent nationalist movement.7 4 Milosevic introduced measures calculated to increase Serbian national pride, such as increasing use of the
Cyrillic alphabet, and adopting a new, militant national anthem that
had been banned during Tito's lifetime. 75 The leaders of this movement
sought to arouse nationalist fervor by portraying Serbs as persecuted
76
within the Yugoslav state and threatened in the wake of its collapse.
This enmity of other Yugoslav peoples formed the bedrock of the Serbian national identity.7 7 Serbian leaders used extreme measures to
mobilize Serbian diaspora in support of Serb nationalism, including
rumors of planned genocidal attacks against Serbs living in other re78
publics.
Open conflict erupted in the former Yugoslavia in June 1991, when
67. VESNA PESIC, SERBIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 1

(1996)[hereinafter PESIC].
68. SABRINA PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL 1 (1996) [hereinafter RAMET].

69. PESIC, supra note 67, at 1. Historically, Croatia favored greater autonomy from
Yugoslavia, while Serbia supported greater centralism. These antagonistic positions exhibited during Yugoslavia's existence help to explain the course of the post-Yugoslavia
conflicts. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 5.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78

RAMET, supra note 68, at 7.
Id. at 14.

Id.
PESIC, supra note 67, at 14.
RAMET, supra note 68, at 26.
PESIC, supra note 67, at 14.
Id.
ld. at 21.
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two former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their independence. 79 The dominant Serbian republic, with the weight of the
Yugoslav National Army behind it, joined with the ethnic Serbs living
in Croatia who opposed Croatian independence.8 0 The U.N. responded
by imposing an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia's successor states 81
and by sending an envoy to help mediate an end to the fighting. The
U.N.'s special envoy, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was able to
broker an end to this initial conflict, and the parties agreed to an unconditional cease-fire in November 1991.82 In January 1992, the U.N.
Security Council sent a small contingent of fifty troops to Yugoslavia for
the purpose of overseeing the fragile cease-fire.8 3 One month later, the
Council increased the size of this force by twenty-five.8 4 Finally, in February 1992, after it was satisfied that the major obstacles to the establishment of a peacekeeping force had been removed, the Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force ("UNPROFOR")

through Resolution

743.85

By July 1992, the situation in Croatia seemed relatively secure,
and the U.N.'s attention turned to the newly-created Bosnian Republic.
The hostilities between Bosnia and Serbia developed independently of
those between Serbia and Croatia. While Yugoslavia existed as a state,
both Serbs and Croats inhabited Bosnia-Herzegovina, and both the
Serbian and Croatian republics had historical claims to the region.8 6 As
early as November 12, 1991, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic
warned of the inevitability of war and requested the immediate dispatch of U.N. peacekeeping forces.8 7 After the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed the existence of the Bosnian Serb Republic on December 20,
1991, President Izetbegovic made another futile appeal for the deployment of a peacekeeping force along the Bosnian border.88 On March 3,
1992, the Izetbegovic government declared the independence of Bosnia
after a referendum.8 9 Within a month, conflict broke out between Bos79. For a detailed account of the history leading up to the decision to declare independence, see RAMET, supra note 68.
80. Slovenia was mostly spared from direct military confrontation because only a
small number of ethnic Serbs lived in Slovenia.
81. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
82. S/RES/721 (1991), adopted by the Security Council at its 3018th meeting, on 27
November 1991.
83. S/RES1727 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3028th meeting, on 8
January 1992.
84. S/RES/740 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3049th meeting, on 7
February 1992.
85. S/RES/743 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3055th meeting, on 21
February 1992.
86. See PESIC, supra note 67, at 2.
87. The Security Council received this warning coldly, stating in its Resolution 724
(S/RES/724) that the situation in the former Yugoslavia had not escalated to a level warranting a U.N. peacekeeping force.
88. RAMET, supra note 68, at 245.
89. Id. at 246.
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nian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. Because the Serbs enjoyed the support of the Yugoslav Army, 90 by the end of 1992 they controlled seventy
percent of Bosnian territory. 9 1
Meanwhile, Bosnian Croats were working to consolidate their hold
on the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 92 Although the Croats had
initially supported the Bosnian government, they eventually seized approximately twenty percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's southwestern territory. 93 Ironically Serb and Croat troops, who had been fighting
against each other less than six months earlier, were now working to94
gether to carve up the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2.

The Intervention

Two months after the outbreak of full-scale conflict between Serbia
and Bosnia, the Security Council adopted a resolution on May 30,
1992, 95 that imposed trade sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro - hereinafter "Yugoslavia") for supporting aggression. This resolution also expanded the UNPROFOR mandate to Bosnia and enlarged the duties of the mission. 96 The regional
involvement in the intervention began in July 1992 when the Western
European Union ("WEU") and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") effectuated compliance with the Security Council mandate
97
through their naval operations.
The U.N.'s and European Community's diplomatic efforts, led by
Secretary Vance and Lord David Owen, to resolve the Yugoslav crisis
failed. 98 Meanwhile in November 1992 the Security Council adopted a
resolution calling upon states, acting unilaterally or through regional
organizations, to enforce the embargoes.9 9 A month earlier, the Security Council had resolved to ban military flights in Bosnian air space
and called upon states, acting individually or through regional organizations, to help UNPROFOR enforce the ban.10 0 Subsequently, in

90. Id.
91. Id. Although Milosevic had agreed to withdraw the Yugoslav Army, only 14,000
of 89,000 troops actually left. Milosevic transferred the remaining 75,000 troops to the
command of Radovan Karadzic and renamed them the "Army of the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina." Id.
92. PESIC, supra note 67, at 247.
93. RAMET, supranote 68, at 248.
94. Id. at 251.
95. S. RES/757, adopted by the Security Council on May 30, 1992.
96. Id.
97. See THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION:
INTRODUCTION AND BASIC DOCUMENTS 155-58 (A. Bloed ed., 1995). NATO's intervention

in former Yugoslavia is described in Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizationsin
Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.L. REV. 235, 260-65 (1997).
98. See generally RAMET, supra note 68, at 249-50.
99. S/RES/ 787 (1992).
100. S/RES/781 (1992).
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March 1993, the Security Council adopted another resolution to extend
the no-fly zone to all aircraft and authorized states to take "all necessary measures" to enforce it.101 The next month it passed another
resolution imposing total economic and diplomatic sanctions on Yugoslavia. 102 NATO and WEU responded by expanding their operations.
The Security Council adopted several more resolutions, creating
U.N. Safe Areas, "free from armed attacks and from any other hostile
act,"'0 3 empowering UNPROFOR to protect them and promote the
withdrawal of military forces by using force, 1° 4 and inviting the Secretary General to take necessary steps to ensure respect of the Gorazde
Safe Area. 10 5
The Council also authorized air power to assist
UNPROFOR,106 in response to which NATO conducted air strikes. After the Bosnian Peace Agreement, signed in Dayton, Ohio, in December
1995,107 the Security Council authorized member states to establish a
multinational implementation force ("IFOR") under unified command
and control and acting through or in cooperation with NATO, and to
take "all necessary measures ...in defense of IFOR or to assist the
force in carrying out its mission. ' 108 It phased out the arms embargo
and suspended sanctions against Yugoslavia. 10 9
3.

Appraisal

Initial attempts by the United Nations to intervene and bring about
peace in the former Yugoslavia were again hampered by the lack of
adequate resources at its command, coupled with the lack of political
will of member states to make concerted efforts toward that end. Subsequently, it was the U.S. leadership and intervention by NATO forces
that imposed peace in the region.
C. Haiti
Although the Haitian crisis did not receive the same media attention as Somalia or Bosnia, it represents another instance in which massive violations of human rights compelled the U.N. to authorize forcible
intervention. 110
101. SfRES/816 (1993).
102. S/RES/820 (1993).
103. SfRES/824 (1993). The Safe Areas were Sarajevo, TuzIa, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac,
and Srebrenica.
104. S/RES/836 (1993).
105. S/RES/913 (1994).
106. See SfRES/836 (1993) and S/RES/958 (1994).
107. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reprinted
in 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996).
108. S/RES/1031 (1995).
109. S/RES/1020 (1995); S/RES/1022 (1995).
110. By the time the Security Council adopted a resolution to intervene on July 31,
1994, there were independent reports of widespread massacres of those allegedly suppor-
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The Conflict

The Haitian crisis began in September 1991, when newly-elected
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted from office and forced to
flee to the United States."' Aristide had been elected by an overwhelming majority of Haitian voters in the first free election in Haiti's
history. 112 After Aristide's overthrow by a military junta, widespread
human rights abuses ensued. Over 3,000 Haitians were murdered, and
others were raped, arbitrarily arrested, and tortured." 3 These violations spurred a massive flight of Haitian citizens who took to makeshift
vessels in hopes of reaching the U.S..
The Organization of American States ("OAS"), with its long history
of intervention in Haiti," 4 was the first to impose sanctions against the
military regime. In an emergency meeting held on September 30, 1991,
the OAS "recommended action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of
those who hold power illegally in Haiti." 115 The Permanent Council of
the OAS went further and called for an economic embargo to isolate
Haiti from the rest of the Western Hemisphere.1 6 Meanwhile, the U.N.
General Assembly passed a resolution supporting these sanctions and
condemning the coup and the ensuing human rights abuses. 117 The
U.N. was also instrumental in universalizing the sanctions originally
imposed by the OAS. At the urging of Western governments, the U.N.
Security Council expanded the OAS embargo of Haiti to include all U.N.
member states."18 However, the U.N. did little else to oust Haiti's militive of the ousted Haitian President Aristide. Amnesty Reports, Haiti-HumanRights: Increase in Violations, GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK, Aug. 24, 1994, at 1 (Lexis/Nexis
News File).
111. See generally INTERAGENCY AND APOLITICAL MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF PEACE
OPERATIONS: HAITI - A CASE STUDY 10 (Margaret D. Hayes & Gary F. Wheatley eds.,
1996); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 85th Sess.,
O.A.S. Doc. OEAISer. L/VIII.85 (Feb. 11, 1994).
112. Aristide, a Catholic priest, garnered sixty-seven percent of the vote. Michael P.
Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute InternationalCrimes
in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 2 (1996).
113. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HAITI: THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY, HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS SINCE THE COUP (1992). President Clinton described the military junta as
"plainly the most brutal, the most violent regime anywhere in our hemisphere ....[The]
brutal atrocities threaten tens of thousands of Haitians." Gene Gibbons, Clinton Vows
Haiti's Military Will Leave, REUTERS, Sept. 14 1994, Lexis/Nexis Library; President Bill
Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation, Sept. 17, 1994, Lexis/Nexis Library.
114. Haiti:From Intervention to Invasion, CURRENT AFFAIRS, Feb. 1995, at 54.
115. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OAS Doc. MRE/RES 1/91 (October 3, 1991.)
116. Id. In May, 1992, the OAS passed a second resolution after failed attempts at
negotiations asking member states to renew their commitment to the embargo by denying
port access to ships violating the embargo, denying visa privileges to coup members, and
freezing coup leaders' assets. O.A.S. Doc. OEAJSer. G/CP/SA 896/92(8) (Apr. 1, 1992).
117. G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/46/L.8/Rev.1 (1992).
118. Diego Arria, Diplomacy and the FourFriendsof Haiti, in HAITIAN FRUSTRATIONS:
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tary regime.
Diplomatic attempts to find a negotiated settlement to the Haitian
crisis began early the following year. 119 In February 1992, representatives of Aristide and the military leaders met in Washington, D.C., and
signed the Washington Accord, which called for the selection of a new
Prime Minister as well as amnesty for the military leaders and others
who were involved in the coup. Although the Washington Accord also
acknowledged Aristide as the president, it did not make provisions for
his return to Haiti. Soon after the signing of this agreement, both Aristide and the military regime denounced the Washington Accord, marking the failure of the first round of negotiations.
The collapse of the Washington Accord demonstrated that during
the year following the coup little progress had been made toward a
resolution of the crisis. The U.S. found itself addressing the issue of
refugees fleeing the repressive C~dras regime and seeking asylum in
the U.S. In May, President George Bush began the controversial policy
of using the U.S. Coast Guard to turn back Haitian refugees intercepted
on the high seas. 120 In September, the OAS sponsored further negotiations between representatives of the military regime and Aristide. Although no resolution was reached on the point of Aristide's return, the
de facto military government did agree to allow human rights observers
into the country.
Although another new year began with the military government
still firmly in power, the newly-elected President Clinton made some
attempts to resolve the crisis the following year. In March 1993,
Clinton named Lawrence Pezzullo as a special advisor on Haiti to the
Secretary of State. The following month the U.S. imposed new economic sanctions on Haiti, an oil embargo and a freezing of Haitian assets abroad. In this context of increased pressure on the military leadership, C6dras and Aristide signed the Governors Island Agreement.
The Governors Island Agreement called for a new government and
prime minister, the resignation of the military leaders, a general amnesty for those involved in the coup and U.N.-mandated training of
Haiti's police and military. Most significantly, and unlike previous
agreements, the Governors Island Agreement provided for Aristide's return to Haiti by October 30, 1993.
The signing of the Governors Island Agreement raised hopes for a
peaceful solution to the crisis. In August, the international embargo
against Haiti was lifted and apparent progress toward Aristide's return
to Haiti was made. These hopes, however, were doomed to disappointDILEMMAS FOR U.S. POLICY 95 (Georges A. Fauriol ed., 1995).
119. We have relied heavily upon sources cited in supra notes 111-114 for the following
discussion of Haiti.
120. Although presidential candidate Bill Clinton denounced the Bush Administration's policy of forced repatriation during the campaign, President Bill Clinton would
eventually continue the policy after taking office.
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ment. In spite of the fact that both Aristide and the military leaders
signed the Governors Island Agreement, they were not really in agreement, because the differences between the two sides had merely been
"papered over." 121 This lack of real consensus made itself clear shortly
before the date set for Aristide to return. The prospects for Aristide's
return to Haiti dimmed on October 11 when the American naval ship
U.S.S. Harlan County was turned back from landing in
Port-au-Prince. 122 Two days after this setback, the U.N. re-imposed
economic sanctions and an oil embargo, and the U.S. Navy sailed into
Haitian waters to enforce the embargo. The date set in the Governors
Island Agreement for Aristide's return passed without a resolution to
the crisis. After the failure of the Governors Island Agreement, the
U.S. had no immediate alternative policy, but the Clinton Administration still hoped for a negotiated resolution.
Negotiations began again in December when Haitian Prime Minister Robert Malval traveled to Washington to meet with Aristide. Malval, who had come into office in August as part of the Governors Island
Agreement, faced intimidation by the Haitian military, and despite the
fact that he and Aristide needed each other's support against the military government, a rift grew between the two of them. 23 Despite this
tension, Malval decided to seek an agreement with Aristide to resolve
the crisis. He traveled to Washington, D.C., where he proposed a plan
which the Clinton Administration endorsed enthusiastically. Under the
Malval Plan, a national conference would choose a new, more broadlybased government which could negotiate a resolution with the military
leaders in order for them to comply with the Governors Island Agreement. The U.N., the OAS, the Four Friends of Haiti (Venezuela,
France, the U.S., and Canada), and Haiti's political and business leaders all supported the Malval Plan. Aristide, however, rejected it on the
ground that the military would still retain substantial power under this
plan.
Despite Aristide's rejection of the Malval Plan, diplomatic efforts to
resolve the crisis were not at an end. The Four Friends of Haiti sent a
delegation to Haiti and issued a warning to C6dras that unless Haiti's
military leaders stepped down by January 15, 1994, Haiti would face
even tougher sanctions. In spite of this warning, the January 15 deadline passed without compliance by the C6dras regime. Attempts at a
diplomatic resolution to the crisis continued in February 1994, when a
Haitian parliamentary delegation traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet
with Aristide. This delegation proposed another solution to the crisis,

121. Georges A. Fauriol and Andrew S. Faiola, Prelude to Intervention, in HAITIAN
FRUSTRATIONS: DILEMMAS FOR U.S. POLICY 103 (Georges A. Fauriol ed.,
1995)[hereinafter Fauriol & Faiola].
122. See generally Kate Doyle, Hollow Diplomacy in Haiti, 11 WORLD POLY J. 50
(1994).
123. See Fauriol & Faiola, supra note 121, at 104.
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calling for a new Prime Minister and government, and the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Governors Island Agreement.
Aristide also rejected this plan, and demanded tougher sanctions
against the military leaders instead of further efforts at a diplomatic
resolution.
Although the Clinton Administration still favored a diplomatic
solution to the crisis, Aristide and his demands for tougher sanctions
enjoyed support in the U.S. Senate. Under pressure from Aristide's
American supporters the Clinton Administration subsequently announced its intention to seek tougher sanctions against Haiti, unless
the C6dras regime gave up power and allowed Aristide to return. These
new sanctions included a complete economic embargo and the closure of
Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic. After the military leaders
once more refused to step down, the U.N. imposed these new sanctions
on May 21, 1995. Over the next month, the Clinton Administration
took additional unilateral steps by cutting off all American flights to
Haiti, restricting financial transfers to Haiti from the U.S., revoking all
non-immigrant visas, and preventing Haitians from entering the country.
2.

The Intervention

Unfortunately for the Clinton Administration, even these stricter
sanctions failed to resolve the crisis and force the military leaders out of
power. Hoping that a show of force would compel the military leaders
to step down, the U.S. stationed 2,000 Marines off the Haitian coast,
along with several assault ships and attack helicopters. This step may
have had the unintended consequence of making a military intervention
inevitable. 24 Doubts still remained, however, about taking the final
step, an invasion of Haiti. Weighing against military intervention were
concerns about the risks and commitment involved, as well as the
precedent that such a measure could potentially set. 125 However, notwithstanding these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 940, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" by a multina126
tional coalition to restore the Aristide government in Haiti.
The following month President Clinton officially authorized plans
for invasion, and a State Department representative met with the leaders of four Caribbean nations to form the multinational coalition which
was to carry out the invasion. On September 15, over substantial domestic opposition from Congress, President Clinton delivered a televised address to the nation and discussed the plans to invade Haiti.
Just when an invasion seemed inevitable and all hope for a peaceful
124. See id. at 112.
125. See id. at 112-13
126. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
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resolution appeared lost, an eleventh hour attempt to find a diplomatic
resolution succeeded.
Two days after President Clinton's televised address, an American
delegation including former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam
Nunn and General Colin Powell arrived in Haiti as a last-minute attempt to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The following day, the
two sides reached a compromise. C6dras agreed that he and the other
military leaders would step down by October 15, and that American
troops could enter Haiti unopposed. On September 19, U.S. troops
landed peacefully in Port-au-Prince. On October 12, C6dras officially
resigned, and Aristide finally returned to Haiti on October 15, 1995.
Although the consolidation of democracy in Haiti was far from complete, the crisis that the military coup had touched off was finally over.
3.

Appraisal

The United Nations played a rather limited role in resolving the
Haitian crisis. The OAS's role was equally limited. It is hard to imagine the military junta relinquishing power without the U.S.' threat to
send armed forces into Haiti and the credibility of that threat as perceived by the junta. However, both the U.N. and the OAS had endorsed
the U.S. leadership in mounting an interventionary force, and the outcome of the intervention was an end to the brutal repression of Haitians
127
by the junta.
D.

Rwanda

In a little over three months in the summer of 1994, between
500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutus, died tragically in a
genocidal campaign. While this slaughter took most of the world by
surprise, there was sufficient early warning that such a massacre might
occur. However, the United Nations and member states took no effective action to prevent the disaster. Nor did they intervene to stop the
killings. 128 Rwanda had in fact suffered several massacres since the
127. For two opposite views on the Haiti intervention, see James Morell, Haiti: Success Under Fire (1995 Report of the Center for International Policy) (in support of intervention); Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for
the United Nations, 36 HARV. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
128. See generally U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND

RWANDA, 1993-1996 (1996)[hereinafter U.N. AND RWANDA]; STUDY 1-5, THE JOINT
EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA EXPERIENCE (1996); GERALD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
AFRICA, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: APRIL-MAY 1994 (1994); ARTICLE 19, BROADCASTING
GENOCIDE - CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA AND STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN RWANDA
(1990-1994) (1996); Holly Burkhalter, The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administra-

tion and Rwanda, WORLD POL'Y J., Winter 1994/1995, at 44; Peter Rosenbloom, Book Review: The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 313 (1997).
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1950s-in 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993.129 Despite this, the 1994 genocide was unprecedented. To provide an appropriate context for understanding the failure of the international community to prevent the 1994 massacre, we will briefly review Rwanda's
post-colonial history, early U.N. and regional efforts aimed at halting
violence in the region, and the events immediately preceding the summer of 1994.
1.

The Conflict

Prior to the 1994 massacre, Rwanda was one of the most densely
populated countries in the world. Within its population two major ethnic groups existed. The Hutus accounted for eighty-five percent of the
total population, while the Tutsis comprised roughly fourteen percent of
the population. 130 In spite of the fact that the Hutus formed the majority group, the Tutsis had ruled over the Hutus since the sixteenth century. 13 1 Prior to colonization, the Tutsis had maintained "reciprocal obligations and allowed for a degree of social mobility," thereby quelling
ethnic violence. 132 After World War I, German and Belgian colonizers
exploited ethnic differences between the Hutus and Tutsis, creating a
system of ethnic stratification between two culturally and linguistically
133
homogenous groups.
By 1959, Belgium, under pressure from the United Nations General
Assembly, instituted democratic reforms in Rwanda, which had become
a trust territory of Belgium under U.N. auspices. Democratization, as
could be expected, met with strong support among the Hutu population,
and fierce opposition among the Tutsi minority. Despite constitutional
changes that gave the Hutus greater representation, the Tutsi minority
retained control over Rwanda. During this period of post-colonial democratization, the first Hutu uprising claimed the lives of hundreds of
Tutsis and drove thousands more from the country. Through this uprising, Hutus gained control of Rwanda upon its independence in 1961.
Fear of this Hutu-led government caused over 200,000 Tutsis to flee to
neighboring Uganda and other countries.
In 1973, General Habyarimana seized power in a military coup.

We have relied heavily on these sources for the following discussion on Rwanda.
129. See Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in
Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1125 (1994).
130. U.S. Agency for International Development, Rwanda-Civil Strife/ Displaced Persons 1 (Situation Report No. 4, 1994).
131. JASON A. DZUBOW, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL WAR IN RWANDA 513
(1994).
132. See generally GuY VASSALL-ADAMS, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL
AcTION (1994).

133. Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participationin
Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 52 (1995).
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Habyarimana, a Hutu, governed Rwanda for the next twenty years
through the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development ("MRND"), Rwanda's sole political party. In part, he maintained control by refusing to repatriate Tutsi refugees living in other
countries, invoking Rwanda's poor economic conditions. In 1990, however, efforts by the Organization of African Unity ("OAU") and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR")
compelled Habyarimana to enter into talks regarding political reform.
But the process proved fruitless when the Rwandese Patriotic Front
("RPF"'), comprising Tutsis who had earlier fled from Rwanda, invaded
from Uganda, killing hundreds of Rwandans and displacing thousands
more. In spite of the MRND's numerous human rights violations
against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the peace process resumed on October 17, 1990, and continued through the rest of the year.134 Evidence
suggests that Habyarimana, through a campaign of hate propaganda,
promoted hatred and fear of Tutsis. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the Question of Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions stated
that since the RPF attacks in 1993, all Tutsis within Rwanda had been
labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition
party were considered traitors. Between 1990 and the massacre in
1994, the Habyarimana government feigned cooperation with those interested in reform, while actually promoting ethnic hatred within
Rwanda.
The floodgate of ethnic hatred opened on April 6, 1994, when
Habyarimana's airplane was shot down as he was returning from a regional peace summit in Dar es Salaam. His death set off a chain reaction of indiscriminate killing of Tutsis and Hutu opposition members,
led by the Presidential Guard. This massacre sparked renewed fighting
between the RPF and the Rwandan Government Army which lasted until July 18, when the RPF took control of the country. 135 This armed
conflict, coupled with the MNDR's inflammatory broadcasts, created
widespread fear and displaced 1.5 million people. After gaining control,
the RPF established a government with a broad representative base.
2.

The Intervention

Early U.N. efforts were focused primarily on promoting cease-fire
agreements between the Rwandan government and Tutsi guerrillas13 6
These efforts, while not addressing human rights violations in Rwanda,
played a decisive role in promoting the Arusha Peace Agreement. The
Arusha Peace Agreement sought the U.N.'s oversight of the installation
134. Africa Watch, Talking Peace and Waging War (1992); Africa Watch, Beyond the
Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda (1993).
135. Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. U.N. Doc. S/1994/1133 (1994).
136. See Kimberly D. Barnes, InternationalLaw, the United Nations, and Intervention
in Civil Conflicts, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 117, 136 (1995).
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of a broad-based transitional government terminating upon national
elections. The Agreement was designed to help unify the armed forces
of the government and the RPF and to oversee the cease-fire as established by the Agreement. Both parties, under direction from Tanzanian
President Mwinyi, requested U.N. assistance in implementing the
Arusha Peace Agreement after its signing.
The U.N. had been previously involved in the region through the
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda ("UNOMUR'), deployed in June 1993.137 UNOMUR's primary purpose was to ensure
that no military assistance from surrounding countries flowed into
Rwanda. The Arusha Agreement served as an invitation for a U.N.
peacekeeping operation and led to the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda ("UNAMIR"). UNAMIR's mission
was to provide short-term peacekeeping operations involving monitoring of the Arusha cease-fire provisions, erecting safe zones, overseeing
the transitional government, and providing a security presence in Kigali. The UNAMIR plan consisted of four phases. First, the U.N. would
establish a broad-based transitional government in Kigali. Second, the
armed forces would be demobilized and integrated. Third, the U.N,
would expand and monitor the Demilitarized Zones ("DMZs") throughout Rwanda and along the Rwanda-Uganda border. Fourth, the mission would terminate with nationwide elections in Rwanda.
UNAMIR succeeded in meeting its early goals, but failed to bring
lasting peace to the region. In the first ninety day phase, the SecretaryGeneral reported to the Security Council that the political aspects were
stabilizing under the leadership of the U.N. Special Representative,
that steps toward demilitarizing Rwanda were underway, and that humanitarian relief efforts had commenced. 138 However, the SecretaryGeneral also pointed out that during November 1993 two mass slayings
in and around the DMZs occurred, humanitarian relief efforts had been
interrupted by violence in Burundi, and a serious drought had occurred.
The Secretary-General also stressed the importance of continued cooperation and support from Member States. However, as time passed and
the crisis deepened, the support of U.N. Member States would falter,
hindering U.N. efforts in Rwanda.
Security Council Resolution 893, passed on January 6, 1994, called
for the deployment of a second battalion of U.N. troops ahead of schedule. Despite this increased U.N. presence, the creation of the transitional government was delayed, creating further tension within the
country. By March 1994, a deadlock in the creation of the transitional
government created tremendous impediments for the U.N..
One day before the fateful April 6 plane crash, the Security Council

137. See S.C. Res. 846, U.N. SCOR, 3244th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/846 (1993).
138. Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR, U.N. Doc. S/26927, December 30,

1993.
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passed Resolution 909, extending UNAMIR's mandate and calling for
the parties to resolve their differences.
The death of President
Habyarimana and the ensuing genocide in its aftermath soon overwhelmed this call. Rather than taking immediate action, the U.N. reduced UNAMIR forces from 2165 to 1515.
In a memorandum Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent to the Security
Council, he presented three options to the Council. The first was to
massively expand the number of troops in Rwanda and enlarge its
mandate under Chapter VII to authorize UNAMIR to "coerce" a ceasefire. This option would have required Security Council action and the
provision of equipment and troops from Member States. Conversely,
the U.N. could withdraw its forces completely. The third option, the intermediate alternative, was the one accepted by the Security Council in
Resolution 912. Resolution 912 provided authorization to continue with
the existing mission with reduced U.N. personnel of only 270, authorizing them to act as an intermediary between the Rwandan government
and the RPF.139
Continued .massacres, however, compelled the U.N. to re-evaluate
this decision, since Resolution 912 did not empower UNAMIR to bring
an end to the grisly massacres taking place in Rwanda. Furthermore,
this resolution seemed to convey the international community's lack of
concern about the situation in Rwanda. Finally, on May 17, 1994, over
a month after the commencement of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council adopted Resolution 918, under which it expanded UNAMIR
personnel to 5,500. Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. However, the unwillingness of
Member States to contribute troops and equipment drastically delayed
the deployment of this mission. After the Somali experience, the U.S.
was reluctant to address U.N. intervention in Rwanda, and refused
even to acknowledge the genocide, using instead the language that "acts
140
of genocide may have occurred."'
With efforts to revive UNAMIR stalled, the French government
stepped forward with an offer to lead a multilateral force in Rwanda
similar to the American-led UNITAF mission in Somalia. Part of this
proposal required the Security Council to grant the Rwanda mission the
right to use force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Two days
later, Security Council resolution 929 authorized France to use "all necessary means" to achieve humanitarian objectives in Rwanda. This operation, known as "Operation Turquoise," represented only the second
time that a non-U.N. force received authorization to use force for humanitarian reasons.

139. See U.N. AND RWANDA, supra note 128, at 43 , Boutros-Ghali's version, and the
actual memorandum, at 264-65.
140. See Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killing "Genocide,"
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at A8.
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The French-led force was dispatched immediately. Operation Turquoise's first task was the establishment of safe zones for the fleeing
Hutus. Despite the widespread skepticism that the French were not
impartial and were in fact supporting the Hutus, this effort, in conjunction with the RPF's military victory, brought an end to the largest
population movement in modern times. 141 Once security had been established, UNAMIR and UNAMIR II troops took over from Operation
Turquoise on August 21, 1994.
3.

Appraisal

Could the genocide in Rwanda have been prevented? Could it have
been halted by forcible intervention? Based on the evidence presented
in the various studies mentioned earlier,1 42 the answer to both of these
questions has to be in the affirmative. There is plenty of blame to go
around - the Secretary-General, the U.N. and its member states, especially the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, with the
U.S. in the lead share the blame. If there is a clear-cut case to be made
for intervention, Rwanda was it. The Rwandan tragedy also makes a
powerful case for the creation of a standing U.N. quick-reaction volun-

tary force. 143
E.

Liberia

The Liberian civil war was the first case in which a sub-regional
group and the United Nations intervened as partners. Although it was
not an effective partnership, the Liberian experience aptly illustrates
that the world community regards humanitarian intervention as a valid
exception to non-intervention when egregious human rights violations
occur within a state.
1.

The Conflict

44

The roots of the Liberian civil war, which began in 1989, can be
traced to perennial tribal animosities and conflicts, 145 or recurring
abuse of power by the ruling elites who have always oppressed the citizenry. 146 Perhaps a combination of these factors was responsible for
Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe's coup of April 12, 1980, which ended 130
141. U.N. AND RWANDA, supra note 128, at 56.
142. See the authorities cited in supra note 128.
143. For a persuasive proposal for such a force, see Carl Keysen & George W.
Rathjens, Send in the Troops: A U.N. ForeignLegion, 20 WASH. Q. 207 (Winter 1997).
144. This is an adapted and updated version of Ved P. Nanda, Civil War in Liberia:A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Nonintervention, in AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et. al. eds., 1996).
145. See, e.g., J. GUS LIEBENOW, LIBERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE (1970); J. Gus
LIEBENOW, LIBERIA: THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY (1987).
146. See, e.g., MARTIN LOWENKOPF, THE POLITICS OF LIBERIA vii (1970).
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years of the rule of Americo-Liberians, an elite group of descendants of
freed American slaves who founded Liberia in 1847. Although the
country was independent rather than colonized by any European power,
the settlers were repressive and exploitative. 1 47 Doe toppled the
authoritarian regime of President William Tolbert (1971-1980), which
had become increasingly repressive in its effort to silence political dissent.148
Despite its promises to institute fundamental structural reforms,
the Doe regime came to be known as the most corrupt and brutal regime in Liberia's history. It imposed Draconian laws, violated human
rights with impunity, and unleashed a reign of terror. 149 Doe was a
member of the Krahn, a minority ethnic group from the east, and he
promised to provide for the indigenous tribespeople of Liberia. This he
failed to do for any but his own people, many of whom he promoted to
power regardless of their complete lack of qualification. 150 In October
1985, his National Democratic Party of Liberia was declared the winner
in national elections that were marked by fraud.' 5 ' Following four more
years of Doe's severe repression, the stage was set for the bloody civil
war in Liberia.
Charles Taylor, who had served under Doe as head of his procurement agency but fled to avoid being tried for corruption, launched a
guerilla movement which invaded Liberia late in 1989. His goal was to
quickly overthrow Doe, but instead Liberia became mired in a deadly
and protracted civil war. Taylor, a member of the Americo-Liberian
elite, began his rebellion in Nimba County, home of the Gio and Mano
ethnic groups, which suffered greatly under Doe. 152 As the rebel group,
known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL"), attracted
thousands of followers, Taylor's soldiers targeted not only Krahn but
also the allied Mandingo tribespeople with horrendous acts of brutality. 53 Eventually, Taylor overtook much of Liberia, including parts of
the capitol, Monrovia.
The international community for the most part stood by while these
atrocities took place. The United Nations did nothing, and the Organization of African Unity ("OAU") felt constrained by the principle of nonintervention. As Doe had announced he would not be a candidate for
147. See M.S. David, The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here, REV. AFRICAN POL.
ECONOMY, No. 31, at 57 (1984); Gerald Bourke, A Once-Proud Nation Looks Wistfully
West, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 21, 1990, at 11.
148. See generally George May Kieh, Jr., The Causes of the Liberian Coup, 6
TRANSAFRICA FORUM, No. 2, 1989, at 45.
149. See, e.g., LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIBERIA: A PROMISE
BETRAYED (1986).
150. See supra notes 145 and 147.
151. See supra note 149, at 18.
152. See generally B. Berkeley, Liberia: Between Repression and Slaughter, ATLANTIC,
Dec. 1992, at 52-64.
153. See id.
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president in the next elections, the U.S. considered that there was some
chance for a negotiated settlement 5 4 and ruled out direct intervention
to impose a cease-fire and political settlement. Only the Economic
Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") directly intervened,
calling upon the fighting parties to end the conflict peacefully.
Religious leaders brokered and mediated cease-fire talks between
Doe's and Taylor's forces in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with no success.
Then in August 1990, under the auspices of ECOWAS, six of its member West African states agreed on a plan to send in military contingents
from Sierra Leone and Guinea, assisted by a smaller Nigerian contingent, with the intent of preventing further bloodshed and restoring basic security. 155 Three of the six states, Gambia, Mali, and Togo, were
members of the ECOWAS standing mediation committee, and Sierra
Leone and Guinea were already involved in sheltering thousands of Liberian refugees. Together with Nigeria, they hoped to assist in installing an interim government in Monrovia with opposition participation,
and also to facilitate elections within six months. In order to do so, they
would need to prevent Taylor from seizing power. It was considered
that "[h]e may be invited to join the interim government; though unlikely to welcome the ECOWAS initiative, he may have no option but to
56
accept."1
One reporter proposed that the initiative was undertaken because
"none of the member states likes the idea of a fellow West African government coming to power as a result of civil war." 157 The U.S. government was reported at that time to be privately supporting the initia15 9
tive 58 while France openly backed it.
The plan, however, came under attack from Taylor and others who
considered that the action "would be nothing less than an invasion,"
and criticized the ECOWAS initiative as an attempt to "show citizens in
other African nations that it would be futile to attempt to overthrow
dictatorial governments in their own countries."' 60 But the Nigerian
government stated that "Nigeria and other countries could not sit by
154. See Statement from U.S. Embassy, Freetown, Sierra Leone, quoted in REUTERS,
June 21, 1990, BC cycle. Earlier, thousands of Liberians had danced and sung in the
streets during a heavy tropical downpour to demand U.S. intervention. Intervention Call,
INDEPENDENT, June 15, 1990, at 10.
155. See Naomi Wimbourne, Nigeria Tells Liberia It Plans Military Intervention,
REUTERS, Aug. 3, 1990; Robert Powell, West Africa to Demand Ceasefire from Liberian
Rebel Leader, REUTERS, Aug. 15, 1990.
156. Michael Knipe, West African States May Send Troops Into Liberia, THE TIMES,
July 6, 1990.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See France Backs Liberia Intervention Force, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 3, 1990.
160. Comments by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a finance minister in the overthrown government of President Tolbert and by Tom WoWeiyu, Washington-based spokesman for
NPFL. Michael Knipe, LiberiaRebel 'No' to Intervention, THE TIMES, July 7, 1990.
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while their nationals were trapped in the war-torn country without
food, water, or medical facilities." 16 1 The first aim was evacuation of its
nationals, but it also "aim[ed] to restore peace and stability in Liberia
and end a conflict which, if left unchecked, would endanger regional se63
curity."162 Accordingly, Nigeria announced it would intervene.
Complicating the situation was the involvement of another rebel
faction led by Prince Yormie Johnson, a former commander under
Charles Taylor who had a fall out with Taylor's main rebel army. The
reasons for the split between Prince Johnson and Mr. Taylor were not
clear, but the rivalry was serious enough that skirmishes and even one
significant battle took place early on between the two rebel leaders'
troops.164
While pressure mounted upon the U.S. to intervene, 65 the OAU
seemed unwilling to take any action to respond to the crisis. 66 Charles
167
Taylor "continue[d] to insist that this [was] an internal matter."'
Taylor denounced both the Nigerian promise to intervene and the pos168
sibility of U.S. intervention as infringements of national sovereignty.
At the same time, he said that the U.S. must share some of the blame
for Samuel Doe's "crimes," as it had given such substantial aid to Doe
during his 10-year rule, 69 and charged unofficial parties in the U.S.
with supporting Prince Johnson against the main NPFL.170 Prince
Johnson, on the other hand, stated that he would welcome intervention
171
by the United Nations, or an African force.
As ECOWAS convened a mini-summit in Gambia in early August
to endorse just such an intervention of Liberia, the Ghanaian High
Commissioner in Lagos said that the action could no longer be considered a violation of sovereignty because there was no effective government in Liberia. 17 2 Charles Taylor's rebel forces orchestrated a massive
demonstration of civilian refugees to show support for his opposition to

161. Nigeria Considers Intervention in Liberia,REUTERS, Aug. 3, 1990, BC cycle.
162. Naomi Wimborne, Nigeria Tells Liberia it Plans Military Intervention, REUTERS,
Aug. 3, 1990, AM cycle, quoting a senior government source in Lagos.
163. Id.
164. See Robert Powell, Liberia'sRival Rebel Vies for Supremacy, INDEPENDENT, July
31, 1990.
165. See Pope Urges Liberia'sAllies to Help End Civil War, Aug. 1, 1990, REUTERS, BC
cycle. Up to 600 civilians taking shelter in a church in Monrovia were reported to have
been killed by government troops.
166. See Intervention in Liberia, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at 16.
167. Id.

168. See Gill Tudor, Rebel Leader Vows to Resist Foreign Intervention in Liberia,
REUTERS, Aug. 3, 1990, AM cycle.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Michael Roddy, Liberian Rebels Fight Government Troops Through Capital
Streets, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 1990, BC cycle.
172. See Naomi Wimborne, Wide Support Expected for Nigerian-Led Intervention in
Liberia, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 1990, BC cycle.
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any outside involvement. The demonstrators were part of 200,000 refugees who had been sheltered at a University campus near Monrovia,
and the NPFL had assumed responsibility for their well-being, but it
was unable to actually take care of them for lack of provisions. Thus, as
the refugees were marched out by the rebels to express their defiance
with placards proclaiming to the ECOWAS meeting, "We want no socalled peacekeepers," and "We can handle our own affairs," one reporter
called it "a pathetic, unconvincing charade." 173 Many West African nationals at the refugee camp feared for their lives after six Nigerians
174
were killed there by the NPFL.
The intervention was announced by ECOWAS as a "humanitarian
intervention,"' 175 to ensure that food and medical supplies got to those
who needed them and to safely evacuate ECOWAS and other foreign
nationals. 176 It was noted, as the news broke about the finalizing of the
peace-keeping force that both Doe and Prince Johnson had indicated
that they would welcome the ECOWAS force.1 77 Taylor did not object
outright, as he was reassessing his position and his chances at overtaking Doe alone and the probability that if not for the combined action
of ECOWAS, Nigeria and Guinea would act on their own.178 But a few
days later about 1,800 Nigerians taking refuge in the Nigerian Embassy in Monrovia were forced to flee when forces believed to be tied to
Taylor's rebels ransacked the building. 179 The U.S., which continued to
stress that it would not take sides, sent 225 marines into Monrovia to
reinforce security and evacuate the U.S. embassy. 80 The Liberian ambassador to Nigeria accused the U.S. of arming the Liberian antigovernment forces and undertaking other activities in support of the
81
rebels against the Doe government.'
The Taylor forces launched a last-minute attack on the presidential
mansion in an attempt to oust Doe before the arrival of the ECOWAS
peace-keeping force. In the process of moving into the mansion area
from the eastern suburbs, they also had to fight Prince Johnson's forces
on the port side of Monrovia. 8 2 As the ECOWAS forces prepared to
173. Gerald Bourke, Liberia's Refugees Caught Between Army and Rebels,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 7, 1990, at 10.
174. Id.
175. See ECOWAS to Dispatch Intervention Force to Liberia, XINHUA GENERAL
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 7, 1990, Item No. 0807024.
176. Id.
177. Id., citing Ghanaian Foreign Secretary Obed Asamoah, returning from the Banjul, Gambia meeting of ECOWAS.
178. Id.
179. See Nigeria Says its Monrovia Embassy Ransacked by Rebels, REUTERS, Aug. 9,
1990, AM cycle.
180. See Robert Powell, West African Peacekeeping Force to Move into Liberia Next
Week, REUTERS, Aug. 10, 1990, BC cycle.
181. See Liberian Ambassador Accuses Washington of Backing Anti-Government
Forces, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 11, 1990.
182. See Liberian Anti-Government Forces Launch Final Attack on PresidentialMan-
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move into Liberia, Taylor clearly was one of the most serious obstacles
facing them. 8 3 Observers noted that the West seemed to be holding
back in supporting the African countries' effort, perhaps doubting that
84
the operation was viable because of inadequate planning.1
2.

Intervention

As the ECOWAS troops-now known as ECOMOG (ECOWAS
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group)- poised to move into Monrovia under
the command of Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo, one observer reported that Taylor announced he was willing to participate in the ceasefire and that ECOWAS and the OAU did have a role to play toward a
meaningful solution of the conflict. 185 He accepted an invitation to talks
led by the ECOWAS mediation committee. 8 6 Taylor, however, simultaneously appeared to be consolidating his hold on Monrovia as he
blocked roads and refused to let expatriates of any of the West African
87
countries involved in the peace-keeping mission leave Liberia.1
Liberians and nationals from other countries were fleeing over
land, while some were evacuated by sea, including a U.S. evacuation of
nearly 2,325 foreigners.1 88 Guineans and Nigerians, however, were not
permitted to leave, 8 9 as evidenced by the two thousand Nigerians reported to be trapped in the Nigerian embassy. 190 Taylor contended that
Guinea and Nigeria had militarily supported the Liberian army and
that their participation in the peacekeeping force meant that it could
not be construed as neutral.19' Meanwhile, Taylor failed to show up for
the ECOWAS talks which he had agreed on in Gambia, due to an auto192
mobile accident. The talks were rescheduled.
Taylor's troops tried to prevent the 4,000-man peace-keeping force
from landing as it arrived by flotilla in Monrovia port on August 25,
sion, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 11, 1990.

183. See Robert Powell, Troops for Liberia Peace-KeepingForce Gather in Sierra Leone,
REUTERS, Aug. 12, 1990, AM cycle.
184. See William Keeling and Michael Holman, Tough Logistical Obstacles Face Liberia Task Force, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at 4.
185. See Three Warring Parties in Liberia Agree to ECOWAS' Military Intervention,
XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 14, 1990.

186. Id.
187. See Gill Tudor, West Africans Refused Passagefrom Liberia as Diplomats Leave,
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 1990, BC cycle.
188. See Gill Tudor, Taylor Will Attend Peace Talks, Liberian Rebels Say, REUTERS,
Aug. 19, 1990, BC cycle; Peace Force of 3,000 Ready to Sail to Monrovia, INDEPENDENT,
Aug. 22, 1990, at 10.
189. See Robert Powell, U.S. Navy to Evacuate 400 Indians from Liberia by Helicopter,
REUTERS, Aug. 16, 1990, BC cycle.
190. See id.
191. See Gerald Bourke, Liberians Must Agree to Truce, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 17, 1990,
at 8.
192. See Robert Powell, LiberiaPeacekeeping Force Bigger than Anticipated, REUTERS,
Aug. 17, 1990, BC cycle.
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1990. But Prince Johnson's fighters held the port and after a 13-hour
battle between Taylor's and Johnson's men, the peace-keepers were able
eventually to dock without opposition. 193 The Taylor-led rebels, continuing to accuse Guinea and Nigeria of supporting Doe, attempted to
widen the mediation efforts, calling upon all 16 members of ECOWAS
to become involved in a summit to end the war.' 94 A split in ECOWAS
between English speaking countries such as Nigeria and Ghana and
Franco-phone nations such as Senegal and Burkina Faso frustrated attempts to gain progress toward a cease-fire. 195 Senegal appeared to
have no interest in the peace-keeping move and Burkina Faso, charged
with supporting the Taylor forces, had openly opposed the ECOWAS
military intervention.' 96 Diplomatic efforts were attempted with heads
of the dissident countries, 197 as Taylor declared war on ECOMOG on
September 3.198

The Frenchgovernment was formally charged through its ambassador to Nigeria with supporting the Francophone countries' opposition to
the ECOWAS peace-keeping force. 199 Taylor's rebels were said to possess French arms supplied through the Ivory Coast and Burkina
Faso.20 0 The Nigerian government also expressed its fears that the resistance by the Francophone countries would result in a split in
ECOWAS itself.20 ' France denied that it was behind the arms sup202
ply.
Prince Johnson's troops captured Samuel Doe when he made an
unscheduled visit to the ECOMOG headquarters building on September
9203 and shot him in both legs. Johnson's reported intention was to hold
Doe for court martial. He told the press that Doe had surrendered control of the country, 204 but shortly thereafter the Doe faction announced
a replacement for Doe as head of the government. 20 5 On September 10,
Doe was reported to have died of his gunshot wounds and possibly tor193. See Robert Powell, Liberia Peacekeeping Force Clashes with Taylor Rebels,
REUTERS, Aug. 25, 1990, BC cycle.
194. See Rebels Ask for West African Summit on Liberian Civil War, REUTERS, Aug.

26, 1990, BC cycle.
195. See ECOWAS Leaders to Hold Emergency Meeting on Liberian Crisis, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Sep. 6, 1990.

196. See id.
197. See ECOWAS Head Asks Burkina Faso to Speed Peace in Liberia, REUTERS, Sep.
7, 1990, BC cycle.
198. See id.
199. See Nigeria Warns Against French Involvement in Liberian Crisis, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Sep. 9, 1990.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Doe Captured, Rebel Leader Johnson Claims Control of Liberia, REUTERS,
Sep. 9, 1990, BC cycle.
204. See id.
205, See Doe Associates Appoint Interim Leader of Liberia, REUTERS, Sep. 10, 1990, BC
cycle.
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ture in questioning by Johnson's troops. 20 6 His body was said to have
been paraded at the ECOMOG headquarters where he had been shot.207
As time went on, news reports revealed that observers found the
incident to be a result of ECOMOG's weaknesses: Doe had apparently
arrived with a large contingent of bodyguards to see General Quainoo
when Johnson arrived with his own men a few minutes later. Johnson's
men invoked a truce between themselves and Doe's forces, persuading
Doe's bodyguards to lay down their weapons, then opened fire on
them. 208 Apparently ECOMOG itself considered this a humiliation, and
it soon appointed Nigerian Major Genneral Joshua Dogonyaro as field
20 9
commander to restructure the ECOMOG force.
When Charles Taylor still would not accept any kind of cease-fire
and instead continued to push rapidly toward the former Doe executive
mansion, ECOMOG troops were given new orders in mid-September to
return fire whenever they were attacked, rather than "stand[ing] by
peacefully and get[ting] killed." 210 Thus ECOMOG was to be considered
a "peace-enforcing force" rather than a "peace-keeping force." 211 Taylor's troops on September 14 sacked the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia
and took away thousands of Nigerian civilians who were camped in212
side.
On September 22, Charles Taylor unilaterally announced a truce,
supposedly because of his expressed concern about the sufferings of the
people of his country. 2 13 The heralded cease-fire was broken only eight
days later as the factions resumed fighting with one another. Prince
Johnson concluded that there was now no hope of peace talks to end the
war. Declaring all-out war against Taylor on September 30, he stated:
"Negotiations have failed .... I think that violence is the only solution
to establish real democracy in Liberia. 21 4
ECOWAS convened a conference of Liberian exiles in late August,
to elect an interim government led by Amos Sawyer. 215 Taylor, too, announced the formation of an interim government, with himself as its

206. See Nigerian Officer to Restructure Liberia Peace Force, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 1990,
PM cycle.
207. See Liberia:President Reported Killed, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sep. 10, 1990.
208. See Gill Tudor, Taylor's Liberian Rebels Sack Nigerian Embassy, Sources Say,
REUTERS, Sep. 14, 1990, BC cycle.
209. See Nigerian Officer to Restructure Liberia Peace Force, REUTERS, Sep. 21, 1990,
PM cycle.
210. ECOMOG Ordered to Return Fire, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE,
Sep. 14, 1990, quoting a senior ECOMOG officer.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Force to Enforce Ceasefire in Liberia, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Sep. 23, 1990.
214. Liberian Rebel Leader DeclaresAll-Out War, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 1990, BC cycle.
215. See Clement E. Adibe, supra note 14, at 475.
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president. 2 16 ECOMOG was now dragged into the conflict, joining
Prince Johnson's INPFL (Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia) army and the AFL (Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia) against Taylor. 217 The force, now numbering 7,000, had taken over Bensonaville,
near Monrovia, and was moving toward the area where 100,000 refugees were sheltered. 218 ECOWAS scheduled an emergency meeting to
discuss the crisis, but the split between French-speaking and English219
speaking interests resulted in the meeting again being postponed.
In the midst of the chaos, world aid organizations were struggling
to support the half-million refugees and tens of thousands of displaced,
sick, and starving civilians suffering from the war. 220 Finally on November 28, 1990, at an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS in Mali,
Taylor agreed to a cease-fire that would eventually hold for some 20
months. 221 The impetus for the agree,ment was pressure from West African foreign ministers upon supporters of Taylor's forces, particularly
Burkina Faso, Libya and the Ivory Coast. 2 2 2 The cease-fire accord was
also signed by representatives of Prince Johnson's INPFL, which supported the ECOMOG/Sawyer interim government, and the AFL. 223 Under the accord, Taylor was not required to recognize Sawyer, leaving the
implication that Taylor would have a part in the future interim government. 224 The cease-fire led in October 1994 to the Yamoussoukro IV
Accord.
This situation, more a stalemate than a truce, lasted about 20
months as the ECOMOG-supported
government of Sawyeradministered Monrovia, and Taylor controlled most of the countryside. 225 The cease-fire ended and the second war began when a new
group of Doe loyalists, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for
Democracy (ULIMO), began full-scale fighting with the other factions in
August 1992.226 Elections, tentatively scheduled for November 30 and
agreed to by all the Liberian parties, were frustrated by the heightened
tensions. The fighting expanded, causing over 3,000 new casualties. 227

216. See Fresh Fighting Delays Sawyer's Return to Monrovia, XINHUA GENERAL
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 1990.

217. See ECOWAS Leaders to Meet in Cote D'Ivoire, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 13, 1990.

218. See ECOWAS Chairman Defends ECOMOG Offensive in Liberia, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 1990.

219. See id.
220. See Guinea Reaffirms Commitment to Liberia Peace Force, REUTERS, Oct. 19,
1990.
221. See Mark Huband, Liberian Rebel Leader Forced to Sign Cease-Fire, UPI, Nov.
29, 1990, BC cycle.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Cindy Shiner, Liberian Vote Under Fire,AFRICA NEWS, Sep. 28, 1992.
226. See id.
227. See Ved Nanda, The Libyan Nightmare is Not Yet Over, DENVER POST, No . 22,
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The conflict had a far-reaching effect, with the U.S. withdrawing its
ambassador from Burkina Faso after it accused that country of continuing to supply Taylor with arms from Libya, 228 and with the U.S. and
229
France exchanging accusations of complicity.
Until November 1992, the United Nations deferred to ECOWAS
and ECOMOG. In 1990, then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar had approved ECOWAS's action in Liberia "as a welcome precedent
for conflict resolution." 230 With the latest developments, however, and
with more members of ECOWAS uniting against the war, ECOWAS
31
looked to the U.N. to avert a renewal of the bloodshed.2
Initially several African countries were opposed to the U.N. Security Council involvement in the civil war in Liberia which they considered to be an internal African affair. 232 But in light of subsequent developments and at the urging of ECOWAS through the Organization of
African Unity, which represented ECOWAS at the U.N., the Security
Council took action. It met on November 19, 1992 and passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the rebel factions in Liberia and
authorizing a fact-finding mission to assess the situation there.2 33 The
U.N. endorsed the efforts of ECOMOG without specifically mentioning
234
its military intervention.
Several peace agreements followed without bringing an end to the
conflict. 2 35

The following is a brief account of the ECOWAS and U.N.

efforts. This is unlike the preceding discussion, which detailed the conflict and the initiation of the ECOWAS intervention. It should be recalled that this intervention was in marked departure from the prior
1992, Section Perspective, at 4H; Richard Boucher, State Department Briefing, Nov. 2,
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What
Hope
for
Peace?
(Online),
http://www.unicc.org/unhcr/refworldlcountry-/writenet/wrilbr.htm
(Oct. 1994); Liberia, 34 U.N.
CHRONICLE, No. 1, at 17-18 (1997); Stephen Riley & Max Sesay, Liberia:After Abuja, REV.
AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, No. 69, at 429 (1996); B. Nowrojee, United Nations and
Regional Peacekeeping- Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 129 (1995).
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African practice of nonintervention, for it overrode the concepts of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention in internal affairs
embodied in the OAU Charter.
In the Summer of 1993, the warring factions signed the Cotonou
Agreement. Pursuant to the Agreement the U.N. Observer Mission in
Liberia ("UNOMIL") was created. The Agreement also called for the establishment of the Liberian National Transitional Government replacing Sawyer's interim government, disarmament of the warring factions,
and the holding of national elections. The Cotonou Agreement failed
soon after it was initiated because,
[c]ontrary to the letter and spirit of the Agreement,
ECOMOG was unable to expand its forces, partly because many of the African states were unable to fulfil
their pledge to contribute troops for the mission. Worse
still, ECOMOG was substantially downsized because of
financial and domestic political uncertainties in Nigeria
and continuing concerns in Ghana about the seriousness
236
and good faith of the parties to the Liberian dispute.
This was followed by the Akosombo Agreement of 1994, which also
failed, and finally the Abuja Agreement of 1995.237 The Security Council, however, continued to extend UNOMIL periodically. Renewed
fighting broke out in April 1996 and after protracted negotiations the
leaders of various factions agreed on a revised version of the Abuja Accord. 238 This led to at least partial disarmament and national elections
in July 1997, with the inauguration in August of Charles Taylor as the
239
elected President of Liberia.
3.

Appraisal

The Liberian civil war caused widespread devastation and a long
period of suffering in the country. The intervention was a muddled affair, and as to the ECOWAS-U.N. partnership, Professor Adibe provides
an insightful observation:
In Liberia, UNOMIL and ECOMOG maintained parallel
command structures. This is especially surprising because the U.N. had been invited because of the particular deficiencies of the regional command structure. The
weakness of U.N. deployments in the field frequently
challenged the relative autonomy of the U.N.'s chain of
236. Clement Adibe, supra note 14, at 479

237. See Stephen Riley & Max Sesay, supranote 235.
238. See Max Sesay, supra note 235, at 405.
239. Karen Lange, In Liberia, The People Choose An Awful Hope for Peace, WASH.
POST, August 10, 1997, at C4; Liberia Inaugurates Taylor as President, WASH. POST,
August 3, 1997, at A22; James Rupert, Election May Signal an End to Liberia's Seven
Years of Upheaval, WASH. POST, July 28, 1997, at A14; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Liberia
Gets a Free Vote, Courtesy of Unfree Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at A9.
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command, thus leaving the ECOWAS command structure as the only real source of authority to which Liberia's warring factions frequently referred.
Consequently, the subordination of regional command
structures to global authority was neither attempted
nor achieved by UNOMIL. For this particular reason,
UNOMIL was essentially redundant in Liberia
as a par2 40
ticipant in the process of conflict resolution.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION REVISITED
These five case studies underscore both the increased need for humanitarian intervention and the often striking incapacity of the U.N. or
regional organizations to take appropriate action. After the initial postCold War euphoria dissipated, the probability that the U.N. will not be
able to respond to every humanitarian crisis became clear. Disinterest
among the permanent members and the financial woes of the organization mean that many cries for help will go unheeded by the U.N.. Taking into consideration the increased need for humanitarian intervention
after the end of the Cold War and the diminishing capacity of the U.N.
to meet this need, there must remain some room for action by regional
organizations and individual states.
A.

Who May Intervene?
1.

The United Nations

Collective humanitarian intervention, when undertaken or
authorized by the U.N., now meets with little controversy. 241 In the
case studies discussed above, the Security Council used its broad Chapter V11 242 powers to authorize military operations, notwithstanding
claims that the matter was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the Member State under article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, that were
actually humanitarian in nature. In the Post-Cold War era, the United
Nations should be able, if not always willing, to act when gross viola243
tions of human rights demand a forceful response.
While the legality of humanitarian intervention by the United Na240. Clement Adibe, supra note 14, at 484.
241. James A.R. Nafziger, HumanitarianIntervention in a Community of Power, 22
DENV. J. INT'L & POL'Y 219 (1994); Fernando R. Teson, Collective HumanitarianIntervention, 17 MICH J. INT'L L. 323 (1996). However, arguably, there are legal and not just political limits to the exercise of the enforcement role of the U.N. Security Council. See, e.g.,
Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 285 (1996).

242. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51.
243. Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the U.N. Security Council in Protecting Human
Rights in Crisis Situations: U.N. HumanitarianIntervention in the Post Cold War Era, 3
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1995).
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tions today enjoys a broad consensus, the U.N.'s capacity to undertake
such operations must be strengthened. This will entail sufficient financial resources and establishment of a rapid deployment force - a small
force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops under direct U.N. command, supplemented by voluntary units designated by states for such operations to
be undertaken by the United Nations. It must, however, be reiterated
that the current situation cannot be ignored - that the U.N.'s ability to
undertake humanitarian intervention is limited by its lack of resources
and lack of political will among the permanent members of the Security
244
Council.
2.

Regional Organizations

Regional organizations and arrangements played a significant role
in interventions in three cases studied here-Haiti, Liberia, and the
former Yugoslavia. In Haiti the initiative was taken by the OAS, which
subsequently received endorsement, while in Liberia, a sub-regional organization, ECOWAS, was responsible for the intervention. In the former Yugoslavia, it was NATO (with WEU initially undertaking some
functions as well) that implemented the Security Council mandates.
The authorization for regional involvement in enforcement actions
is explicitly stated in the U.N. Charter. Under Article 52,
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence
of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies
and their activities are consistent245
with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.
Article 52 further provides that "the Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority."246 It also provides, however, that
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization of the security Council." 24 7 Former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in An
Agenda for Peace, said that regional arrangements "possess a potential
that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report:
preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict

244. Richard Falk characterizes the shift as one from an "initial unfounded enthusiasm" to "a more recent unwarranted disillusionment." Richard Falk, The Complexities of
HumanitarianIntervention: A New World Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 513
(1996).
245. U.N.. CHARTER, art. 52, para. 1.
246. Id. art. 53, para. 1.
247. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:5

peace-building. 248 Subsequently, in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda
for Peace, he said that U.N.-regional cooperation could take several
forms, such as consultation, diplomatic and operational support, co249
deployment, and joint operations.
During the Cold War era the prevailing climate of mistrust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and hence the likelihood of a veto
in the Security Council rendered moot the utilization of regional arrangements for enforcement purposes. But as interventions in Haiti,
Liberia, and the former Yugoslavia illustrate, regional organizations
and arrangements under the supervision of the Security Council can
and should perhaps constitute a most important instrument of collective intervention.
3.

Individual States

Although the right of individual states to carry out humanitarian
intervention came under heavy fire during the Cold War, the U.N.
Charter leaves room for such intervention. Critics interpret Article 2(4)
of the Charter broadly to prohibit any unilateral use of force by
states. 250 However, the text of the Charter does not justify such an
overly broad statement. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force by states
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a member
state, or when such use is otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of
the U.N..251
For humanitarian intervention to be considered valid it is usually
undertaken for a limited purpose and duration; it should not impair the
252
political independence or territorial integrity of the target state.
However, assume that crimes against humanity, especially genocidal
acts, are implicated and unilateral use of force on humanitarian
grounds is aimed at changing the target state's policies or threatening
those responsible for such violations. The goal of prevention or restoration when such violations have occurred might necessitate change in
the structure of authority in the target state. Thus we contend that far
from being inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N., humanitarian
intervention furthers the U.N.'s purposes by protecting human
25 3
rights.
During the Cold War, the right to unilateral humanitarian inter248. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para. 64. U.N. Doc. A147/277,
S/24111, June 17, 1992.
249. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, para. 86, U.N. Doc.
A/50/60, S/1995/1 (1995).]
250. See, e.g., IAN BROWNIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

338-42 (1963); Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
HumanitarianIntervention by MilitaryForce, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
251. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
252. Thus, the Charter prohibition does not apply. Id.
253. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, para. 1, 55 and 56.
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vention assumed special importance because the deadlock in the Security Council undermined the U.N.'s ability to respond to humanitarian
crises. 254 As stated earlier, in the post-Cold War era this right is likely
to remain important because of the U.N.'s financial difficulties and the
general lack of enthusiasm among the major powers for new humanitarian missions. The U.N. may be unable or unwilling to act, 255 and
there may be no regional organization that has the capacity or the will
to intervene. In such cases, individual states should not be prohibited
25 6
from doing what international organizations cannot.
B.

Who Should Intervene?

If intervention should be undertaken by the U.N., regional organizations, or individual states, the U.N. Charter does not provide a clear
answer to the question of who should intervene among these actors.
Chapter VIII of the Charter addresses the issue of regional arrangements, 257 but the chapter does not specify whether the U.N. or the relevant regional organization should have primary jurisdiction over humanitarian crises.
The relationship of regional organizations to the U.N. is not clearly
and consistently defined within the Charter. For instance, the Charter
prohibits regional organizations from undertaking "enforcement action"
without the consent of the Security Council. 258 On the other hand, the
Charter gives regional organizations priority over the peaceful resolution of disputes by requiring Member States to "make every effort to
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the
Security Council. '"259 Because humanitarian intervention utilizes military force, it cannot be considered pacific settlement. Neither is it an
enforcement action, which would be taken against a state committing
an act of aggression against another state.
Clearly, the answer to the question of who should intervene cannot
be found within the text of the Charter, but should be reached bearing
in mind the principles expressed in that text. The United Nations was
founded to take collective measures to ensure international peace and
security. 260 Therefore, the U.N., rather than regional organizations,
254. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L.
REV. 325 (1967).
255. See Falk, supra note 244.

256. See, e.g., Byron F. Burmester, On HumanitarianIntervention: The New World
Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269 (1994); Steve G.

Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral HumanitarianIntervention, 24 CAL. W.
INT'L L. J. 117 (1993).
257. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 52-54.
258. Id. art. 53, para. 1.
259. Id. art. 52, para. 2.
260. See id. art. 1, para. 1.
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should have primary jurisdiction over intervention in humanitarian crises. As the most universal and representative international organization, the actions of the U.N. enjoy the greatest legitimacy and are least
likely to be motivated by the self-interest of a particular Member State.
If the U.N. explicitly delegates this authority to a regional organization, is unwilling to act on a crisis brought to its attention, or chooses
not to address the crisis at all, then this authority should pass to the
relevant regional organization if one exists. In some cases, there will be
no relevant regional organization with the capacity, authority, or willingness to act on a humanitarian crisis. In such cases, states that are
willing to intervene to prevent or respond to egregious violations of human rights should be able to do so. Any such action must, however,
meet the customary international law requirements of necessity and
proportionality. The intervening state must report to the Security
Council the measures taken and must remain accountable for its actions. In addition, it must also comply with the standards discussed
below.
C.

When Should Intervention Take Place?

Any instance of humanitarian intervention must meet the criteria
enunciated in Part I to be considered legitimate. These criteria are necessity, proportionality, purpose, nature of the actor(s), and maximization of the best outcomes. 261 Most of these criteria, such as proportionality and the maximization of the best outcomes, are fact-specific and
can only be applied after the intervention has taken place. Only the necessity criterion can effectively be applied prior to the actual intervention.
As to its application, the existence of gross, persistent, and systematic violations of human rights which are likely to result in massive loss
of life in any country would satisfy the necessity criterion and such
state would be a potential target for intervention.
As we have noted, in the euphoria following the end of the Cold
War the Security Council eagerly created new humanitarian operations
in the glow of its new-found spirit of cooperation. Many of these operations yielded disappointing results, souring the short-lived enthusiasm
of the U.N. for humanitarian intervention. This waning enthusiasm
indicates the need for additional policy-oriented criteria for determining
when humanitarian intervention would be not only legitimate, but pru262
dent as well.
The need to discriminate among potential cases based on the likelihood of success possesses an ethical as well as pragmatic foundation.
261. See Nanda, supra note 3.
262. See Ruth E. Gordon, Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti,
31 TEX INT'L L.J. 43, 56 (1996).
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States owe an overriding duty to defend the lives of their own citizens.
In exceptional situations, such as self-defense or in cases of gross, persistent, and systematic human rights abuses abroad, especially if the
cause involves genocidal acts or crimes against humanity, the state may
determine that the potential outcome justifies risking the lives of its
soldiers. However, to intervene in a situation with minimal prospects
for success frivolously risks the lives of the state's soldiers, thereby
compromising the obligation of the state to protect the lives of its citizens.
Determining the potential for an operation's success is not a scientific process, and some miscalculations will undoubtedly occur. However, because of their ethical obligations, states, and by extension the
international organizations of which states are members, must endeavor to create standards by which potential cases will be evaluated.
Evaluating the chances of success prior to intervening will also mitigate
humanitarian fatigue resulting from unsuccessful operations or indifferent results.
Thus, the capability to marshal the necessary resources to accomplish the desired objective, the anticipated timeframe of the intervention, and the strategy for exit are all relevant policy-oriented criteria.
In cases of failed states or situations such as Cambodia under the Pol
Pot regime or the Rwandan genocide, bringing about a change in the
regime might be appropriate if it appears likely that egregious human
rights violations will cease with such change.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the persistence of egregious violations of human rights in the
post-Cold War era, humanitarian intervention will remain a fixture in
international law for the foreseeable future. With the return of U.N.
inactivity and incapacity after a brief period of activism, intervention by
regional organizations and individual states will similarly remain an
important part of the international system for the protection of human
rights. Given the number of potential cases and actors, standards for
evaluating the legitimacy of intervention will become more important
than ever.
Taking into consideration limited material rbsources and waning
political will, the U.N., regional organizations, and states must maximize the results of humanitarian intervention by applying resources
and political will where they will accomplish the desired results.
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VI. POSTSCRIPT
In March 1999, NATO forces launched air strikes against Yugoslavia, 263 following unsuccessful attempts to negotiate settlement of the
crisis in Kosovo. The crisis was caused by the Serbian crackdown on
the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA"). The KLA, comprised of ethnic Albanians, is seeking secession from Yugoslavia. In a speech explaining
these strikes, President Bill Clinton said:
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in
Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to
prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the
heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this
century with catastrophic results. We act to stand
united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are
upholding our values, protecting
our interests and ad264
vancing the cause of peace.
This NATO intervention, purportedly undertaken on humanitarian
grounds-to protect the ethnic Albanian Kosovars-was taken without
the U.N. Security Council's approval. In fact, the Security Council was
paralyzed as two permanent members, Russia and China, were on record against the use of force in Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, combating
secession in one of its parts, Kosovo. Thus, the Security Council was
sidelined, although earlier it had adopted resolutions expressing concern over the deteriorating situation in Kosovo.
In light of the charges of ethnic cleansing by the Serb forces in
Kosovo and the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Albania,
Macedonia and Montenegro, with an equally large number displaced
within Kosovo, this crisis presents a powerful case in favor of humanitarian intervention. Applying the criteria stated earlier to judge the
validity of such action, it could be argued that once the Security Council
was unable to act, it was appropriate for a regional body to undertake
humanitarian intervention. However, since the Security Council and
the Secretary General were not allowed to play their intended role under the U.N. Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security, the precedent set by NATO is questionable because it was not
directly authorized by the Security Council nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe with the approval of the Council. 265
263. See Alexander Nicoll & Guy Dinmore, NATO Forces Bomb Yugoslavia,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 1, col. 3; Alexander Nicoll, OperationAllied Force

Attacks Serb Targets, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 2, col. 1.
264. Conflict in the Balkans; In the President's Words: We Act to Prevent a
Wider War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15,col. 2.
265. On April 10, 1999, the Executive Committee of the World Federation of
the United Nations Associations ("WFUNA"), meeting in Geneva, considered
the situation in Kosovo and, expressing its concern for the suffering of the people and the potential dangers of a widening of the conflict, reiterated "the
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United Nations Charter principles on the protection of human rights and the
use of force," and
deplored the paralysis of the United Nations Security
Council which has prevented it from playing its proper
role in gaining the implementation of its earlier resolutions and in responding to developments in Kosovo. It
calls for an end to this paralysis and in particular for the
Security Council and the Secretary-General, each making full use of its powers under the Charter, to resume
the search for a peaceful and negotiated solution to the
problem of Kosovo, respecting the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the human rights of its people of all ethnic origins.
In that context the committee noted the step taken on 9
April by the Secretary-General and encouraged him to
continue to give a lead in the search for a solution.
The Committee concluded by underlining "the fact that a solution to the
problem of Kosovo can only be found at the negotiating table. The UN should
be enabled to play a significant and constructive role in reaching and implementing any such solution.
One of the authors of this article, Professor Ved Nanda, serves as the ViceChair of the WFUNA and was one of the drafters of the resolution. A copy of
the text is on file with the Journal.

RESOLVING NORTH AMERICA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
Mike Mauseth*
I. INTRODUCTION

Seventeen years ago John E. Carroll and Newell B. Mack analyzed
the then-current status of environmental protection mechanisms used
between Canada and the United States.' They criticized the ad hoc nature of North America's history of environmental dispute resolution,
which they dubbed "ad hockery," 2 and believed the present ambiguity
3
hurt business, diplomatic relations, and the citizenry's environment.
Since that publication, increasing efforts to incorporate environmental
concerns into Conventions have resulted in several multilateral agreements focusing on environmental protection and dispute resolution.
Part Two of this paper will introduce a few of these recent agreements
and the mechanisms they have established to monitor environmental
damage and to enforce the goals of the agreements. The agreements
discussed include: Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer; 4 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer; 5 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; 6 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal; 7 Canada-United States: Agreement on Air
Quality; 8 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; 9 Frame" Pursuing J.D./M.A.

at the University of Denver College of Law and the University

of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. The author would like to thank Professor Ved P. Nanda for his guidance and Katie Coffey for her insight.
1. John E. Carroll & Newell B. Mack, On Living Together in North America: Canada, the United States and InternationalEnvironmentalRelations, 12 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 35 (1982).
2. Id. at 38.
3. Id. at 39-41. The authors claim that the greatest disadvantage of the ad hoc approach is the loss of predictability where each Party to a dispute is a potential loser and
thus has less incentive to raise criticism. Id. at 41.
4. Reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). For adjustments and amendments to the
Montreal Protocol, see 31 I.L.M 874 (1993).
5. Reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987).
6. Reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
7. Reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1991).
8. Reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991).
9. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
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work Convention on Climate Change;10 Convention on Biological Diversity;11 and the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera1 2

tion.

Part Three will discuss the general concern related to economic development (with the need to maintain "sustainable development" 3), the
possible environmental impact of NAFTA, and the Supplemental
Agreement's strengths and weaknesses.
II.

SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT/ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORKS

A. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol)
The Montreal Protocol asks the Parties to "take appropriate measures to protect human health and environment against the adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or
14
are likely to modify the ozone layer."'
The protocol requires Parties to reduce their CFC production based
on levels emitted during 1986.15 The Parties, after entering the agreement into force, will report yearly levels of CFC production to the Convention's secretariat who will supervise Parties' compliance with the
Convention's requirements.' 6 The protocol holds that Parties shall ban
trade with non-members who do not comply with the protocol if such
trade involves any of the controlled substances listed within the Convention. 17
10. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
11. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
12. Id.
13. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), reprinted in U.N. Document A/CONF.48/14 which states at principle 7 that "economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favorable living and working environment for man and.. . necessary for the improvement of the quality of life." See also
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 4-5
(1987) (finding that pursuing sustainable development an important aspiration, and the
key aspect in doing so is "the recognition that economic and environmental goals are inextricably linked").
14. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, at 1549. The agreement applies a different standard to developing countries when it states that a "special provision is required to meet
the needs of developing countries for theses substances." Id.
15. Id. art. 2.
16. Id. art. 7. Data collection of CFC production is measured and reported by domestic functionaries. Id. Developing countries are given preferential treatment, they are allowed to exceed such limits if done "in order to meet its basic domestic needs." Id. art. 5.
The developing countries also benefit from a ten-year grace period in fulfilling the requirements of the agreement.
17. Id. art. 4. This includes products produced with, but not containing, certain con-
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The goals of the Montreal Protocol are detailed, giving desirable
levels of CFC production for Parties of the agreement.18 Such detail
disappears when looking for enforcement power or guidance for dispute
resolution under the agreement. 19 The agreement refuses to implement
specific enforcement powers of the Secretariat and mentions no proce20
dure for settling disputes.
B. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
The Convention takes a broad view of adverse effects to the environment, defining it as "changes in the physical environment or biota,
including changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects
on human health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of
natural and managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind." 21
In preventing such damage, the Convention requires Parties to "take
appropriate measures ... to protect human health and the environment
against adverse effects resulting from human activities which modify or
'22
are likely to modify the ozone layer.
The "appropriate measures" include requiring Parties to engage in
systematic research and observation, to adopt harmonized internal legislation that limits damaging human activities, and to cooperate with
the individual Party-states and international bodies in creating standards and enforcement of this Convention. 23 The Convention, though
requiring coordination of activity, is ever mindful of not usurping domestic sovereignty 24 and the need for a scientific basis for any action. 25
The need for reasonable action motivates the Convention in encouraging the exchange of information. 26 The exchange of information also encourages the transfer of technologies to developing countries through:
(a) the facilitation of developing countries acquiring alternative technologies; (b) the provision of instruction on the alternative technologies;
(c) the provision of required equipment and research; and (d) the provi-

trolled substances. Id.
18. See Annex C of the Montreal Protocol Adjustments and Amendments, supra note
4.
19. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8.
20. Id. The reason may be that the Protocol refers to its recognition of the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Id. art. 1.
21. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 5, art. 1.2.
22. Id. art. 2.1.
23. Id. art. 2.2.
24. Id. art. 2.3.
25. Id. art. 2.4.
26. Id. art. 4.1 (suggesting that Parties "facilitate and encourage the exchange of scientific, technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal information" to bodies agreed
upon by the Parties).
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sion of appropriate training of required personnel. 27
The Convention provides an established framework for dispute settlement, requiring Parties to negotiate if a conflict arises about the interpretation or application of the Convention. 28 If the Parties cannot
agree on a solution, a third Party may be requested to preside over the
dispute. 29 If the Parties are still unable to end the conflict, three things
may happen: (a) the dispute may go to arbitration; (b) the dispute may
be heard and decided by the International Court of Justice; or (c) a conciliation commission may be created (with equal members appointed by
the separate Parties) which will deliver the final award. 30 No specific
enforcement powers are granted through the Convention, but the final
judgments and recommendations on the disputes must be "considered
31
in good faith" by the Parties.
C. The Global Convention on the Control of TransboundaryMovements
of Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention)
The Convention serves to protect neighboring environments of
waste producing Parties by prohibiting the exportation of hazardous
wastes to non-consenting neighboring states. 32 The Convention goes
farther by: requiring Parties to minimize the creation of hazardous
wastes within their own domestic boundaries; ensuring proper disposal
facilities are located in the domestic territory; having proper management and procedure to deal with the hazardous wastes; and reporting
33
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.
The Convention emphasizes the need for Party cooperation to better handle environmental waste. 34 To do this, the Convention requires
Parties to: (a) harmonize technical standards and practices "for the
adequate management of hazardous waste and other waste"; (b) cooperate in monitoring the effects of hazardous waste management on hu27. Id. art. 4.2. The Convention makes clear that transferring technology must be in
compliance with the domestic laws of the transferring Parties. Id.
28. Id. art. 11.1.
29. Id. art. 11.2. The direction which the dispute will go depends on whether the Parties involved have authorized the ICJ or arbitration proceedings to rule over their case.
This is done by writing a declaration to the Convention's Depository that such proceedings are allowable. Id. art. 11.3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be
the Depository of this Convention. Id. art. 20.1.
30. Id. art. 11.
31. Id. art. 11.5.
32. Basel Convention, supra note 7. The preamble recognizes the idea that "hazardous wastes and other wastes should, as far is compatible with environmentally sound and
efficient management, be disposed of in the State where they were generated."
33. Id. art. 4. The state of export may export the waste after it has received written
confirmation from the receiving state which contains a contract for the "environmentally
sound management of the wastes in question." Id. art. 6.3.
34. Id. art. 10.1.

1998

RESOLVING NORTH AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES

875

man health and the environment; (c) develop and implement low-waste
35
technologies; and (d) transfer the technologies to developing countries.
Dispute resolution under the Basel Convention encourages Parties,
in case of a dispute over the interpretation, application, or compliance
with the provisions in the Convention, to settle the dispute through any
peaceful means of the Parties' choice.3 6 If this consensual resolution
fails to work, the Parties may allow the dispute go before the International Court of Justice or to arbitration. 37 If the Parties cannot agree to
either of these destinations, they are still required to seek resolution of
38
the dispute.
The Convention sets out a detailed list of procedures for arbitration
which will be in effect if both Parties agree to a forum for dispute settlement. 39 A tribunal, consisting of three members, will be established
to settle the dispute. 40 Each Party appoints one arbitrator and the two
appointees agree on a third arbitrator who is not a national of either
Party. 41 The decisions of the tribunal are decided by a majority of votes
and the arbitrators may engage in any reasonable fact-finding that they
deem necessary to make a decision. 42 The tribunal is not given explicit
sanctioning or enforcement power, but the Convention requires the Par43
ties to consider the final decision as binding and final.
D. Canada-United States: Agreement on Air Quality
The agreement begins by proclaiming that air pollution can cause
"significant harm to natural resources of vital environmental, cultural
and economic importance, and to human health." 44 To combat such
harm, the agreement lists both general and specific air quality objectives for both nations to meet. The general objective controls transboundary air pollution between Canada and the United States, 45 and
includes the following steps: (a) establishing specific emissions limita35. Id. art. 10.2. All domestic laws must be upheld while fulfilling the requirements
of this treaty. Id.
36. Id. art. 20.1.
37. Id. art. 20.2-.3. The Parties may consent to either forum when they ratify, accept,
approve, confirm, or accede to the Convention (or any time after that). Id.
38. Without both Parties agreeing to the ICJ or arbitration, they are left to their own
peaceful devices to settle the dispute. Id.
39. Id. at Annex VI.
40. Id. at Annex VI, art. 3.
41. Id. at Annex VI, art. 3. If the two appointed arbitrators cannot agree on a third
arbitrator, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the request of either Party,
will appoint the third arbitrator. Id. at Annex VI, art. 4.
42. Id. at Annex VI, art. 6. The absence or default of a Party in the dispute will not
hinder the effectiveness or validity of the tribunal's proceedings. Id.
43. Id. at Annex VI, art. 10.2.
44. Canada-United States: Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 8.
45. Id. art. 3.2.
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tions or reductions of air pollutants and the adoption of programs to
implement such standards; 46 (b) beginning environmental impact assessments, prior notification, and mitigation efforts; 47 (c) maintaining
coordinated scientific research and technical activities, including the
exchange of information; 48 and (d) creating dispute resolution and assessment institutions. 49 The agreement also formed the Air Quality
51
Committee 50 that will be kept apprised of pertinent issues.
If a dispute arises over the implementation or interpretation of the
52
agreement, the Parties must negotiate at the request of either Party.
If the Parties cannot resolve their dispute by negotiating they may elect
the International Joint Commission 53 (IJC) to settle the conflict. If Parties cannot agree to the IJC presiding over the dispute, they must sub54
mit to another agreed on form of dispute resolution.
E. Rio Declarationon Environment and Development
Though not a Convention with binding requirements on signatories, the Rio Declaration 55 demonstrates the significance of the environment to the global community and highlights the concern of North
America 56 in protecting the environment. The declaration begins by reiterating the point that nations have the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies coupled with the responsibility not to damage other nations' environments "or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."' 57 This
46. Id. art. 3.2(a). Each Party must follow its domestic laws when considering to undertake an environmental impact statement. Id. art. 5.1. Either Party may consult with
the other when any domestic activity (either industrial or legislative) may have a significant affect to transboundary pollution. Id. art. 5.3. If either Party becomes aware of a air
pollution problem which affects both nations, the aware Party must notify and consult
with the other Party. Id. art. 5.6.
47. Id. art. 3.2(b).
48. Id. art. 3.2(c).
49. Id. art. 3.2(e).
50. Id. art. 8.
51. The Committee will gather joint information on monitoring emissions, technologies for controlling emissions, atmospheric processes and effects of air pollutants. Id. art.
7.1. The Commission will not release the provided information unless authorized to do so
by the informing Party. Id. art. 7.2.
52. Id. art. 13. The negotiations must begin within ninety days from the date of request, unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties. Id.
53. Id. art. 13.2. The IJC is a mechanism of the Boundary Waters Treaty, of which
both Canada and the United States are Parties.
54. Id.
55. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, supra note 9.
56. Canada, Mexico, and the United States are Parties to the Declaration.
57. Id. at Principle 2. This is the idea of state sovereignty combined with the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("one should use one's own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another") as enshrined in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
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exercise in sovereignty balances with several international principles
58
that intertwine environmental protection with economic development.
The burden placed upon developing countries, though not as heavy as
the developed nations, requires acknowledgment of the developing
countries' responsibilities to the global environment in pursuing sustainable development. 59 As part of preventing unjustified environmental degradation, the declaration outlines several procedures, including: (a) public awareness and public access to information activities
in their communities (including the opportunity for public participation
in the-decision-making process); 60 (b) the enactment of effective domestic environmental legislation; 61 (c) promoting the internalization of environmental costs; 62 and (d) the use of environmental impact assessments for proposed activities "that are likely to have a significant
63
adverse impact on the environment."
F. Framework Convention on Climate Change
The Convention's objective is to stabilize the concentrations of
greenhouse gases at such a level so as to not pose a threat to the climate system. 64 The level of concentration would allow natural climate
adaptation by ecosystems yet ensure both adequate food production and
sustainable economic development. 65 Parties should protect the climate
system for future generations 66 and take precautionary measures to
"anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects." 67 In pursuit of the Convention's objectives and
principles, the Parties have committed to several programs, which include: (a) publishing and updating national inventories of anthropo-

supra note 13.
58. See id. at Principle 3 ("the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations");
Principle 4 ("environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it").
59. Id. at Principle 7 ("States have common but differentiated responsibilities").
60. Id. at Principle 10.
61. Id. at Principle 11. The legislation should reflect the "environmental and developmental context to which they apply" and must be relative to the particular situation of
each Party. Id.
62. Id. at Principle 16. This idea goes to the idea that the polluter should bear the
cost of pollution, yet avoiding injuring international trade. Id.
63. Id. at Principle 17.
64. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 10.
65. Id. art. 2.
66. Id. art. 3.1. The Parties' particular development and needs must be considered
when considering the responsibilities placed on the Parties. Id. art 3.2.
67. Id. art. 3.3. The lack of scientific certainty should not be used as an excuse for
postponing implementation of such measures. Id.
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genic emissions by sources; 68 (b) publishing and updating national and
regional programs which mitigate climate change; 69 (c) promoting the
transfer of technologies and cooperation in the development of new
technologies; 70 (d) considering climate change when implementing domestic policies and activities; 71 (e) promoting scientific cooperation in
gathering and analyzing climate system data; 72 and (f) promoting education, training, and public awareness of climate change and the envi73
ronment.
In an effort to coordinate the Parties, the Convention creates institutions to monitor Parties and to facilitate Party action consistent with
the objectives of the Convention. These institutions include: (a) Conference of the Parties, 74 (b) Secretariat,7 5 (c) Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice, 76 and (d) Subsidiary Body for Implementa77
tion.
The Convention requires Parties to attempt to negotiate a resolution to a dispute. 78 If the Parties cannot peacefully resolve the conflict,
the dispute may go before the International Court of Justice and/or to
arbitration under the Convention. 79 If either Party does not consent to
either the ICJ or arbitration for resolution then the Parties have twelve
months to reach an agreement.8 0 If a year passes without a solution the
Conference of the Parties will create a conciliation commission com68. Id. art. 4.1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. art. 7. Their duties include, as supreme body of the Convention, reviewing the
implementation of the Convention, adoption of legal instruments, and facilitating the exchange of information. Id.
75. Id. art. 8. The Secretariat acts as the Convention's administrator; compiling reports and acting as an intermediary between the Subsidiary bodies, the Conference of the
Parties, and the Parties. Id.
76. Id. art. 9. Their duties include assessing scientific knowledge of the Parties, identifying new and efficient technologies, providing scientific programs to encourage international cooperation, and responding to scientific and technical questions asked by the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies.
77. Id. art. 10. The Body is open to all Parties' participation and considers all information gathered to help the Conference of the Parties determine the level of current implementation and recommendations to further future implementation and compliance.
Id.
78. Id. art. 14. The dispute must concern the interpretation or application of the
Convention. Id.
79. Id. art. 14.2. The Parties may recognize either forum as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement when the Parties ratify, accept, approve or accede to the
Convention. Id. Such a recognition shall remain in force until it expires (due to the terms
of the agreement) or until three months after written notification of a Party's revocation
has been deposited. Id. art. 14.3.
80. Id. art. 14.5.
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prised of equal number of members appointed by concerned Parties
with a chairman chosen jointly by the appointed members.8 1 The commission will recommend a decision which the Parties will consider in
82
good faith.
G. Convention on BiologicalDiversity
The objective of the Convention8 3 and the contracting Parties is to
preserve biological diversity8 4 while at the same time maintaining sustainable use8 5 of the environment and encouraging "sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources."86 In order to
achieve this goal the Convention sets out several policies for Parties to
follow, including mechanisms for: (a) the creation or adoption of national programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity;8 7 (b) the identification of components important for biological
diversity and sustainable use;88 (c) the monitoring components important for biological diversity and sustainable use (paying particular attention to those requiring urgent conservation measures);89 and (d) the
categorization of processes which have or likely will have "significant
adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity."90
The Convention recognizes the different types of conservation efforts and possibilities by establishing separate policies and procedures
for both "in-situ"91 and "ex-situ"9 2 conservation. Each Party must, to
81. Id. art. 14.6.
82. Id.
83. United Nations on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 11.
84. As defined by the Convention, "biological diversity" means "the variability among
living organisms from all sources including ... terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are apart; this includes diversity
within species, between species and of ecosystems." Id. art. 2.
85. As defined by the Convention, "sustainable use" means the use of biological resources "in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological
diversity . . .to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations." Id.
art. 3.
86. Id. art. 1. See also id. art. 5 (stating that contracting Parties, to the extent possible, should cooperate with each other in all appropriate matters and methods "for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity").
87. Id. art. 6. Such programs must integrate with existing domestic legislation and
policies. Id.
88. Id. art. 7(a). The identification should be in reference to the Convention's Annex
I, which breaks the identification into (1) ecosystems and habitats (containing high diversity, large numbers of endemic or threatened species or wilderness) and (2) species and
communities (which are threatened or of some economic, agricultural, social, cultural or
scientific importance).
89. Id. art. 7(b).
90. Id. art. 7(c).
91. In-situ conservation is defined by the Convention as the "conservation of ecosys-
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the degree possible and appropriate, do the following for in-situ conservation: (a) create a system of protected areas; 93 (b) develop guidelines
94
for the establishment and management of the protected areas; (c)
manage biological resources important to conserving biological diversity;95 (d) promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and
the maintenance of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings; 96 (e) rehabilitate degraded ecosystems and help recover
threatened species; 97 and (f) create or maintain regulation to help pro98
tect threatened species.
For ex-situ conservation, the Convention is less demanding but requires the Parties to: (a) create mechanisms for ex-situ conservation of
components of biological diversity; 99 (b) establish facilities for ex-situ
conservation and research on plants, animals and micro-organisms; 100
(c) enact domestic measures to aid in the recovery and rehabilitation of
threatened species so they may be returned to their natural environment; 10 1 and (d) regulate the collection of biological resources from
natural habitats for ex-situ conservation purposes "so as not to threaten
' 102
ecosystems and in-situ populations."
The Convention focuses on the need for sustainable use of components for biological diversity and delineates several steps the Parties
must take, including: (a) integrating the concept of sustainable use into
national policy-making; 10 3 (b) implementing measures to minimize the

tems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surrounding and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in
the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties." Id. art. 2.
92. Ex-situ conservation is defined by the Convention as the "conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural habitats." Id.
93. Id. art. 8(a).
94. Id. art. 8(b).
95. Id. art. 8(c). This applies to biological resources both within and outside of the
designated protected areas.
96. Id. art. 8(d). The Convention also asks for the promotion of "environmentally
sound and sustainable development in areas adjacent to protected areas with a view to
furthering protection of these areas." Id. art. 8(e).
97. Id. art. 8(f). The rehabilitation efforts are through "the development and implementation of plans or other management strategies." Id.
98. Id. art. 8(k). The steps required are many but the funding for such projects is
vague at best. Id. art. 8(k) (encouraging Parties to "cooperate in providing financial and
other support for in-situ conservation... particularly to developing countries").
99. Id. art. 9(a). The Convention encourages ex-situ conservation to be done in the
country of origin of the components. Id. art. 9(a)-(b).
100. Id. art. 9(b).
101. Id. art. 9(c).
102. Id. art. 9(d). The Convention is also vague on the financing structure for encouraging ex-situ conservation efforts. Id. art. 9(e) (encouraging cooperation in financing exsitu conservation, especially for developing countries).
103. Id. art. 10(a). One piece of domestic legislation asked of all Parties is the authori-

1998

RESOLVING NORTH AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES

881

damage to biological diversity caused by the use of biological resources; 104 and (c) encouraging cooperative efforts between domestic
governments and private sector actors in developing methods for sus10 5
tainable use.
As for the Convention's institutions, the Parties created the Conference of the Parties, 10 6 the Secretariat, 10 7 and the Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice. 108 These bodies play an
important role in dispute settlement under the Convention. If two or
more Parties have a disagreement regarding the interpretation or
application of the Convention, they are required to initially attempt
resolution by negotiation. 0 9 If negotiation fails to resolve the conflict
the Parties may request a third Party mediation. 110 Provided that
mediation brings no solution, the dispute will go before either the
International Court of Justice, an arbitration tribunal, or a conciliation
commission."' If the Parties agree to go to arbitration, they shall notify
1 2
the Secretariat of the decision. "
The arbitral tribunal will consist of three members; each of the two
Parties appoints an arbitrator and the two appointees jointly appoint

zation of access or transfer of technologies relevant to the sustainable use of biological diversity. Id. art. 16. The promotion of national policies encouraging the scientific and
technical cooperation is also stressed by the Convention. Id. art. 18.
104. Id. art. 10(b). The Convention suggests, as one minimizing measure, that Parties
use environmental impact assessments for all internal projects proposed that are likely to
have a significant adverse effect on biological diversity. Id. art. 14(1).
105. Id. art. 10(e).
106. Id. art. 23. The Conference of the Parties' duties include the adoption and
amending of rules, transmission of information to the Parties (as well as receipt of information), and reviewing advice and information given to it so as to define compliance with
the Convention. Id.
107. Id. art. 24. The Secretariat is required to perform the administrative functions
for the Convention, as well as any other functions assigned to it by the Conference of the
Parties. Id.
108. Id. art. 25. The Body's duties include the scientific assessment of biological diversity, identification of efficient technology related to conservation and sustainable use, and
providing advice on any scientific, technical, or methodological question put to it by the
Conference of the Parties.
109. id. art. 27(1).
110. Id. art. 27(2).
111. Id. art. 27(3)-(4). Before whom the continued dispute finally goes depends on
whether the Parties are both able to agree to go before either the ICJ or the Convention's
arbitration tribunal. If the Parties have not come to such an agreement then the conciliation commission is created. Id.
112. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 1. The notification will contain the disputed interpretation or application of the Convention which is in dispute (if the subject in dispute cannot
be agreed upon, the tribunal will determine the subject matter). The Secretariat will forward all collected information to all the contracting Parties. Id.
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113
the president, who cannot be a national of either Party in dispute.
The tribunal must base its decision on the content of the Convention
and international law.1 1 4 The disputing Parties must provide the
tribunal with all relevant documents and information, which may
include calling experts and other witnesses when necessary to properly
develop the issues.11 5 Failure of a disputing Party to appear or properly
defend itself before the tribunal will not be a bar to the proceedings and
the tribunal may make a final decision.1 1 6 The decision will be based on
a majority of the arbitrators 17 and will be without appeal unless the
Parties previously agreed to an appellate procedure. 118

If the Parties cannot agree to either the ICJ or an arbitration
tribunal settling the dispute, a conciliation commission is created upon
the request of one of the disputing Parties. 119 The commission consists
of five members; two appointed by each Party, with the president of the
commsission jointly elected by the four appointees.1 20 The commission
will render its "proposal for resolution of the dispute, which the Parties
12
shall consider in good faith." 1
H. NAFTA 's Supplemental Agreement on EnvironmentalCooperation
NAFTA's stance within the primary agreement was to "recoginze
that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic
health, safety or environmental measures."'122 Building on the text of
the main agreement, the Supplemental Agreement 2 3 announced the
importance of maintaining the environment in a cooperative manner
"for the well being of present and future generations."'1 24
The
Agreement's objectives include: (a) to protect and improve the
113. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 2. If the disputing Parties cannot select the president
of the tribunal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will select the president
within a two-month period. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1 art. 3.
114. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 4. The tribunal will determine its own rules of procedure. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 5.
115. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 7.
116. Id. at Annex II,pt. 1, art. 13. Before making a final decision, the tribunal must
be satisfied that the claim is "well founded in fact and law." Id.
117. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 12.
118. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1,art. 16.
119. Id. art. 27(4).
120. Id. at Annex II, pt. 2, art. 1. If the disputing Parties cannot select the president of
the commission, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will select the president
within a two-month period. Id.
121. Id. at Annex II, pt.2, art. 5. The word "proposal" instead of "decision" may make
the outcome seem less determinative than that of the arbitration tribunal, which gives
"final decisions." Id. at. Annex II, pt. 1, art. 13.
122. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1114, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993).
123. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supranote 12.
124. Id. at Preamble.
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25
environment for "well-being of present and future generations"; (b) to
promote sustainable development through cooperative efforts in
implementing environmental and economic policies; 126 (c) to increase
the enforcement and compliance of environmental laws and regulations;' 27 and (d) to avoid creating barriers to trade or trade distor1 28

tions.

To best fulfill the Agreement's objectives, the Parties resolved to
commit themselves generally to: (a) preparing and publicly releasing
129
reports on the condition of the environment within their boundaries;
(b) developing environmental emergency procedures;' 30 (c) educating
the public on environmental matters; 131 (d) assessing environmental
impacts; 132 and (e) promoting economic tools to effectively achieve envi33
ronmental goals. 1
The Parties agreed to the above obligations with the condition that
each Party establish its own level of environmental protection and environmental policies. 3 4 Though it may seem to thwart harmonization
under the Agreement, the Parties also committed that such domestic
regulation would "provide for high levels of environmental protection
135
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations."'
After announcing such preeminence of internal legislation, the Agree136
ment outlines particular government action required of the Parties,
including: (a) effective enforcement of its environmental laws and
regulations; 137 (b) the existence of judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings for sanctions or remedies related to violations under its
environmental laws and regulations;' 38 and (c) the allocation of appro125. Id. art. 1(a).
126. Id. art. 1(b). The polices would be enacted by and under the supervision of the
domestic mechanisms of the Parties to the Agreement. Id. art. 1(b)-(f).
127. Id. art. l(g).
128. Id. art. 1(e).
129. Id. art. 2.1(a). The Agreement also requires Parties to ensure that its domestic
laws and regulations relating to any matter covered in the Agreement must be published.
To the extent possible, the Parties should allow notice of prospective measures it may
adopt and a reasonable opportunity for interested persons to comment. Id. art. 4.
130. Id. art. 2.1(b).
131. Id. art. 2.1(c).
132. Id. art. 2.1(e).
133. Id. art. 2.1(f).
134. Id. art. 3.
135. Id.
136. Id. art. 5.
137. Id. art. 5.1. Examples of "effective enforcement" are given, including: appointing
inspectors, monitoring compliance and investigations of suspected violations, promoting
environmental audits, requiring record keeping and reporting, using licenses (permits or
authorizations), initiating proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations (including emergency orders), or providing for search, seizure or detention. Id.
138. Id. art. 5.2. The Agreement requires the ability of private interested persons to
have access to the proceedings. The private person's rights would include the ability to
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priate sanctions and remedies for violations of its environmental laws
39
and regulations.'
The Agreement established the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation to oversee the implementation and administration of the
announced objectives and criteria. l40 The Commission consists of a
Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.' 4 ' The
Counci' 42 convenes at least once a year 143 and may use wide discretion
145
in deciding what procedures to apply 144 and what action it may take.
The Council acts as the governing body of the Commission 146 and its
functions are to: (a) serve as a forum for environmental matters; 147 (b)
supervise the implementation of the Agreement as well as recommend
elaborations to strengthen the agreement;' 48 (c) oversee the Secretariat; 149 (d) address "questions and differences that may arise between the
50
Parties regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement";'
(e) consider and develop recommendations for the Agreement's
functions;11 (f) strengthen Parties' cooperation for improving
environmental laws and regulations; 5 2 (g) promote public access to
environmental information;' 53 (h) cooperate with the NAFTA Free

sue another person, seek sanctions or remedies to mitigate environmental damage, and
request authorities to enforce the domestic environmental laws and regulations. Id.
139. Id. art. 5.3. A Party must consider the nature and gravity of the violation, any
economic benefit derived from the violation, and the economic position of the violator.
Compliance agreements, fines, imprisonment, closure of facilities and the cost of containing or cleaning up the pollution are possible sanctions to be imposed. Id.
140. Id. art. 8.1.
141. Id. art. 8.2.
142. The Council "shall comprise cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the
Parties or their designees." Id. art. 9.1.
143. Id. art. 3.
144. Id. art. 2.
145. Id. art. 5. The council may assign responsibilities to ad hoc or standing committees, seek advice of non-governmental organizations or persons, and take such action "in
the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree." Id.
146. Id. art. 10.1.
147. Id. art. 10.1(a).
148. Id. art. 10.1(b). The Council will review the effectiveness of the Agreement four
years after the entry into force. Id.
149. Id. art. 10.1(c).
150. Id. art. 10.1(d).
151. Id. art. 10.2. The Council may develop recommendations on a broad spectrum of
possible subjects, including: techniques and methodologies for gathering data and analysis; environmental matters as they relate to economic development; protection of endangered species and habitats; approaches to environmental enforcement; and "any other
matters it may decide." Id.
152. Id. art. 10.3. The Agreement encourages the exchange of information on developing environmental standards with the goal of harmonizing such standards. Id.
153. Id. art. 10.5. This would include public participation in the decision-making process. Id.
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Trade Commission to discourage Parties from waiving environmental
measures;154 (i) create a system that oversees Parties' national policies
with environmental impact assessments;1 55 and (j) develop proper
56
access and remedies for a Party who has suffered an injury.
The Secretariat fulfills the Agreement's needs for an informationgatherer and record-maker. Every year the Secretariat prepares a
report of the Commission 5 7 which is ultimately released to the public. 158 Questions over a Party's non-enforcement of its environmental
laws and regulations result in the Secretariat investigating the matter.15 9 The Secretariat "may consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization (NGO) or person asserting that a Party is
failing to effectively enforce its environmental law."' 60 To be considered
by the Secratariat, the submission must contain "sufficient information
to allow the Secretariat to review the submissions, including
documentary evidence on which the submission may be based"1 61 and
appear to be "aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing
industry."162 Notification of the complaint must be made to the accused
Party163 and the person or NGO must reside or exist in the territory of a
164
Party to the Agreement.
When the Secretariat acknowledges that a submitted complaint
fufills the set criteria it will determine the necessity of a response from
the accused Party. 165 If the accussed Party notifies the Secretariat that
the matter is "the subject of a pending judicial or administrative

154. Id. art. 10.6.
155. Id. art. 10.7.
156. Id. art. 10.9. The injured Party would need proper redress in the violating Party's
adjudicative systems, as if the injury had been caused within the violator's own territory.

Id.
157. Id. art. 12.1. The report covers many areas of interest: the activities and expense
of the Commission, actions taken by each Party (including enforcement data), views of
non-governmental organization (or persons), and recommendations made on any matter.
Id. art. 12.2. If the Secretariat wishes to prepare a report on a matter within the scope of
the annual program it may, unless two-thirds of the Parties object to the creation of such
a report. Id. The report may not concern itself over a Party's lack of enforcement of its
environmental laws. Id.
158. Id. art. 12.1.
159. Id. art. 14.1.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 14.1(c).
162. Id. art. 14.1(d).
163. Id. art. 14.1(e). The submission must also include any response the accused Party
has made to the complaint. Id.
164. Id. art. 14.1(f0.
165. Id. art. 14.2. The Secretariat will determine necessity of response based upon
whether: (1) the submission alleges harm to the complaining Party; (2) the submission
requires study that advances goals of the Agreement; (3) private remedies under the accused Party's law have been exhausted; and (4) the submission is drawn exclusively from
mass media reports. Id.
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proceeding" the Secretariat must stop the investigation. 166 The accused
Party shall submit any information it wishes if no internal proceedings
are in progress. 167 The Secretariat may proceed further, with the
consent of the Council, 168 by developing a factual record 169 using a wide
array of sources for information. 170 It shall submit a draft to the
Council and any Party may provide commentary on the record's
171
accuracy after the Secretariat compiles the factual record.
The Agreement creates the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC)172 whose duties include: (a) advising the Council on any matter
within the scope of the agreement, as well as implementing and
elaborating on the agreement; 173 (b) providing relevant information to
the Secretariat to assist in developing factual records;174 and (c) any
175
other duties required by the Council.
The Agreement contains an elaborate and innovative structure for
dispute settlement that begins with consultation. 176 Any Party may
request a consultation with another Party "regarding whether there has
been a persistant pattern of failure ...to effectively enforce its
environmental law."' 77 All interested Parties are allowed to participate
in the consultation1 78 and shall "make every attempt to arrive at a
' 79
mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through consultations."'
A special session of the Council may be requested if consultations
fail to resolve the dispute within sixty days of a Party's request for a
consultation.1 80 The Party requesting the special session will submit,

166. Id. art. 14.3
167. Id. art. 14.3(b). This includes any previous action or remedies given by the accused Party relating to the matter. Id.
168. Id. art. 15.2. The Council must authorize the preparation of a factual record by a
two-thirds vote. Id.
169. Id. art. 15.1. The Secretariat must consider whether "the submission, in the light
of any response provided by the Party, warrants developing a factual record." Id.
170. Id. art. 15.4. The Secretariat may consider any information "furnished by a Party
and may consider any relevant technical, scientific, or other information" that is: (a) publicly available; (b) submitted by an interested NGO or person; (c) submitted by the Joint
Public Advisory Committee; or (d) developed by the Secretariat or by independent experts.

Id.
171. Id. art. 15.5. The Parties commenting have 45 days after the Secretariat submits
the draft record to the Council. Id.
172. Id. art. 16.1. The Parties will appoint an equal number of the fifteen members to
the Committee. Id.
173. Id. art. 16.4.
174. Id. art. 16.5.
175. Id. art. 16.4.
176. Id. art. 22.
177. Id. art. 22.1.
178. Id. art. 22.3.
179. Id. art. 22.4.
180. Id. art. 23.1.
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with their request, a description of the dispute. 181 The Council, unless
otherwise decided, will convene within twenty days of the request and
attempt to resolve the issue. 182 In resolving the dispute, the Council
may:
(a) call on such technical advisers or create such working groups
or expert groups as it deems necessary;
(b) have recourse to good offices, conciliation, mediation or such
other dispute resolution procedures; or
(c) make a recommendation, as may assist the consulting Parties
to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute. Any such
recommendations shall be made public if the Council, by a two-thirds
183
vote, so decides.
Provided the Council cannot resolve the matter sixty days after the
convening of the special session, it may consider creating an aribitral
panel.1 84 An interested Party must request the panel and the Council
must approve the panel by a two-thirds majority.18 5 The agreement
limits disputes to failures of enforcement "involving workplaces, firms,
companies or sectors that produce goods or services"1 86 that are involved
with trade among the Parties or compete with "goods or services
1 87
produced or provided by persons of another Party."
The Council, after approving the dispute for arbitration, will
establish a roster of forty-five individuals who are able to serve as
panelists.188
The rosters members must have experience in
environmental law or international dispute settlement, or have relevant
professional expertise or experience.189
The chosen panel consists of five members whose selection depends
upon the number of Parties involved in the arbitration.1 90 Each Party
selects two panelists who are citizens of the opposing Party when there
are two disputing Parties. 91 When there are more than two Parties,
the Party complained against selects two panelists whose citizenry is
from different complaining Parties.' 92 The complaining Parties must
select two panelists whose citizenry is from the complained against

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 23.2.
art. 23.3.
art. 23.4.
art. 24.1.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 25.1.
Id. art. 25.2.
Id. art. 27.
ld. art. 27.1.
Id. art. 27.2.
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Party. 193
The panel, either upon request by a Party or by its own initiative,
"may seek information and technical advice from any person or body
that it deems appropriate."'194 This seemingly broad power is curtailed
by disputing Parties who retain the power to limit this investigative
power of the panel "to such terms and conditions as such Parties may
agree."' 95 The panel must present an initial report to the disputing
Parties within 180 days after panelist selection. The panel's initial
report contains: (a) findings of fact; (b) its ruling as to whether there
has been a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce
environmental law; and (c) the panel's recommendation, if any, for
196
resolution of the dispute.
After the disputing Parties are given an opportunity to comment
and to request reconsideration of the initial report, 9 7 the panel will give
the disputing Parties a final report that will be subsequently published. 198 If the panel found a persistent pattern of failure to effectively
enforce environmental law, the disputing Parties may agree on an
action plan to eliminate such failure. 99 The panel may be reconvened if
the disputing Parties cannot agree to an action plan2 ° ° or agree that an
20 1
action plan is being fully implemented.
If the panel reconvenes to resolve disagreement over a proposed
action plan, the panel will determine the sufficiency of the proposed
action plan to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement.2 02 If found
insufficient, the panel may impose monetary enforcement assessment
20 3
within ninety days after the panel reconvenes.

193. Id. When settling disputes between two or more Parties, the Parties must agree
on the chair to the panel. If such agreement cannot be reached, a Party will be chosen
randomly and it will be allowed to select the chair (the chair cannot be a citizen of the
randomly chosen Party). Id.
194. Id. art. 30.
195. Id.
196. Id. art. 31. This normally is the required adoption of an action plan that remedies
the pattern of non-enforcement.
197. Id. art. 31.5.
198. Id. art. 32. The report will be published five days after it is transmitted to the
Council. Id.
199. Id. art. 33. The Parties must notify the Secretariat and the Council of any agreed
resolution of the dispute.
200. Id. art. 34. The disputing Parties cannot agree on an action plan within sixty
days of the final report.
201. Id. The implementation dispute may be over an action plan agreed to by the Parties or one established by the panel.
202. Id. art. 34.4. If the panel does not approve the plan it may create one consistent
with the Party's domestic laws. Id.
203. Id. art. 34.4. The Council deposits all funds generated by the monetary enforcement assessment into a fund that improves and enhances the environment or environmental law enforcement in the Party complained against. Id. at Annex 34.
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If the panel reconvenes to determine whether a complained against
Party is fully implementing an action plain, the panel will decide on the
questioned implementation. 204 The panel may not impose a monetary
enforcement assessment if it finds that the plan is being fully
implemented. 2 5 The panel shall impose a monetary enforcement
assessment within sixty days after the panel reconvenes if full
20 6
implementation has not been established.
A complaining Party to a dispute may annually suspend the
NAFTA benefits when a complained against Party fails to pay the
207
monetary enforcement assesment within 180 days of the judgment.
The suspension of benefits cannot exceed the monetary enforcement
assessment. 208 Where the dispute involved more than one complaining
Party, the suspension of benefits will be calculated in the aggregate and
the sum of the suspensions cannot exceed the monetary enforcement
assessment. 209 The suspension of the benefits will cease when the Party
pays the monetary enforcement assessment or begins to fully
210
implement the action plan.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT VS. THE ECONOMY
As estimated by the U.S. Trade Representative Office in 1993,
NAFTA creates the world's largest market 21 1 and will stimulate
economic growth for the members to the agreement. 212 But with the
increased economic activity come fears of environmental degredation
and the belief that rapid growth will outpace environmental

204. Id. art. 34.5.
205. Id.
206. Id. In addition to the monetary assessment, the panel will require full implementation of the action plan. Id. To determine the amount of the monetary enforcement assessment the panel should look at: (a) the duration and degree of the Party's persistent
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law; (b) the enforcement level
reasonably expected of a Party, considering its resources; (c) the Party's reasons for not
fully implementing an action plan; (d) effort made by the Party to begin remedying the
non-enforcement; and (e) any other relevant factors. Id. at Annex 34.
207. Id. art. 36. The first year of the Agreement, any monetary enforcement assessment could not exceed twenty million dollars (U.S.). For the years following, the assessment cannot exceed .007 percent of the total trade in goods between the Parties during
the most recent year for which data is available. Id. at Annex 34.
208. Id. art. 36.2.
209. Id. art. 36.3.
210. Id. art. 36.4. The panel may be requested to reconvene to determine if the suspension of benefits is "manifestly excessive." The panel will present its decision in a report to the disputing Parties within forty-five days of the request. Id. art. 36.5.
211. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF NAFTA (1994).
The market will consist of over 370 million people and $6.5 trillion of production.
212. Id.
The Trade Representative Office predicted an increase of U.S. exportsupported jobs by 200,000 in the first two years and one percent increase to the Mexican
growth rate. Id. at 1.
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infrastructure. 213
One concern lies with Mexico's ability to enforce its environmental
laws and whether free trade will result in Canadian and U.S.
14
businesses sponsoring the lackluster enforcement in pursuit of profit.2
Many environmentalists point to the current maquiladoraindustry as a
road sign to where free trade will take North America. 215 Sparked by
the Mexican economic crisis of 1982, maquiladora employment
216
increased at the rate of fifteen percent a year during the mid-1980s.
The present rate of employment does not rival previous levels, yet it
grows at a high rate as do the exports derived from the industry. 217
Industry and populations have been drawn to the border area to take
advantage of the economic benefits. 218 The increased industrial activity
and population, without environmental protection mechanisms
21 9
established or enforced, resulted in the poisoning of the environment.

213. Jagdish Bhagwati & Herman E. Daly, Debate: Does Free Trade Harm the Environment?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 1993, at 41.
214. DANIEL MAGRAW, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (1995). The fear is that Mexico
would become a "pollution haven" where businesses would be attracted to low levels of
environmental protection to save production costs. Id.
215. The maquiladora program allows components to be imported duty-free into Mexico from the United States for further manufacturing by border factories and then exported duty-free back into the United States (a twin factory is created on the border, with
the production side in Mexico). Id. at 5.
216. Edward J. Williams, The MaquiladoraIndustry and Environmental Degradation
In the United States-Mexico Borderlands,27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 766 (1996).
217. Id. The first ten months of 1995 displayed an increase of maquiladora employment by 9.4% with maquiladora exports increasing by 19.2%. The exports for the first
quarter of 1996 increased 12% since the first quarter of 1995.
218. Electronic industries increased their presence, from 1979 to 1985, by 65% and account for 85% of maquiladora employment. Between 1984 and 1988, the chemical industry increased employment from 272 to 1674 workers. From 1980 to 1990, the number of
furniture industry plants increased from 59 to 274 resulting in the addition of 22,000
workers. Id. at 776.
219. Id. Everything from raw sewage to hazardous wastes has been dumped into the
local environment. The Mexican government admits that over 28,000 tons of hazardous
waste produced by the maquiladora industry is not accounted for in 1995. Id. The
authors cite Polly Chaz, America's Deadly Border, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 12, 1993, at
16, who reports that children play in pools of toxic green scum and hazardous waste is
dumped by local factories onto the streets. Id. at n.33. For more detail on the problems
resulting from the maquiladora industry, see Jane Kay, The "Toxic Dump" that Flows into
California,S.F. EXAMINER, June 22, 1986, at 7 (reporting that ground water is highly contaminated, as is the New River, which flows from Mexico into California and "contains
every disease known in the Western hemisphere"); Michael Scott Feeley & Elizabeth
Knier, Environmental Considerationsof the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade
Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259 (1992) (stating that the pollution of the water
is so high that 90% of adults thirty-five or older in the towns near San Elizario, Mexico
contract hepatitis during their lifetimes); and Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423, 446 (1995)
(stating that in Ciudad Juarez, a ditch filled with untreated household and industrial
sewage carries over one million gallons of waste a day into the Rio Grande).
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The example given by the maquiladora industry begins the list of
environmental problems tied to industrialization. Acid rain stands as
another concern related to North American industry. 220 Pollution along
the U.S.-Canadian border poses a special problem due its size 221 and
population concentration along it.222 History marks notable increased
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide (two pollutants linked to
acid rain) during the last fifty years in North America. 223 The increase
of the pollutants traces directly back to rising power plant and motor
vehicle emissions. 224 The short-term effects of acid rain include the destruction of many species populations and various aquatic ecosystems. 225 The long-term effects are debatable, but many studies suggest
permanent damage to agriculture (damage to soil, root systems, and
microorganisms), urban damage (erosion of stone, paint and metals),
and hazards to human health (ingestion of water and food affected by
226
acid rain).
Both the maquiladora industry and the increased levels of acid rain
display pollution's lack of deference to national boundaries and the increased levels of pollution associated with economic growth. 227 The environmentalists' wariness seems logical since the purpose of NAFTA is
to stimulate industrial activity and economic prosperity. Whether the
Side Agreement contains sufficient incentives and enforcement powers
deserves attention and will be discussed below.

220. In 1986, the annual rainfall in the eastern half of the U.S. was estimated to be
ten to forty times more acidic than normal rainfall, with manmade pollutants the source
of the acidity. Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-CanadaAir Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing TransboundaryAir Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 421,
422 n.6 (1993).
221. The two countries share approximately 5,000 miles of border and more than 150
lakes and rivers. Brian R. Popiel, Comment: From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment: A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage
Between Canadaand the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 447 (1995).
222. Almost 90% of all Canadians live within one hundred miles of the U.S.-Canadian
border. Id.
223. As of the early 1980s, annual sulfur dioxide emissions for the U.S. equaled approximately 26 million tons, a 26% increase since 1946, while nitrogen oxide emissions
totaled 23 million tons as of 1980. Canada's annual emission of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide were, respectively, 5 million tons and 2 million tons. Roelofs, supra note 220, at
422.
224. More than 90% of acid rain is due to man-made emissions of sulfur oxide and nitrogen oxides (sulfur oxide causes two-thirds of the problem). Id. at 421.
225. Id. at 423 (citing ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS: THE POLICY DISPUTE
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (Jurgen Schmandt & Hilliard Roderick eds.,
1988)).
226. Id. at 423-24.
227. Some scholars suggest several of NAFTA's potential threats to the environment,
including- declining domestic environmental standards; deteriorating air and water quality; eroding of physical infrastructure within Mexico; and increasing mishandling of hazardous waste. Feeley & Knier, supranote 219, at 6-8.

892

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:5

A. The Side-Agreement's Shortcomings
The directives of the Side Agreement require enforcement of domestic environmental laws and regulations. Critics of the Agreement
attack this objective, arguing that baseline levels of environmental protection must be established. 228 Without requiring environmental standard harmonization it is feared that Mexico will sacrifice continued en229
vironmental protection in an effort to entice businesses to relocate.
Critics raise the ability for a Party to side-track enforcement procedures 230 and the ease which a Party may withdraw from the Agreement 23 1 as other weak areas of the Convention. The Council, which set-

tles disputes under the Agreement, consists of political appointees and
has a myriad of procedures to delay any adjudication of conflicts. 232 A
Party must only give notice and wait six months to withdraw from the
Agreement. 233 Critics argue that Parties' behavior will change only
234
when obligations are not easily circumvented or dischargeable.
Critics also find fault with the limited access and remedies involved
with the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Agreement. 235 The
Agreement allows for private remedies for those who have, as deter236
mined by Parties' environmental laws, a "legally recognized interest."
This gives non-citizens difficulty in finding sufficient standing to bring
237
cross-border suits and complicates the enforcement of the Agreement.
If a private actor has a sufficient interest to bring suit, the person or or-

228. See Farah Khakee, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Need to Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 880 (1993). The idea of
global standardization of environmental policies has been argued long before the creation
of NAFTA. See Developments in the Law - InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1484, 1609 (1991) (discussing the concept of extraterritorial environmental regulation to cover those nations whose environmental regulation lacks substance).
229. Alicia A. Samios, NAFTAs Supplemental Agreement: In Need of Reform, 9 N.Y.
INT'L L.R. 49 (1996) (reviewing Mexico's history of lax enforcement as reason to doubt the
strength of the Agreement); see also Khakee, supra note 228, at 880 (detailing the deficiencies of Mexican, Canadian, and U.S. domestic legislation).
230. David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment - Making the Side Agreement
Work, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603, 604 (1995).
231. Samios, supranote 229, at 67.
232. Baron, supra note 230, at 604. The obstacle most obvious is the bar put on any
dispute that is currently "subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding."
Supplemental Agreement, supra note 12, art. 14.3(a).
233. Supplemental Agreement, supranote 11, art. 50.
234. Samios, supra note 229, at 67.
235. Id. at 69.
236. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 12, art. 6.2.
237. Samios, supra note 229, at 69. In interpreting the standing requirements of the
Agreement, one scholar suggests the disregarding of U.S. Supreme Court's view of
standing. Baron, supra note 230, at 610 (claiming the U.S. approach to standing "leads to
enormously complex and costly litigation to no productive end[s]"). Id.
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ganization may only submit a complaint to the Secretariat. 238 The Secretariat can investigate the matter more thoroughly only after two of
the three Parties consent to such an investigation. 239 This politicizes
240
the alleged injury and may hinder the resolution of disputes.
Finally, critics object to the limited subject matter allowed in dispute settlement 241 and the sanctioning mechanisms to enforce decisions
under the Agreement. 242 The Agreement limits the scope of arbitration
to matters relating to "workplaces, firms, companies or sectors, that
produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the... Parties; or
(b) that compete ...with goods or services produced or provided by person of another Party."243 This arguably limits the environmental protection to commercial areas and allows private disregard of environ244
mental laws.
If the dispute falls within these parameters, the imposition of trade
sanctions (or monetary assessments) to enforce the decision may be
counter-productive. 245 The Agreement allows trade sanctions for "persistent and unjustifiable pattern[s] of non-enforcement." 246 But such a
pattern lacks objective definition and would likely result in arbitrarily
imposed sanctions. 247 Even if objective criteria could be achieved it may
not be desirable. The narrow focus to heighten environmental enforcement might be at the cost of Mexico's infrastructure. 248 The requirement
of similar levels of environmental enforcement may be unrealistic when
one considers the disparity of economic development between Mexico
and its northern partners. To comply with the Agreement's enforcement conditions, Mexico may have to sacrifice its spending on important infrastructure projects (such as sewers). 249 What may result is less
238. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 11, art. 14.
239. Id. art. 15(2).
240. Samios, supra note 229, at 71 (concluding that the agreement fails to promote
public participation in developing environmental laws, regulations and policies). Id.; see
also id. at 73 (complaining that the "broad sovereignty-protection clauses as ripe for manipulation by the Party-governments").
241. Id. at 72.

242. Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental
Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59 (1994).

243. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 12, art. 24(1).
244. Samios, supra note 229, at 72 (claiming that the Agreement is not able to assess
sufficiency of environmental laws).
245. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 112-113.
246. Id.
Kublicki argues that "persistent and unjustifiable pattern of nonenforcement" will be interpreted at a level commensurate with that of Canada and the
U.S. Id. at 111.
247. Id. at 111.
248. Id. at 113.
249. Id. at 115. The author cites a columnist who writes: "How can a country that has
been unable even to clean up its own drinking water - and still uses vast quantities of
pesticides that are banned in the United States - comply with far-higher U.S. environ-
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development in the name of enforcement which may leave the environment worse off than before the Agreement. 250 Focusing narrowly on enforcement raises several concerns, including: (a) the formation of an adversarial relationship between business and government; 25 1 (b)
compliance with regulation will be the focus of business instead of conserving resources; 252 and (c) the absence of mechanisms within Mexico
253
to enforce the regulations.
B. The Side-Agreement's Strengths
Despite the criticisms, many environmentalists find the SideAgreement to procure considerable power in preserving the environment and enforcing domestic regulation. 2 4 Supporters hold out the
Agreement as marking "the first time in international trade agreements
255
the environment is incorporated as a significant factor."
The Agreement protects more stringent national environmental
standards from erosion by emphasizing concepts of national autonomy. 256 This prevents the atrophy of higher domestic standards in or257
der to create harmonized international standards.
Supporters also point to improvements in domestic environmental
infrastructure as another strength of the Agreement. 258 The increased
economic benefits derived from free trade would allow for proper monitoring, air and water treatment, and education needed to properly en-

mental standards?" Id. at n.249 (citing Harold Gilliam, Will Clinton Put the Earth First?,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1993, at 4).

250, Id. at 115.
251. C. Foster Knight, Comment: Voluntary Environmental Standards vs. Mandatory
EnvironmentalRegulations and Enforcement in the NAFTA Market, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L. &
COMP. LAW 619, 629 (1995).
252. Id.
253. Id. The ability for private enforcement is mostly missing within Mexican environmental law. Id. at n.36. The author suggests the implementation of voluntary compliance with the international environmental standards as the best method of harmonizing standards and enhancing compliance with those standards. Id. at 634.
254. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 69.
255. Id. (quoting Jay D. Hair, President of the National Wildlife Federation).
256. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 12, art. 3
(holding that each Party has the right to "establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities"). See also
Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Laws and Regulations After NAFTA, 1 U.S. MEXICO
L.J. 199, 204 (1993); Kublicki, supra note 242, at 70.
257. Id. The Parties are to ensure that its laws are enforced and must "strive to improve those laws and regulations." Id. This will leave intact the high requirements already established in the United States and Canada, while encouraging development
within Mexico's legislation. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 30-32.
258. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 65.
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force environmental regulation. 259 Infrastructure development would
institutionalize environmental protection through public projects, as
well as environmental education. 260 Developing infrastructure would
alleviate the problems of international enforcement while avoiding sovereignty conflicts caused by trade sanctions or fines. 261 It is asserted by
supporters that with economic prosperity comes a cleaner environment;
those who are wealthier can afford more efficient technologies and pollution control. 262 With the proper revenues, infrastructure can be improved (or created). 263 Though an inverse relation may not exist between the economic prosperity and environmental degradation,
economic growth is a logical prerequisite to environmental protection in
developing countries.264
The Agreement allows considerable public participation within the
Agreement, especially in dispute-resolution processes. 265 It requires notification of a government's change in food safety measures, 266 on which
the public is then allowed to comment. 267 It is ground-breaking in that
it encourages private citizens to submit complaints. 268 Despite the political nature of arbitration, 269 no other environmental agreement al270
lows such private access.
Arguments that the Agreement will encourage business to relocate
to Mexico are rebuffed by stating that such relocation was not prohibited prior to NAFTA.271 Supporters point out that NAFTA discourages
272
environmentally motivated relocation.

259. Id.
260. Id. at 65-66.

261. Id.
262. Id. at 106-107 (citing Jonathon Marshal, How Ecology Is Tied To Mexico Trade
Pact, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1992, at A8 (reporting about a Princeton study by Gene
Grossman and Alan Krueger showing that pollution levels rise steadily until income
reaches beyond $4,000 per capita, and then pollution falls off as income increases beyond
$4,000). Mexico's per capita income in 1992 was $5,000. Id.
263. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 66.
264. Id. at 107.
265. Stenzel, supranote 219, at 478 (1995).
266. North American Free Trade Agreement, supranote 122, art. 718.
267. Id.
268. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 12, art. 14
269. See Samios, supra note 229, at 71.
270. See Stenzel, supra note 219, at 478.
271. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 102.
272. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 122, art. 1114.2 (stating that
a "Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from such [environmental] measures as an encouragement").
Supporters of the
Agreement state that environmental regulation is a minor consideration when deciding
where to locate a business or factory. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 104. Labor costs,
transportation costs, raw material costs, labor skill, and corporate good will all must also
be considered. Id. Normally environmental regulation costs average 3% of total output of
industries that pollute the most. Id. at 103.
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While critics believe the Agreement falls short of what is currently
needed, 273 supporters claim that the Agreement's potential to enforce
environmental protection with economic incentive makes the Agreement uniquely powerful. 274 The creation of jobs and higher wages may
275
be the environment's most effective protection.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The landscape of international environmental protection and dispute resolution has changed markedly since 1982. Several Conventions
and agreements later, the North American countries can no longer
question the existence of procedures able to deal with environmental
damage. Instead, the U.S., Canada and Mexico must weigh the many
possible rights and obligations under the discussed agreements and decide what actions would be most effective. The agreements balance
sovereignty and community with the hope of attaining responsible independence. The mechanisms for resolving environmental disputes often sacrifice binding force in favor of cooperative efforts. While weak
enforcement and limited applicability haunt these dispute mechanisms,
the development of trade sanctions and/or fines opens new possibilities
for future agreements.
North American countries currently have the framework to change
a neighbor's behavior through any one of the discussed agreements.
The wealth of procedure indicates a growing awareness of the environment's importance and an increased desire to encourage sustainable
development. Improvements must be made in defining a Party's obligations to the environment and outlining the steps necessary to correct a
nation's behavior. Yet, the great progress made in the last seventeen
years must be recognized and respected if further agreements are to occur.

273. See, e.g., Samios, supra note 229.
274. Stenzel, supra note 219, at 478.
275. Id. at 467-68 (noting that Jay D. Hair, president of the National Wildlife Federation stated "the means of addressing environmental concerns are directly tied to economic
development. If environmental progress is not to remain solely the property of affluent
nations, developing nations must have their fair shot at progress.").

THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA
David Whiting*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which went
into effect on November 16, 1994, designates the Earth's ocean areas as
being part of the common heritage of mankind, and sets forth the goals
of finding peaceful and equitable solutions to disagreements regarding
sovereignty over disputed territories and to establishing equal access to
the Earth's marine resources.1 In furtherance of these goals, the Convention contains provisions granting the state which has sovereignty
over an island group the right to exploit its natural resources, and an
entire part containing dispute resolution mechanisms to aid in the
resolution of conflicts over disputed territories and their resources.
There are few places in the world that provide a greater challenge to
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Law of the Sea than the
South China Sea's Spratly Islands.
The islands were first mapped by the British in the 1880's,2 and are
now claimed by six nations: The People's Republic of China (PRC), The
Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. 3 Although all of these claims have a historical basis, the primary reasons for the claims are the islands strategic location and their
4
potential oil and gas reserves.
Considering the amount of attention they have received from
nearby countries, the islands themselves are small and physically insignificant by any standard. The total area of the 100 or so islets that
comprise the Spratlys is less than five square kilometers, 5 the largest of
* J.D., 1997, University of Denver, College of Law.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, preamble, 21
I.L.M. 1261, 1271 [hereinafter Law of the Sea].
2. Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim Over Spratly and Paracel Islands:A Historical
and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 399, 400 n. 8 (1991).
3. Michael Bennett, The People's Republic of China and the Use of International
Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT'L LAW 425, 425 (1992).
4. Roberto R. Romulo, PhilippineForeign Policy: New Policy in a Changing World
Environment, 17-SUM FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 131, 133.
5. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1992 WORLD FACTBOOK 318 (1992), cited in
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the islands being only .43 kilometers square.6 Bearing in mind that the
islands are spread over a 200,000 square mile area (518,000 square
kilometers), it seems clear that these islands, despite their strategic
importance, are actually very small, and that the dispute over them is
driven by the desire on the part of the various parties to profit from po7
tential oil reserves and control the South China Sea.
The goal of this paper is to examine the claims on the Spratly Islands that are made by the PRC and Vietnam in light of the signing of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea by both countries. The scope of
the paper will be limited to the claims made by the PRC and Vietnam
because, of the claimants, they are the two nations between whom tensions over the Spratlys are highest. In addition, they are the nations
who are most actively pursuing their goals of possessing and economically exploiting the islands. Finally, this paper will discuss the impact
of the dispute resolution provisions contained in the Law of the Sea on
the possible resolution of the disagreement between the PRC and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands.
II.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 293(1) of the Law of the Sea states that when a territorial
dispute is being settled using the Law, "[a] court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules
of international law not incompatible with this Convention" when settling the dispute.8 This language clearly indicates that previously existing international law is to be taken into account when settling territorial disputes under the Law of the Sea.
Since the turn of the century, there have been three cases that have
demonstrated what courts base their decisions on in cases involving territorial disputes over islands. 9
In The Island of Palmas, the United States and the Netherlands
agreed to arbitrate their conflicting claims of ownership of islands in
the southern part of the Philippines. The United States claimed that
the islands had been given to it by the Spanish at the end of the Spanish-American War. In effect, the claim was based on Spain's claim to

Richard D. Belier, Note, Analyzing the Relationship Between InternationalLaw and InternationalPoliticsin China'sand Vietnam's TerritorialDispute Over the Spratly Islands,
29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 295 (1994).
6. Tao Cheng, The Dispute Over the South China Seas Islands, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J.
265, 267 (1975).
7. Bennett, supranote 3, at 429.
8. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 293, 21 I.L.M. at 1324.
9. See Beller, supranote 5, at 303-4.
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the islands by their discovery in the 16th century. 10 The Dutch claimed
that the islands had been given to the Dutch East Indies Company as
tribute by native princes."
After examining the competing claims, the arbitrator ruled in favor
of the Dutch on the grounds that although Spain has discovered the islands, they had not taken sufficient steps to protect against their use by
the Dutch. Since the Dutch used the islands on a regular basis, the
court held that their title was superior to that of Spain and by extension, the United States, and that the Netherlands would retain sover2
eignty over the islands.'
This doctrine was refined in the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island, a case between France and Mexico. 13 In this case, the French
claimed the rights to an island in the Pacific Ocean due to its discovery
by a French Naval Officer in 1858, after which the French did not use
or visit the island until 1897. They did, however, survey the island
during their 1858 expedition, and upon their arrival in Hawaii, their
next port of call, placed a notice in the newspaper notifying interested
14
parties that the island had been claimed by France.
In 1897, a French Naval Ship which had been ordered to inspect
the island found three Americans on the island excavating guano for a
San Francisco company. France promptly protested to the United
States, which replied that it had not granted any concession to the men
and that it had no claims to the island. A month later, a Mexican vessel
stopped at the island and forced the Americans to raise the Mexican
flag, claiming that the island belonged to Mexico. Upon hearing of this,
the French protested to the Mexicans, and the parties agreed to have
the case settled through arbitration. 15
In this case, the arbitrator ruled for France on the grounds that the
French had taken sufficient steps to protect their claim by publishing
notice of the claim and protesting unauthorized exploitation of the islands resources by the Americans whom they found on the island. This
modified the Island of Palmas ruling insofar as the arbitrator did not
require France to make use of the island, as Spain had been required to
do. In the case of Clipperton Island, all that was required of the French
was that they publicize their claim to the island and exclude others
from it.16

10. Philip C. Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735, 737
(1928).
11. Id., at 735.
12. Beller, supra note 5, at 303-4.

13. Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
14. Id., at 391.

15. Id., at 391-92.
16. Id., at 391-94.
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The international law standard was further modified in 1933 in the
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland.17 In this case, the Permanent Court
of International Justice held that if the territory in question was uninhabited due to its remote location and unfavorable climate, occupation
is not required in order to retain sovereignty of the territory and that
protests and the exclusion of others are sufficient.
Taken as a whole, these cases lead to the conclusion that in order to
establish sovereignty over an island, a nation needs to establish title to
the islands through discovery and, except in the case of inhospitable
territory, needs to protect the title through use.
Examining China and Vietnam's claims on the islands in light of
international case law is a task that could only be done adequately in a
paper exclusively devoted to that analysis.1 8 For the purposes of this
paper, however, a brief overview will suffice to demonstrate that both
parties have claims which meet the criteria for sovereignty established
in the cases discussed above.
China's claim to the Spratlys dates back to their discovery by the
Chinese in the second century B.C., which was shortly followed by the
establishment of Chinese administration over the islands. 19 Following
their initial discovery and use of the islands, the Chinese sent numerous expeditions to the islands, starting in about 111 B.C. 20 In addition
to governmental use and exploration of the islands, the Chinese point to
the fact that fishermen from Hainan used the Spratlys as emergency or
seasonal homes throughout this period. This use would strengthen the
Chinese claim. 21 Perhaps more importantly, the Provincial Government
of Kwangtung issued five licenses between 1921 and 1932 for the ex22
ploitation of the islands resources.
Starting in 1883, China's claim to the Spratlys was recognized by
European powers. Of particular note is a survey by Germany conducted
in 1883 which was stopped after protest from the Chinese govern-

17. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No 53,
cited in Beller, supra note 5, at 304, n.103.
18. See generally Bennett, supra note 3 (discussing China's historical claims to the
Spratly Islands and its attitude regarding international legal norms in relation to the dispute); Chang, supra note 2 (includes an exhaustive discussion of China's historical claims
to the islands in addition to legal analysis of the different legal claims made by China);
Cheng, supra note 6 (provides a more succinct overview of China and Vietnam's claims to
the islands).
19. Chang, supra note 2 at 403. (Chang notes that his accounts of the Chinese discovery and use of the islands are based on Chinese history books. Bearing this in mind, it
may be that these sources overstate the Chinese claim somewhat, as I was unable to find
other articles that verify the dates in this article).
20. Id.
21. Cheng, supra note 6 at 274.
22. Id.
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ment. 23 Following this, use of the islands by Chinese fisherman from
Hainan was documented by the British and the French, and French occupation of nine of the islands was met with official protest from the
Chinese in 1932.24
At the end of World War II, the Japanese, who had occupied the
islands during the war, formally renounced their claim to the islands
and surrendered them to the Republic of China at the signing of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951.25 Understandably,
the Chinese place a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Japanese surrendered the island to the Chinese, and not to the French, who
had occupied some of the islands prior to their seizure by the Japanese
in 1939.26 This is especially important because the Vietnamese claim to
the islands is based in part on the French occupation of the islands from
1932 until 1939.
Since World War II, both the PRC and the Republic of China have
maintained garrisons on the islands 27 and have taken steps to maintain
the validity of their claims on the islands. 28 The most dramatic example of China's assertion of its sovereignty over the islands was a naval
engagement that occurred in 1988 when Chinese patrol craft opened
fire on three Vietnamese freighters delivering supplies to a Vietnamese
outpost on one of the islands. 29 Most recently, the People's Republic of
China has built what it claims are shelters for fishermen on what is
perhaps appropriately called Mischief Reef. This activity has been met
with strong objections by the Philippines, which claim the reef as a part
of Palawan Province, and which claims that the structure is in fact a
naval support installation. 30 In addition to this, in 1992 the Chinese
Parliament passed a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone on February 25, explicitly claiming the Spratlys as a part of
3
China. 1

23. Chang, supra note 2 at 405.
24. Id., at 406.
25. Cheng, supra note 6 at 275.
26. Id.
27. Although both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
maintain forces on the islands, this paper only addresses the claims made by the PRC for
two reasons. First, the PRC has been the more aggressive of the two in pursuing its
claim. Second, since both the PRC and Taiwan only recognize the existence of one China,
and since the PRC is a member of the UN and Taiwan is not, it seems logical to concentrate on the PRC's claim, understanding that the PRC has acquired Taiwan's claim
through the process of state succession. See Beller, supra note 5 at 307-8.
28. Id., at 295 (All of the nations in the dispute maintain garrisons on the islands except for Brunei. In addition to its garrison, Malaysia has built a hotel on one of the islands. Id. at 310).
29. Bennett, supra note 3 at 427.
30. Philippines: Manila Rules Out Armed Response in Spratlys, Reuters, Feb. 10,
1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News Database.
31. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, adopted
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Vietnam's claims to the islands do not have as extensive a history
as those of the Chinese. They are based in large part on Vietnam's continuation of French claims and French actions in the South China Sea
during Vietnam's colonial period.
The French first contested Chinese sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands in 1933, when the French Foreign Ministry announced that
France had occupied six of the islands since 1930, and asserted French
authority over them. It is not clear what the legal grounds for the
French action were, but some commentators have speculated that the
French considered the islands to be terra nullis even though they found
32
Chinese living there when they arrived.
Like China, France's priorities changed during World War II, and
as a result, the French claim to the Spratly Islands does not appear to
33
have been raised until well after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
The Vietnamese first acted to strengthen their claim in 1956, when the
South Vietnamese government placed a garrison on Spratly Island.
This was followed by a declaration stating that the entire Spratly ar34
chipelago was a part of Vietnam's Phuoc Tuy Province.
After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Vietnamese government in Hanoi restated the claims made by the South Vietnamese government and
sent troops to the Spratlys to increase the number of islands under its
control. 35 More recently, the Vietnamese government issued a statement which reiterates the Vietnamese claim to the islands and places
these islands within the baselines of Vietnam's territorial sea. 36 In
1992, Vietnam took steps to strengthen its claim to the islands by conducting surveys of the islands and signing an agreement with a Norwe37
gian oil company for the exploration and drilling rights to the islands.
Although the Chinese claim to the islands would appear to be the
stronger of the two, based on its earlier claim of discovery and its nearly
continuous use of the islands since the second century B.C., the Vietnamese insist that the islands are theirs, and state that the Chinese
claims are not valid. In light of the rising tensions between the countries over the islands, it seems clear that one of the few ways in which a

by the Standing Committee of the People's Congress, reprinted in The Law of the Sea:
Current Developments in State Practice (No. III), at 26-9.
32. Cheng, supra note 6 at 268-69.
33. Id., at 269-70.
34. Bennett, supra note 3 at 439.
35. Id.
36. Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam on the territorial sea baseline of Viet Nam, reprinted in The Law of the Sea:
Current Developments in State Practice (No. I), at 143-44 (Previously circulated as UN
document A/37/697 of 6 December 1982).
37. Beller, supra note 5 at 297.
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peaceful resolution can be reached is through arbitration. The dispute
settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea are designed for these kinds
of disputes. Since all of the major parties in the Spratly Islands dispute
are signatories to the Law of the Sea Convention it is only natural that
our attention turn to the impact of the Law of the Sea on the existing
38
international law.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

Under the Law of the Sea, disputes concerning the implementation
or application of the Convention must be settled using Convention and
39
international law not incompatible with it.
Simply put, the Law of the
Sea incorporates existing international law into it and refines it. Of
particular interest in this dispute are the articles of the Law of the Sea
that define the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone,
and the continental shelf, and their impact on the existing law.
Under Article Two of the Law of the Sea, "[t]he sovereignty of a
coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters.. .to
an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea." 40 The Law of
the Sea also establishes the contiguous zone, within which the coastal
state may enforce its laws to the extent necessary to punish the violation of those laws. 41 By granting the coastal state sovereignty within its
territorial sea and the right to enforce its laws within the contiguous
zone (which includes the territorial sea), the Law of the Sea grants the
coastal state the exclusive right to authorize the exploitation of any
natural resources within those areas.
In addition to the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the Law
of the Sea grants the coastal state "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources" within the exclusive economic zone of the coastal state, an area
extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. 42 The coastal state also has the right to authorize
the construction of artificial islands, which, under Article 60, includes
oil rigs and other structures necessary for the economic development of
43
the economic zone under Article 56.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Law of the Sea grants
the coastal state the sovereign right to develop the natural resources on

38. Except for Brunei, which did not sign either the final act of the Conference or the
Convention. See 21 I.L.M. 1447.
39. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 293, 21 I.L.M. at 1324.
40. Id., art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
41. Id., art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
42. Id., art. 56(1)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1279; art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
43. Id., art. 56(1)(b), 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
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the State's continental shelf. 44 The continental shelf is an area, most
often extending beyond the contiguous zone, that
comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
45
not extend up to that distance.
In Article 76(6), the Convention states that regardless of the provisions of Article 76(1), that a State's continental shelf area cannot extend
46
further than 350 nautical miles.
The effect of adopting these provisions has been to raise the importance of the Spratlys by granting the state that has sovereignty over
them the right to exploit the natural resources within a 350-nauticalmile radius of the islands, an area that includes much of the South
China Sea.
However, there are also portions of the Law of the Sea which would
appear to mitigate the effects of Articles 2, 33, 56, and 77 by redefining
what an island is, thus diminishing the strategic and economic importance of some islands relative to what their status would have been
prior to the adoption of the Law of the Sea in 1982.
Article 121 defines what constitutes an island under the Law of the
Sea. Using the definition in this article, it would seem that all but the
largest of the Spratlys are not islands under the Law of the Sea, and
therefore do not have a territorial sea of their own and cannot be used
when determining the boundaries of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or the continental shelf.
Specifically, Article 121 states that "[an island is a naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide." Furthermore, in order to be considered an island, the land must
be capable of sustaining "human habitation or economic life of their
own." 47 Article 60(8) states that "[a]rtificial islands, installations, and
structures, do not have the status of islands," and that because of this,
they cannot "affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or the continental shelf."48
These articles have an important impact on the Spratlys primarily
because they have the potential to reduce the exclusive economic zone
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id., art. 77(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
Id., art. 76(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
Id., art. 76(6), 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
Id., art. 121(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
Id., art 60(8), 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
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and continental shelf areas of the islands significantly. According to
the CIA's World Factbook, the Spratly Islands consist of "islets, coral
reefs, and sea mounts" many of which are submerged at high tide and
are therefore not considered islands under Article 121. 49 The fact that
Article 60(8) clearly states that artificial islands such as the ones that
have been built by the Chinese and Vietnamese will not affect the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf means
that although the structures may strengthen their respective claims
through use of the islands, they will not aid them in establishing the
right to exploit some of the resources that would be within the exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf if the structures were considered in
the delimitation.
Furthermore, even if the islands which the Law of the Sea allows to
be taken into account for the delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf are arranged in such a way as to maintain
the original geographic dimensions of the archipelago, there is some
question as to whether or not they can sustain human habitation or
economic life as required by Article 121. One could certainly argue that
since it is possible for men to live year-round on Antarctica, it is certainly possible to sustain life on the Spratlys, given sufficient planning
and resources. The existence of the various garrisons of the islands
seem to bear this out. A close reading of Article 121, however, seems to
point to the conclusion that the drafters of the Law of the Sea intended
that the life on the islands be self-sustaining, and not dependent on
regular shipment of supplies from Beijing, Hanoi, Manila, or Kuala
Lumpur. The article is quite clear in this respect, stating that "[riocks
which cannot sustain human habitation.. .of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."50 This interpretation of Article 121 would seem to preclude the majority of the Spratly "Islands"
from being classified as islands under the Law of the Sea, thereby preventing them from playing a substantial role in the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Additionally, leaving aside considerations such as the strategic location of the islands and the national pride that the nations involved
seem to attach to remaining on the islands, it is questionable whether
or not it is economically feasible to maintain a population on the islands. In large part, this will depend on the feasibility of removing oil
from the surrounding area.
The view that application of the Law of the Sea to the Spratlys
lessens their importance is reinforced by the provisions of the Law of
the Sea that address the status of archipelagos.

49. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1992 WORLD FACTBOOK 318 (1992), cited
in Belier, supra note 5.
50. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 121, 21 I.L.M. at 1291 (emphasis added).
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Article 46 of the Law of the Sea defines an archipelago as "a group
of islands.. .which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters
and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such." 51 On
reflection, it is not clear that the Spratlys fit into the Law of the Sea's
definition of an archipelago. The geographic unity of the islands is cast
into doubt by the Philippines' claim that islands claimed by them form
an island group that is distinct from the Spratlys chain. 52 The economic
unity of the islands is debatable since there is no trade between the different islands. At this time, the only economic activity on the islands is
the collection of guano and fishing. Finally, it appears clear that although several nations claim all of the islands, the Spratlys have never
been unified under one country's rule. These arguments seem a bit
formalistic in light of the fact that despite the conflicting claims of sovereignty and dividing lines that break the Spratlys up, they are regarded as an archipelago by the majority of the claimants.
The Law of the Sea provides that the baselines of an archipelago
may be drawn from the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are
included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of
3
water to the area of land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.5
Using data taken from Michael Bennett's article, The People's Republic of China and the Use of InternationalLaw in the Spratly Islands
Dispute, and the CIA's 1992 World Factbook, it would appear that the
ratio of water to land falls far short of the required amount. 54 Although
it is unclear how the baselines for the Spratly archipelago would have
to be drawn in order to bring them within Article 47's requirements, it
is apparent that the area within the baselines would be substantially
smaller than what has been traditionally regarded as being the area of
the Spratly Islands, and that this would result within a corresponding
reduction in the dimensions of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
Looking back on the decisions made in the Island of Palmas, Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island, and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
one is forced to wonder if the islands in question would even be consid-

51. Id., art. 46, 21 I.L.M. 1278.
52. Romulo, supranote 4, at 133.
53. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art 47(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1278.
54. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 429 (states that the islands are "500 miles from
north to south and 400 miles from east to west," bringing the total area to 200,000 square
miles, or 518,000 square kilometers); U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1992 World
Factbook 318 (1992), cited in Beller, supranote 5 at 295 (states that the total land area of
the islands is "less than 5 km2 ."). Using these numbers, the ratio of water to land comes
out to roughly 103,000 km 2 of water for every square kilometer of land, far outside the
limits set by Article 47(1).
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ered islands in the first two cases. While the Law of the Sea states that
disputes concerning its interpretation and implementation must be settled in accordance with international law, it seems clear that the definitions contained in the Law of the Sea will have a limiting effect on the
circumstances in which this law can be used.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA

Articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea state that when there is
disagreement concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone (Article 74) or continental shelf (Article 83), the states must try to
reach an agreement under Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ").55 In turn, Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute requires that disputes brought before the ICJ be settled in accordance with international conventions recognized by the states, international custom, and general principles of law in such a way as to ar56
rive at a just and fair decision.
If the parties to the dispute cannot reach a settlement through negotiations within a reasonable time, Articles 74 and 83 state that they
may "resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV."57 Part XV obligates the parties to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner, in keeping with Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter and to find solutions to the
dispute using the non-violent means listed in Article 33(1) of the Charter. 58 All of these provisions incorporate current international law into
the Law of the Sea and reaffirm the support of the signing countries for
the principles set out in the U.N. Charter and other sources of international law.
With the exception of China, the parties to the Spratly Islands dispute have taken steps to demonstrate their willingness to resolve the
conflict in a manner consistent with the U.N. Charter. In particular,
the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
signed declarations in 1988 and 1992 reaffirming their commitment to
finding a peaceful solution to the Spratly Islands dispute.
The Manila Declaration, signed by the ASEAN nations in 1988
states that "[i]ntra-regional disputes shall be settled by peaceful means
in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia and the United Nations Charter."59 Although the primary purpose of the Manila Declaration was to "provide a consensus
55.
1286.
56.
57.
1286.
58.
59.

Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 74(1), 21 I.L.M. 1284; Id., art 83(1), 21 I.L.M.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
Law of the Sea, supranote 1 art. 74(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1284; Id., art. 83(2), 21 I.L.M.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3; U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
Manila Declaration of 1987, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 603, 603 (1988).
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framework for the avoidance of conflict and the pursuit of peaceful cooperation," the reactions from the non-ASEAN parties to the dispute
was mixed. 60 Vietnam, an ASEAN observer at the meeting, expressed
its full support for the declaration. China, on the other hand, said that
it would be willing to enter into negotiations "when the conditions became ripe," an ominous statement that could be interpreted as meaning
"whenever it suits our interests." 61
The Manila Declaration was followed four years later by the Singapore Declaration, which restated many of the themes of the Manila
Declaration. Although the Singapore Declaration was focused more on
economic cooperation than on security matters, the members of ASEAN
did extend an invitation to other states in the ASEAN region to sign
ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 62 which includes provisions
for establishing a regional system of peaceful dispute resolution similar
to the European Court of Justice. 63 Both of these declarations are indicative of the willingness of some of the parties to the dispute to settle
the dispute in a peaceful manner, in keeping with the spirit of the U.N.
Charter and the Law of the Sea.
Under Section 1 of Part XV, the first step in the settlement of a
dispute is to have one of the parties to the dispute initiate conciliation
proceedings by inviting the parties to the dispute to have the matter
settled under the voluntary procedures of Annex V.64 These proceedings are considered to be finished when the parties fail to agree on the
procedure of the conciliation proceedings or when the invitation is not
accepted. 65 Given the fact that neither Vietnam or China have initiated
conciliation proceedings, it does not seen likely that voluntary conciliation proceedings will provide a solution to the dispute between these
two nations over the Spratlys.
If anything, China seems confident that it can successfully back its
claim to the Spratlys through military posturing and intimidation. In
recent years, the Chinese have taken steps to transform their navy from
being primarily a coastal defense fleet to being a blue water fleet capable of projecting power into the South China Sea. Most notably, China
has purchased Russian submarines, 66 and high-ranking officers of the
Chinese Navy have called for the construction of a nuclear-powered air-

60. Romulo, supra note 4 at 133.
61. Id.
62. Singapore Declaration of 1992, Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 498, 499 (1992).
63. Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 809,
859-62.
64. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 279, 21 1.L.M. 1322.
65. Id., art. 284, 21 I.L.M. 1322.
66. Tom Grimmer, Asia: Peace Has Been a Boon for East Asia's Economies - South
China Sea Remains Nagging Problem, FINANCIAL POST, Apr. 19, 1995.
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craft carrier capable of carrying 50 airplanes. 67 In addition to this, both
China and Vietnam have signed contracts with oil companies for the
exploration of the area around the islands. 68 Protests by China and
Vietnam in reaction to each other's actions have only resulted in re69
sponses that further exacerbate the situation.
Given the failure of China or Vietnam to initiate arbitration despite
the rising tensions in the area, it seems more likely that one of the
other parties to the dispute, one which cannot compete militarily with
China and Vietnam, might initiate compulsory binding arbitration under Part XV. A smaller state such a Malaysia or the Philippines would
gain a considerable advantage by initiating arbitration because it removes the military element from the equation.
Parties to Law of the Sea are understood to have accepted arbitration of their maritime disputes under Part XV of the Convention. If the
state does not want to have disputes to which it is a party settled under
the provisions of the Law of the Sea, it must declare that this is the case
at the signing of the Convention. 70 Neither China nor Vietnam did this
when they signed the Convention. Therefore, the dispute resolution
provisions of the Law of the Sea apply to them and disputes to which
they are a party.
Under Part XV of the Law of the Sea, a party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Law of the Sea may submit
it to compulsory proceedings resulting in a binding decision. Article 286
states that "where no settlement has been reached by recourse to Section 1 [voluntary negotiations outside the framework of the Law of the
Sea], [disputes may] be submitted at the request of any party of the dis71
pute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section."
Article 287(3) augments this by declaring that "[a] State Party, which is
a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be
'72
deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.'
Although both Annexes V and VII contain provisions for the arbitration of disputes, Annex VII is the Annex that would be applied to
this dispute. Article 1 of Annex V clearly states that "[i]f the parties to
a dispute have agreed.. .to submit it to conciliation under this section,
any such party may institute the proceedings by written notification
addressed to the other party or parties to the dispute." 73 Clearly, if

67. China Must Have Nuclear Flattop, Naval Officer Says, Kyodo News International,
Jan 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2224358.
68. Belier, supra note 5 at 297.
69. See Id.
70. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 298, 21 I.L.M. 1325.
71. Id., art. 286, 21 I.L.M. 1322.
72. Id., art. 287(3), 21 I.L.M. 1322.
73. Id., Annex V, art. 1, 21 I.L.M. 1344 (Under art. 318, the Annexes to the Convention form an integral part of the Convention and have the same status as the articles of
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Vietnam and China voluntarily agreed to settle their dispute through
arbitration, Annex V would apply. However, that is not case, and it
seems most likely that any arbitration that takes place under the Law
of the Sea will be compulsory arbitration that is initiated unilaterally,
as envisioned in Annex VII.
Under the provisions of Annex VII, "any party to a dispute may
submit the dispute to the arbital procedure provided for in this Annex
by written notification addressed to the other party or parties to the
dispute."74 The Annex then states that "[i]f one of the parties to the
dispute does not appear before the arbital tribunal or fails to defend its
case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue and to make
its award." 75 It appears that if a third party were to initiate arbitration
under Annex VII, China and Vietnam would be compelled to defend
their claims not only because they are bound to as signatories of the
Convention, but also because it is in their interest to do so in order to
state their case before the tribunal.
Finally, if the claims of the Chinese and Vietnamese to the islands
are as substantial as both parties claim they are, there is no reason that
they should be reluctant to participate in arbitration under Annex VII.
Although the party initiating the arbitration may gain a psychological
advantage by starting the proceedings, this is offset by the rest of the
provisions of Annex VII. For example, although the nation initiating
the arbitration is allowed to appoint an arbitrator, that person must be
named from a list of arbitrators to which all signatories are allowed to
contribute four names. 76 If there are more than two parties, as in the
case of the Spratlys, each party may appoint a member of the panel,
and the panel increases in size so that the number of jointly-appointed
arbitrators exceeds the number of arbitrators who have been appointed
by the parties to the dispute. The jointly-appointed members of the arbitration panel must be appointed by agreement between the parties to
the dispute, and cannot be nationals of either of the parties. The President of the panel must be chosen from among the jointly-appointed
77
members of the panel.
Once the arbitrators have been appointed, the panel is left to its
own devices to determine what its operating procedures will be. 78 The
only substantive restriction that is placed on the panel is that in the
course of reaching its decision, it must apply the "Convention and other

the main body of the Convention. Id., art. 318, 21 I.L.M. 1328).
74. Id., Annex VII, art. 1, 21 I.L.M. 1350.
75. Id., Annex VII, art. 9, 21 I.L.M. 1351.
76. Id., Annex VII, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. 1350.

77. Id.
78, Id., Annex VII, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 1351.
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rules of international law not incompatible with it."7 9 However, this
does not preclude the panel from deciding a case ex aequo et bono.80 In
short, the panel may act in equity if it feels it is necessary to do so.
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since 1992, tensions in the Spratlys have increased dramatically
despite numerous calls for the parties to find a peaceful resolution to
the dispute.8 1 Specifically, actions taken by China have raised tensions
in the area.
In 1992, China entered into an agreement with Crestone Energy
Development Corporation of Denver for the exploration of a 25,155
square kilometer area around the Spratlys. The Vietnamese responded
by negotiating a contract between their national oil company, Petrovietnam, and Nopec, a Norwegian company, also for exploration of the
area around the Spratlys for oil.82 Tensions between the countries escalated to the point that shots were exchanged between their Border
83
Guards at the Friendship Gate.
Second, China has recently begun to probe the area of the islands
claimed by the Philippines with its navy and fishing fleets. 84 This pattern of action by the Chinese led to the arrest of 62 Chinese fishermen
in March of this year for straying into waters claimed by the Philippines and fishing there illegally. In addition, two Chinese boats were
impounded by the Philippine Navy, which discovered 80 sea turtles (an
endangered species), dynamite, and cyanide.8 5 Furthermore, China has
seized a reef claimed by the Philippines,8 6 and has built what the Philippines claims is a naval support installation on it.87 These actions
have led to speculation that "China may be readying itself for a military
88
strike against the Philippines."
Finally, the Chinese have broadened the scope of the Spratlys dis79. Id., art. 293, 21 I.L.M. 1324.

80. Id.
81. See Thailand: Banharn Wants Gov't to Host Talks on Spratlys, BANGKOK POST,
Apr. 4, 1995, at 7 (Thailand urges joint development of the islands); Thailand: Chuan Offers to Help Settle Spratly Islands Conflict, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 6, 1995, at 7 (Thailand
offers to act as mediator in negotiations over the Spratlys); Japan: Japan, Vietnam Agree
to Enhance Ties, JIJI PRESS, Apr. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC database (Vietnam expresses hope for settlement under international law).
82. Beller, supra note 5, at 297.
83. Id.
84. Grimmer, supra note 66.
85. Slow Boil in the Spratlys, ASIAWEEK, April 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
database.
86. China: Europe Seeks China's Favour, ECONOMIST, Apr. 22, 1995.
87. Ruben Alabastro, Philippines: Manila Alleges Chinese "Duplicity" in Spratlys,
REUTERS ECONOMIC NEWS, Apr. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC database.
88. China: Europe Seeks China'sFavour, supra note 86.
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pute by drawing Indonesia and Malaysia further into the dispute.
China recently published maps showing the Indonesian archipelago of
Natuna, which is also located in the South China Sea,8 9 as a part of
China's sovereign territory. 90 This claim by the Chinese threatens to
draw the Indonesians into the dispute at a time when Indonesia has
been trying to act as mediator between China and the members of
ASEAN involved in the dispute. 91 China has not responded to Indonesian protests regarding this matter. 92 With regards to Malaysia, Chinese fishing boats have been boarded and warning shots have been
fired by the Malaysian Navy in response to Chinese fishing off the coast
93
of Sarawak, south of the Spratlys.
In short, Chinese actions in the South China Sea are such that
Philippine Secretary of Defense Renato De Villa has stated that
"China's latest activities ... appear to reflect a two-pronged strategy,
that is slowly but steadily moving into the disputed territory while
talking peace with its rival claimants." 94 In addition, the actions have
reinforced fears in Asia that China will emerge from the Cold War as an
expansionist superpower. 95 A recent ASEAN-Chinese consultative
meeting during which the situation in the Spratly Islands was discussed only reinforced these fears, and the ASEAN delegates left not
having made any progress with regards to the Chinese, but determined
to stand -together against what they perceive as the growing Chinese
threat. As one observer noted, "[i]t's time that the line in the water was
96
drawn against the Chinese."
These tensions are further heightened by China's rejection of multilateral talks proposed by ASEAN. To date, the Chinese have insisted
that negotiations between the parties be on a bilateral basis, breaking
up the proceedings in a way that might be advantageous to the Chinese.
With the addition of Vietnam to ASEAN in July of 1997, however, it is
possible that bilateral negotiations could take place bilaterally on a
China-ASEAN level. 97 Although this might satisfy China's demands
that the talks be bilateral, a byproduct of this arrangement might be an
increase in tensions between ASEAN and its powerful neighbor to the
north.

89. Indonesia: No Chinese Reply to Indonesia'sNatuna Question, REUTERS, Apr. 10,
1995, available in LEXIS, ALLNWS database.
90. Greg Earl, Indonesia: Steps Up China Sea Patrols, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW, Apr. 12, 1995, at 12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Slow Boil in the Spratlys, supra note 85.
94. Earl, supra note 90.
95: Lindsay Murdoch, China: Islands Dispute Fuels Fear of Chinese Intent,
MELBOURNE AGE, Apr. 3, 1995, at 12.
96. Slow Boil in the Spratlys, supra note 85.
97. Id.
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The increased tensions in the area make it more important than
ever that the Spratly islands dispute be submitted to arbitration under
Annex VII of the Law of the Sea. As described above, these proceedings
have the advantages of being both compulsory and binding, so any solution reached would be permanent and involve all of the parties to the
dispute.
Under paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83, the parties of the dispute
must "make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a
practical nature" during the period in which a final agreement is being
negotiated. 98 In the case of the Spratly Islands, this might involve either a moratorium on the development of natural resources or an
agreement for the joint development of the natural resources in the
area. 99 Already, there have been suggestions from parties to the dispute and other nations in the region that the parties should look into
the possibility of joint development. 100 As precedent, advocates of joint
development could point to the arrangements agreed upon by Malaysia
and Thailand for the joint development of natural resources in areas in
10 1
which their territorial waters overlap.
In the case of the Spratlys, it is essential that the parties negotiate
an interim agreement pending the conclusion of arbitration under the
Law of the Sea. Not only are they required to under Articles 74 and 83,
but the complexity of the situation and the length of time that it will
take to negotiate a settlement almost demand it.102 Due to the involvement of six rival claimants, a dispute that might not be particularly difficult to resolve has become one of the most complex in recent
history.
The fact that ownership of the islands is contested complicates the
job of boundary delimitation immensely. Almost by definition, boundary delimitation is done after it has been determined which nations own
which pieces of land. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases are a good
example of this.103 In that case, it was clear where the parties continental shelves began and ended, the problem was that they overlapped. In
the case of the Spratlys, there will have to be two steps taken before the
dispute is settled. First, the parties will have to determine which na98. Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 74, 21 I.L.M. 1284; Id., art 83, 21 I.L.M. 1286.
99. Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime DelimitationAgreements, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 360-62.
100. See Spratlys: Taiwan Calls for Joint Development, PERIScOPE DAILY DEFENSE
NEWS CAPSULES, Sept. 8, 1993; Bratislava: China Wants Common Management of
Spratlys - Qian, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News database; Thai-

land: Chuan Offers to Help Settle Spratly Islands Conflict, supra note 81.
101. Thailand: Chuan Offers to Help Settle Spratly Islands Conflict, supra note 81.
102. Lagoni, supra note 99, at 346-47 (noting that the time needed to reach a decision
in recent maritime delimitation cases has ranged from three years eight years, and that
the ICJ expects that more complicated cases will take a longer time to decide).
103. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den, F.R.G. v. Neth), 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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tions own which islands. Only after that is done will they be able to determine where the boundaries between their overlapping zones should
be drawn.
It is possible that the arbital panel established under Annex VII
could address both issues, in which case the proceedings of the panel
could reasonably be expected to last for some time. If this happens, it is
essential that an interim agreement be established due to the potentially lengthy period over which the talks would take place.
VI. CONCLUSION

In light of the rising tensions in the region due to the dispute over
the Spratly Islands, arbitration under Part XV of the Law of the Sea
seems to be the best way to settle the dispute. Even if the ASEAN nations submit the dispute for arbitration as a group, it is not clear that
China will comply with an arbitrated settlement. Like many international agreements, the Convention on the Law of the Sea lacks an enforcement mechanism, and because of this, there is no guarantee that
China will comply with the "compulsory" procedures outlined in Annex
VII.
Given that this is the case, and understanding that it would take a
prohibitively long time to settle the dispute under Annex VII, it may be
best to adopt the course of action advocated by the Thais, Indonesians,
and (at times) the Chinese: joint development. If a program of joint development is agreed on, exploitation could begin relatively soon, and all
of the nations would benefit. In addition to economic benefits, potential
bloodshed between China and the other parties would be averted.
Advocates of this approach to the situation can point to the EmsDollart Treaty of 1960 as an example of what could be done. In that
treaty, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to
joint development of oil and gas reserves in the estuary of the Ems
river. 104 A more persuasive example might be the agreement reached
between Japan and South Korea, in which they agreed to the joint development of the continental shelf adjacent to the two countries. 105
Once joint development is agreed upon, it may be the case that the islands themselves could be set aside for joint administration, leaving
aside the sovereignty issue altogether.
In any case, either through the mechanisms of the Law of the Sea,
or though an agreement for joint development, it is essential that a solution to the Spratly dispute be reached in keeping with the spirit of the
U.N. Charter. If this is not done, China's actions in the area may soon
prove that Thucydides was correct when he wrote "in fact the strong do
104. Lagoni, supra note 99, at 361.
105. Id.
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what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept."10 6

106. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 360 (Rex Warner, trans.).

AN UPDATE ON: SELF-DETERMINATION
AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A
COMMUNITY OF POWER BY JAMES A.R.
NAFZIGER
Julie Jackson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This update focuses on two articles written by James A.R. Nafziger
for the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. The initial article is entitled Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power.' This article was later followed by Humanitarian
Intervention in a Community of Power: Part I.2
Generally, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention
looks at the principles of self-determination and humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. The author suggests that it would be
an appropriate time now for the international community to end the
debates surrounding these principles and move on to constructive discussions about methods of solving the disputes which continue to arise. 3
Specifically, efforts should include greater preventive diplomacy, preestablished procedures when disputes arise, and multilateral initiatives
by regional and international institutions. 4 Nafziger argues that relying on regional and international institutions, rather than the unilateral actions of individual states, may prevent the issues of selfdetermination and humanitarian intervention from becoming threats to
international peace and security. 5
The follow-up article, Humanitarian Intervention II, notes that the
* Pursuing J.D./M.A. at the University of Denver College of Law and the University
of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. The author would like to thank Professor Ved P. Nanda for his guidance and Katie Coffey for her insight.
* J.D., University of Denver, College of Law, May 1997.
1. James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 9 (1991) [hereinafter SelfDeterminationand HumanitarianIntervention].
2. James A.R. Nafziger, HumanitarianIntervention in a Community of Power-Part
II, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 219 (1994) [hereinafter HumanitarianIntervention II].
3. See Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 11.
4. Id. at 39.
5. Id,
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international community has embraced humanitarian intervention in
the past few years, but many key issues remain unresolved. 6 Nafziger
identifies the following five questions:
1. What is the scope of the Security Council's powers to prescribe,
organize, or authorize intervention?
2. Is unilateral intervention any longer permissible?
3. When should the United Nations condition intervention on a
state's consent?
4. May the Security Council authorize the "Blue Helmets" to take
"all necessary measures," including the use of force, regardless of the
purpose or type of operation?
5. Is the new superpower of the Security Council simply a bully
7
multilateral disguise?

in

After Nafziger completed his research for this study in 1993, the
tragedies in Rwanda and Somalia escalated to the point where humanitarian intervention became inevitable. 8 As a result, this update will
first evaluate whether the events in Rwanda and Somalia support Nafziger's contention that reliance upon regional and international institutions could have prevented these situations from threatening international peace and security; and second, whether any of the five
unresolved humanitarian intervention questions have been answered.
II.

SUMMARY OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION II

Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention traces the historical roots of the self-determination principle. 9 Provisions in many international documents contain this principle, most significantly, Article
1(2) of the United Nations Charter. 10 Additionally, the International
Court of Justice further developed the right of self-determination in the
Namibia and the Western Sahara cases. 1 Furthermore, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' 2 and the In6. HumanitarianIntervention I1, supra note 2, at 233.
7. Id.
8. THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, 1993-1996 (United Nations Dep't of Pub.
Info. ed., 1996)[hereinafter U.N. & RWANDA]; THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, 1992-

1996 (United Nations Dep't of Pub. Info. ed., 1996)[hereinafter U.N. & SOMALIA].
9. Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 12-20.
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
11. Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 14. See Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa); Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35 (Oct.
16).
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, G.A.
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ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' 3 expressly provide
for the right of self-determination.
Although generally accepted as a right, the scope of selfdetermination remains ambiguous and consequently is subject to differing views on the meaning of the term. 14 Nafziger raises several unresolved questions regarding the time and to whom self-determination
is appropriate. 15
Another debated issue is the right of selfdetermination for people in self-governing territories. 16 In general,

states oppose this practice, 7 but in the former Soviet Union, this right
was recently exercised through the dismantling of the USSR.18 Overall,
the principle of self-determination lacks precise guidelines for its application.' 9 Section II provides the background on the practice of humanitarian intervention. 20 Humanitarian intervention, as a right, remains
controversial in light of the fact that the only explicit exceptions to the
prohibition against the use of force in the U.N. Charter are in Chapter

VII or VIII, neither of which directly includes humanitarian intervention. 2' In addition, unilateral intervention remains extremely suspect,
but nevertheless potentially permits a prohibited use or threat of
force. 22 As a result, criteria were established to define the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention. 23 Nafziger concludes that the criteria pro24
vide excellent guidelines, but fail to reflect actual practices.
Section III briefly addresses the role of the United Nations during
the Cold War and the constraints on the United Nations' ability to respond to issues of self-determination and humanitarian intervention. 25
Although the United Nations has been instrumental in decolonization
efforts, it has been ineffective when dealing with post-colonial situations and when serving as an instrument for humanitarian intervention. 26 Nafziger contends that the bipolar stalemate limited the ability

Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
14. Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 17.
15. Id. at 17-18.
16. Id. at 19-20.
17. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under InternationalLaw: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-74 (1981).
18. Self-Determinationand HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 19.
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 21-6.
21. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39, 42.
22. Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 25.
23. Id. at 25-26 (citing Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian
Brownlie and Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 249 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
24. Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 26.
25. .Id. at 26-27.
26. Id. at 26.
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of the United Nations to effectively deal with these issues.27
Section IV focuses on the close of the Cold War and its effect upon
the ability of international institutions to handle self-determination and
humanitarian intervention issues. 28 A community of power replaced
29
the bipolar balance of power system present during the Cold War.
The author argues that this community of power also contains a rejuvenated United Nations, capable of "facilitat[ing] self-determination, preempt[ing] unilateral humanitarian intervention by states, and initiat[ing] its own form of intervention and dispute settlement." 30 The
success in the Gulf War experience supports this proposition. Despite
its positive outcome, however, the United Nations was weakened by:
the failure of states to work together in good faith; the absence of clear
ground rules; and the limited bases for decision making. 31 In light of
these criticisms, the author suggests that structural changes, increased
financing, and increased action on the part of other international and
32
regional bodies should be implemented.
Section V focuses on the need for the members of the United Nations to clarify the law of self-determination and humanitarian intervention. 33 The author states that this is even more necessary now due
to the larger community of power present today. 34 Further, improved
mechanisms and procedures could significantly increase the efficiency
of United Nations efforts to deal with these types of problems. 35 Nafziger suggests several possible changes: first, making the Security Council sit in session year-round; second, including the Secretary-General's
participation in Security Council initiatives and undertaking other supportive activities; third, using United Nations human rights bodies to
investigate and assess these issues; fourth, establishing an international courthouse with mandatory mediation prior to adjudication; fifth,
establishing a general instrument for the settlement of disputes; and
sixth, using regional arrangements in the settlement of disputes, coordinated by the staff of the Secretary-General. 36 In essence, Nafziger
suggests shifting from a focus on unilateral action to multilateral delib37
erations and initiatives.
Nafziger further elaborated on his first article with the publication

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-34.
Self-Determinationand HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29-32.
Id. at 32-34.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 1, at 35.
Id. at 35-38.
Id. at 39.
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of Humanitarian Intervention 11.38 In that article, Nafziger concluded
that the international community has finally embraced humanitarian
intervention, but several questions remained unanswered. First, what
is the scope of the Security Council's powers to prescribe, organize, or
authorize intervention? Second, is unilateral intervention permitted,
and if so, must an intervening state first exhaust international or regional remedies? Third, should the United Nations condition intervention on a state's consent? Fourth, may the Security Council authorize
the "Blue Helmets" to take "all necessary measures" including the use
of force, regardless of the purpose or type of operation? Fifth, is the new
Superpower Security Council simply a bully in a multilateral dis39
guise?
III. THE SITUATIONS IN RWANDA AND SOMALIA
A.

Rwanda

In April of 1994, the on-going civil war in Rwanda resumed between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsi (which are primarily
represented by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)).40 Just six months
earlier, representatives from each side had signed the Arusha Peace
Agreement ending the most recent conflict in a long series of conflicts
between the two tribes. 4 1 On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda, a
Hutu, was killed in a suspicious plane crash. 42 In response, the Hutu's
immediately began systematic waves of massacres aimed at the Tutsi
and Hutu moderates resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of
people. 43 Within days, approximately 25% of the population fled or relocated internally.
These events led the United Nations to increase involvement in
Rwanda. Several months after the parties signed the Arusha Peace
Agreement, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) was established for "peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance
and general support through the Secretary-General's good offices" in

38. HumanitarianIntervention II, supra note 2, at 219.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Keith B. Richburg, For Hutus, Life Has Become a Death Trap; Refugees in
Squalid Camps in Rwanda Fear Departure of French, Revenge by Tutsis, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1994, at A29; See also S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994). [hereinafter S.C. Res. 918].
41. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front, signed at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, August 4,
1993; see U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1993, U.N. Doc. S/26915 (1993).
42. Keith B. Richburg & Jonathan C. Randal, FirstFrench Soldiers Arrive on Mission
to Help Rwanda, WASH. POST, June 24, 1994, at A29.
43. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 40, at 2.
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Rwanda. 44 With the civil war reignited, the United Nations took a more
active role, and in coordination with the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and other non-governmental organizations, the U.N.
sought to provide large scale emergency relief to Rwanda. 45 The United
Nations planned first, to provide for urgent survival needs in Rwanda;
and second, to rehabilitate Rwanda's devastated infrastructure as a
means of revitalizing the economy, restoring order, and promoting de46
velopment.
By mid-May, it was clear that humanitarian relief alone would not
turn the situation around. As a result, the United Nations created
UNAMIR II, a force of 5,500 troops utilized to deter hostilities. 47 Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) expanded the mandate of UNAMIR
into UNAMIR II.48 UNAMIR II was mandated to provide security for
refugees, displaced persons, and civilians and to ensure the distribution
49
of humanitarian aid.

Once the Security Council approved UNAMIR II, the mission faced
immediate obstacles to its deployment. The recent problems with the
intervention in Somalia resulted in a reluctance by Member States to
contribute troops and financial resources to what was viewed as another African civil war. 50 Further, the troops that were offered by
51
Member States lacked essential equipment needed for the operation.
As a result, the international community was forced to formulate another plan to assist the people of Rwanda.
The French Government, having historic ties to the region, rose to
the occasion and declared their intention to send troops into Rwanda
with assistance from the Zairian government. 52 France proposed that
this mission would operate under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, thus permitting the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.5 3 On June 22, 1994, Security Council Resolution 929 (1994) approved the mission "Operation Turquoise." 54 Resolu44. Id.
45. U.N & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 69-71.
46. Id.
47. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 40, at 2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia: Lessons from a HumanitarianIntervention, CURRENT 10, May 1, 1996; Richburg & Randal, supra note 42.
51. U.N & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 50-52.
52. Richburg & Randal, supra note 42, at A29.
53. Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the Secretary General of
the United Nations (June 20, 1994), requesting adoption of a resolution under Chapter
VII of the Charter as a legal framework for the deployment of a multinational force to
maintain a presence in Rwanda until the expanded UNAMIR is deployed. See U.N. Doc.
S/1994/734, June 21, 1994.
54. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994)[hereinafter
S.C. Res. 929].
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tion 929 provided that Operation Turquoise would be a temporary operation, under French command, and could take "all necessary means to
achieve the humanitarian objectives of UNAMIR II."55
Operation Turquoise, though mandated by the United Nations, remained a French-led multilateral operation. France retained control
over the operation and the countries supplying troops bore the costs
thereof. This is in contrast to United Nations' peace-keeping missions
in which Member States are reluctant to relinquish control over their
armed forces. 56 Nonetheless, Operation Turquoise worked closely with
UNAMIR and its officers located in Zaire and Kigali towards achieving
the goals of UNAMIR 11.57
Operation Turquoise established a humanitarian "safe zone" in
southwestern Rwanda. 58 The continuing fighting and broadcasting of
threats against the Hutus had resulted in the mass movement of
Rwandans towards the southwestern part of the country and towards
Zaire.5 9 The French troops had seen the large number of displaced persons and fleeing civilians and believed that, short of a cease-fire, the establishment of a safe zone was the only way to protect the Rwandan
population. 60 On July 9, 1994, the French deployed troops to establish
the safe humanitarian zone, which, although opposed by the RPF, was
61
not directly challenged by them.
Although the war ended in July, the problems resulting from the
flight of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans continued. On July 19,
1994, the RPF declared victory and established a government of national unity. 62 Just prior to this declaration of victory and cease-fire,
1.5 million people had fled into Zaire, mostly Hutus, fearing reprisal
from the Tutsi RPF.63 Despite the assurance of the new Rwandan
president that refugees in Zaire could safely return to Rwanda, 64 the
refugee camps in Zaire remained full of Rwandans, inadequately supplied and ridden with disease. 65 The French Government took notice of
55. Id.
56. U.N. & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 54-55.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Aid Effort and Balladur Visit Underscore French Ties to Africa, ASSOc. PRESS,
Jul. 31, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10121428.
59. Id.
60. Letter from the Secretary-General, United Nations, to the President of the Security-Council, United Nations (July 2, 1994) transmitting a letter from the Permanent
Representative of France to the United Nations (Julyl, 1994) concerning the establishment of a safe humanitarian zone in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/19941798, July 6, 1994.
61. U.N. & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 73-74.
62. Jonathan C. Randal & Keith B. Richburg, Rebels Declare Victory, Cease-Fire in
Rwanda, Flood of Hutu Refugees Into Zaire Continues,WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at Al.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Keith B. Richburg, For Hutus, Life Has Become a Death Trap; Refugees in
Squalid Camps in Rwanda Fear Departure of French, Revenge by Tutsis, WASH. POST,
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the anguished situation and indicated that additional resources were
needed not only in the safe zone, but also in Zaire to support fleeing
66
Rwandans.
In order to secure the safety of those in the zone, the need to implement UNAMIR II increased as the termination date of Operation
Turquoise neared. On August 10, 1994, UNAMIR II finally deployed its
troops in the safe zone and replaced the French on August 21, 1994.67
The departure of the French troops resulted in only 70,000 more Rwandans fleeing from the safe zone into Zaire, a number less than ten per68
cent of the 1.2 million in the zone at that time.
Evidence of a planned genocide of the Tutsi minority mounted. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documented
the "pattern of abuses" which occurred at the hands of various militia
groups. The abuses included the torture, rape, and murder of hundreds
of thousands of people. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission for
Human Rights found that the killings had been "planned, systematic,
and atrocious," instigated by the members of the former government to
incite ethnic hatred. The Secretary-General labeled these actions as
"genocide," and, in 1994, Security Council Resolution 955 eventually
created an international tribunal for violation of international human
rights law and genocide in Rwanda.
Severe health problems continued in the refugee camps, which remained filled beyond capacity. 69 As healthy, able refugees slowly returned home, the weak and feeble remained, facing threats and abuse
at the hands of bandits and militia members. 70 A plan to secure the
camps was implemented through a joint effort of the Zairian government, the UNHCR and UNAMIR II, which was ultimately extended until March 8, 1995.71 Security Council Resolution 965 (1994) supported
efforts to inform the Rwandan people by radio of this joint effort to se72
cure the camps and of the humanitarian programs available to them.
Meanwhile, the Secretary-General exposed violations of the arms

Aug. 12, 1994, at A29.
66. Letter from the Office of the Permanent Mission of France to the SecretaryGeneral, United Nations (Aug. 4, 1994). See U.N. Doc. S/1994/933 (1994).
67. Keith B. Richburg, French Troops Withdraw from Rwanda Safe Zone; Zairian
Officials Reopen Border to Refugees, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at A14.
68. Keith B. Richburg, Rwanda's Feared Wave of Refugees Turns Out to Be a Trickle,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1994, at A17.
69. Third report of the Secretary-General on security in the Rwandese refugee camps
(noting heightened tensions). U.N. Doc. S/1995/304 (April 14, 1995).
70. Keith B. Richburg, Refugee Camp Violence is Imperiling Rwandans; Rival Factions in Zaire Form 'a Nasty Cocktail, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1994, at A25. See also,
Keith B. Richburg, Food Aid Failing to Reach Rwandans; Malnutrition Rises as Thugs
Pilfer, Divert Camps' Supplies, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al.
71. U.N. & RWANDA, supranote 8, at 83-84.
72. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3743d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/965 (1994).
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embargo committed by members of the former government. Reports indicated that training of the former government forces was occurring in
Zaire. 73 Although noting the need for measures insuring that Rwandan
nationals did not participate in activities which would jeopardize the
Rwandan government, Security Council Resolution 1011 lifted the arms
embargo against Rwanda, 74 Apparently, the Security Council felt that,
since the embargo was initiated in order to protect civilians, a supply of
weapons would not threaten the well-being of civilians now that the
government had stabilized.
Although UNAMIR II completed its withdrawal from Rwanda on
April 19, 1996, the United Nations continued its involvement in
Rwanda. Security Council Resolution 1053 requests that the SecretaryGeneral maintain the Commission of Inquiry regarding the build up of
arms in Rwanda and urges all States to prevent the further develop75
ment of militia troops of the former Government of Rwanda.
B. Somalia
In the early 1990's tragedy struck in Somalia. Famine, civil war
76
and a devastated economy caused the death of at least 300,000 people.
The international community attempted to mitigate the problem, but
found that outsiders could only do so much without the commitment of
the various Somali factions. 77 As a result, the efforts of the United Nations and its agencies, though substantial, could not rebuild this devastated nation.
Civil war arose in Somalia after the United Somali Congress party
overthrew President Mohammed Siad Barre in 1990. Once the United
Somali Congress party (USC) had control, the dispute over who would
succeed Mohammed Siad Barre led to a division in the party between
two different factions. 78 General Aidid, from the Habr Gedir sub-clan,
was elected chairman by the congress, while Ali Mahdi, from the Abgal
sub-clan, was proclaimed as interim president. 79 The United Nations
sent a mediator to Mogadishu to resolve the dispute, but General Aidid
would not participate in any foreign mediation.8 0 In addition, the
problems were further exacerbated when the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared an independent Somaliland Republic in northern
73. Fighting Abates in Rwanda's Capital, but Clashes Expected to Resume, Assoc.
Press, May 8, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10135801.
74. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3566th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1011 (1995).
75. U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3656th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1053 (1996).
76. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Keith B. Richburg, Peace Effort in Somalia Meets Initial Failure; One Feuding
Side Rebuffs U.N. Mediation, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1992, at A18.
79. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 12.
80. Id.
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Somalia.8 ' Until independence in 1960, northern Somalia was a British
protectorate, while southern Somalia was ruled by Italy.8 2 The SNM
felt that their interests were not adequately represented causing them
83
to declare independence.
The civil unrest, particularly in southern Somalia (which is the
breadbasket of the country), destroyed the ability of Somalis to feed
themselves.8 4 Almost one-fifth of the entire population, 1.7 million people, fled after the fall of the government in 1990. This mass population
movement interrupted food production, which combined with the destruction of farmland, irrigation systems, and livestock, set the stage for
massive food shortages in the following years.8 5 In addition, factions
and bandits, viewing food as a source of power, prevented the distribution of food by non-governmental organizations and United Nations
86
agencies.
The Security Council approved the United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) to provide security for humanitarian providers and to
monitor the cease-fire.8 7 Additional United Nations agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other aid providers had attempted to
continue humanitarian assistance in the war-torn country but faced increasing hostilities.8 8 Although the factions agreed to a cease-fire on
February 14, 1992, absent United Nations monitoring of the cease-fire,
it did not appear that food stuffs and other essential supplies would
reach the Somali people 'due to the continued hostilities.8 9 To address
this problem, UNOSOM placed 50 military observers and 500 lightly
armed troops in Mogadishu to protect the security of relief personnel,
equipment, and supplies. 90
The United Nations, working with UNOSOM, launched a 90 Day
Plan of Action to assist the desperate Somali people in April of 1992. 9 1
The civil war had resulted in the destruction of agricultural land, grain
stores, water and sanitation systems, which compounded by a drought
81. Keith B. Richburg, Fall of African DictatorshipsFuels SeparatistFeeling, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 1992, at Al.
82. Id.
83. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 12.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/751 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 751].
88. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 15.
89. Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of discussions between United Nations officials and representatives of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference with representatives of the
Somali factions in Mogadishu (Feb. 14, 1992). U.N. Press Release IHA/434 (Feb. 14,
1992).
90. S.C. Res. 751, supra note 87.
91. U.N. Doc. S/23839/Add.1, April 21, 1992.
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in northern Somalia, placed millions of lives in jeopardy. 92 The International Red Cross and the World Food Programme flew in 80,000 tons of
food during the first half of 1992, significantly less than the estimated
93
30,000 tons per month needed in Somalia.
As a result of increasing media coverage of the starving Somali
people, nations from around the world mobilized with food and supplies,
including the United States through Operation Provide Relief. Opera94
tion Provide Relief planned to supply 145,000 tons of food to Somalia.
In addition to the efforts put forth by various nations, the United Nations Security Council approved an airlift to the inland areas of Somalia. 95 In August of 1992, the 100 Day Action Programme was established to coordinate the efforts of various nations and agencies to
deliver food and seeds, provide health care, clean water, and distribute
materials for building shelters. 96 These efforts decreased the death rate
in some areas. The efforts were limited, however, by the continued
violence threatening relief workers and the looting of food supplies by
gangs and bandits.
International efforts to further assist the people of Somalia were
halted by the factions' opposition to these activities and suggested that
achieving the mission's objective would be difficult. In August 1992, the
Security Council increased the number of troops mandated under
UNOSOM to 3,000.97 General Aidid announced that he would respond
to the deployment of additional troops with violence. 98 On November
12, 1992, General Aidid insisted that UNOSOM troops leave the Mogadishu airport and fired upon the troops when they failed to depart. 99
Also in early November the leader of the other faction, Ali Mahdi,
threatened to fire upon any ship trying to dock at the Mogadishu port,
believing that the supplies were aiding General Aidid.100 In south-west
Somalia militiamen who had supported the Former President Siad
Barre took over Bardera, which essentially destroyed all progress the
relief workers had previously made. 10' As a result of the factional
fighting the humanitarian assistance did not reach those in need, re-

92. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 21.
93. Id. at 22.
94. Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Begins Airlift for Starving Somali, Negotiations with
Kenya Clear Way for Aid, WASH POST, Aug. 22, 1992, at A18.

95. S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3103st mtg., U.N. Doc. S[RES1767 (1992).
96. 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated HumanitarianAssistance for Somalia

(excerpt, Oct. 6, 1992), reprinted in U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 194. See also, Report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the
economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, U.N. Doc. A/471553, Oct. 22, 1992.
97. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,775th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992).
98. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 28.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 28-29.
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quiring a new plan by the international community.
The United Nations mandated the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)
under Chapter VII of the Charter to use force to implement the distribution of humanitarian assistance under Resolution 794.102 The Security Council authorized UNITAF to use "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia.10 3 The United States commanded this mission, referred to as
"Operation Restore Hope." The nations supplying additional troops
funded the mission.104 The first troops were deployed on December 9,
1992 and swiftly took control over the famine-ridden areas of Somalia,
finally implementing the objectives of the 100-Day Action Pro105
gramme.
Although the UNITAF objective was to provide food for the starving
people of Somalia, early in the mission it became clear that food distribution alone was not enough.10 6 Troops discovered that unless disarmed, bandits and thugs would steal food intended for others, forcing
the UNITAF troops to confiscate weapons from the Somalis. 10 7 In addition, U.S. State Department officials had been facilitating "town meeting" discussions between community leaders to promote discourse between opposing sides. It was hoped that such talks could lay the
foundation for future resolution of the political differences in Somalia. 10S

With security ensured by the UNITAF troops, United Nations
agencies and non-governmental organizations undertook various activities in an attempt to rebuild Somalia. Efforts by UNICEF, the World
Food Programme, and the World Health Organization (WHO) focused
on providing nourishment and health care to the Somali.1 0 9 Other organizations worked to rebuild agricultural production and livestock,
through the distribution of supplies, tools, and the vaccination of the
livestock. 110 In addition to these efforts, the United Nations and other
agencies worked to reopen schools and to repair water sanitation systems. 1'
The mandate of UNITAF included attempting to reconcile and con102. .S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RESI794
(1992).
103. Id.
104. Keith B. Richburg, Broader U.S. Role Developing in Somalia, Americans Move
Beyond "Narrow Focus" to Take on Some Tasks of Civil Rehabilitation,WASH POST, Dec.
31, 1992, at Al6.
105. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 34-35.
106. Richburg, supra note 104.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 35.
110. Id. at 35-36.
111. Id. at 36.
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clude the conflict in Somalia. Talks were held in Addis Ababa in January of 1993, between leaders of the different factions. These talks resulted in the Addis Ababa agreements which included among other provisions a cease-fire, an agreement to disarm and hand over heavy
weaponry, and the establishment of a monitoring body to oversee these
activities."12 Nonetheless, one of the rival factions within the Somali
Patriotic Movement violated the cease-fire provision by moving troops
13
into Kismayo in February of that same year."
The Security Council mandated a United Nations led mission,
14
UNOSOM II, to take over upon the completion of UNITAF.1
UNOSOM II took over for UNITAF on May 5, 1993.1 15 UNOSOM II,
like UNITAF, permits the troops both to defend themselves and to use
force offensively when disarming. 116 Although the United States command ended with the completion of the UNITAF mission, over 3,000
United States troops remained in Somalia to serve under United Na117
tions command.
While UNITAF sought to relieve the starving and to avoid entanglement in the political problems of Somalia, 118 UNOSOM II intended
to participate in a broader range of activities. UNOSOM II was mandated to rebuild the economy, to reinstate political institutions ( including law enforcement), and to promote national reconciliation." 19
Not surprisingly various factions opposed this outside interference,
however well intended, who viewed particular policy choices as biased. 120 Unfortunately, opposition was not only expressed through
words but also through the use of force.
Despite efforts to deter violence against the Blue Helmets, Somali
factions continued to attack. After the death of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in June of 1993, the Security Council approved Resolution 837
which reaffirmed that "all necessary measures" could be employed
against those who attack UNOSOM II forces. 12' UNOSOM II forces
tried to disarm the factions. This created additional fighting between
the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance faction and

112. Id. at 38.
113. Report of the Commission of Inquiry establishedpursuant to resolution 883 (1993)
(investigating armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel). U.N. Doc. A/1994/653 (1994).
114. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 814].
115. Keith B. Richburg, U.N. Takes Command of Troops in Somalia, WASH POST, May
5, 1993, at A23.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 114.
120. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 49.

121. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,3229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993).
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122
UNOSOM II, and caused additional civilian casualties.

The pursuit of General Aidid, who led the USC/SNA faction, contributed to the decreasing support for the mission in Somalia. On June
17, 1993, Admiral Howe, the Special Representative for Somalia, issued
a warrant for the arrest of General Aidid because of the attacks against
UNOSOM II forces. On July 12, United States led United Nations
forces in attacking a suspected meeting place of Aidid, killing several of
his advisors. 123 The United Nations' legal department criticized the attack as an "unnecessary hostility." 124 These differing views on how to
handle the situation in Somalia, along with the death of United States
soldiers in October of 1993, set the stage for the departure of the United
States troops on March 26, 1994.125
After the United States and other European troops pulled out, the
United Nations mission unsuccessfully switched to a peaceful approach
in Somalia.1 26 In August of 1994, peacekeeping soldiers from India
were killed on several occasions. 127 In addition, efforts for national reconciliation continued to fail and violence increased throughout the
country. 128 Realizing that peace cannot be forced upon a nation, the
last United Nations troops left Somalia on March 3, 1994.129
IV.

LESSONS FROM RWANDA AND SOMALIA

A. Can reliance upon regionaland internationalinstitutions rather
than the unilateralaction of individual statesprevent threats to
internationalpeace and security?
Since unilateral intervention did not occur in Rwanda or Somalia,
comparing it to intervention by regional or international bodies is impossible. In both situations, the United Nations authorized the use of
force to prevent a threat to international peace and security. However,

122. Report of the Secretary-Generalon the implementation of Security Council Resolution 837. U.N. Doc. S/26022 (1993).
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1994, at Al.
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127. Statement by the President of the Security Council (concerning an attack on
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August 1994). U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/46, Aug. 25, 1994.
128. Keith B. Richburg, Africa in Agony, Somalia Slips Back into Bloodshed, Anarchy,
Death Toll Grow as U.N. Mission Winds Down, WASH POST, Sept. 4, 1994, at Al.
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the extent to which this intervention prevented the spread of violence
beyond the borders of Somalia and Rwanda, respectively, cannot be accurately gauged based on these two case studies.

B. Whether the questions presented in Nafziger's second article were
answered by the events which occurred in Somalia and Rwanda?
The questions raised by Nafziger focus on the scope of the Security
Council's power and the scope of any individual nation's power regarding humanitarian intervention. In both Somalia and Rwanda, the Security Council was essentially unrestricted in implementing humanitarian intervention, other than through the veto power of the Council's
members. States' consent may limit the discretion of the Security
Council, however, in a case where no government exists, obviously this
will not be a consideration. As a result, the Security Council is only
limited by their inability to convince its members that the reason for
humanitarian intervention meets the requirements under the United
Nations charter for the use of force.
The ability to unilaterally intervene has also not been more clearly
defined in either of these cases. As articulated in sub-section A, unilateral intervention was not proposed, but in Rwanda, France did decide to
intervene prior to approval by the United Nations. This suggests that
unilateral intervention may be permitted. On the other hand, the
seemingly unilateral action of the United States in pursuing General
Aidid faced criticism from the international community. Whether disapproval from the international community acts as a prohibition
against the act in question depends on the policy of the acting state.
Finally, the answer to whether the Security Council qualifies as a
"bully in a multilateral disguise" will depend entirely on the individual
to whom the inquiry is directed. The dictator of a country who faces opposition from an international offensive may argue that it is. On the
other hand, the innocent people seeking food, supplies, and security
would disagree with that characterization of the Security Council. This
question will certainly continue to be debated for many years to come.
V.

CONCLUSION

The events in Rwanda and Somalia exhibit the effect that international missions can have through humanitarian intervention. These
case studies demonstrate that despite the efforts of the international
community, without efforts on the part of the suffering nation permanent change will not last. In addition, the situations in Rwanda and
Somalia teach us that simply delivering food and hastily retreating does
not cure the problem or make a nation self-sufficient. No easy answers
exist in situations where dictators use long standing tribal conflicts to
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artificially divide the country and create public contempt for one particular faction . Nafziger raises many thought-provoking issues in regard to humanitarian intervention in the new community of power.
Unfortunately, the answers to these difficult questions tend to elude us.
The only certainty exists in the fact that these situations will continue
to arise, and the international community will have to struggle collectively in finding acceptable and long-lasting solutions.

